Political Science Quarterly

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Evelyn Z. Brodkin — Policy Politics: If We Can't Govern, Can We Manage?

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From the Editor:

In this issue. . .

KENNETH E. SHARPE examines the impact of the Reagan administration's foreign policy on the post-Vietnam reforms meant to restore a balance between the President and Congress in foreign policy making.

EVELYN Z. BRODKIN illuminates the character and far-reaching political implications of policy making that occur indirectly through administrative means. She considers whether this form of policy making constitutes an institutional adaptation to weaknesses in political mechanisms for resolving contentious policy issues.

M.E. AHRARI examines the role of Congress and public opinion in the making and unraveling of American synfuels policy.

H.W. BRANDS, JR., analyzes three cases of American armed intervention: Lebanon in 1958, the Dominican Republic in 1965, and Grenada in 1983. He identifies similarities in the three applications of military force and offers suggestions for a theory of intervention.

ELAINE K. SWIFT uses current hypotheses about how career goals shape congressional behavior to see whether they apply to the 1789 to 1899 period in the House of Representatives. She finds that they do not.

JOSEPH A. PIKA places the recent expansion of White House liaison with interest groups into historical context by examining the ties of Jewish and black groups with Presidents Roosevelt and Truman.

ROBERT J. ART in this brief review essay examines Joshua Epstein's analysis of the Reagan administration's FY88 Defense Budget. He finds Epstein's prescriptions for how we can have more defense for less money to be right on target.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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The Post-Vietnam Formula under Siege: The Imperial Presidency and Central America

KENNETH E. SHARPE

The Iran-contra affair made public an abuse of executive authority that began in 1981. The deeper issues raised by the trading of arms for hostages and the diversion of profits to the contras, however, harken back to the Vietnam period. The impact of the Vietnam war on our constitutional democracy, which culminated in the Watergate scandal and Richard Nixon's resignation, served as a warning of the dangers of an imperial presidency. This article evaluates the lessons learned, the reforms instituted in the aftermath of Vietnam, and indicates what it is necessary to do now.

Different people drew different lessons from the Vietnam-Watergate scandals. Some blamed the abuse of executive power on the character flaws of the President and his closest advisers, and saw the solution as their removal from office. Others saw the problem as weak laws and sought legislation to strengthen Congress's power to check executive abuses and to legislate foreign and domestic policy. Reforms that I loosely call the post-Vietnam-Watergate formula were enacted to ensure that presidential abuse of power would be less likely to again endanger constitutional democracy in the United States. Others, like Senator J. William Fulbright, supported legislative action but argued that this was not enough. The problem, they argued, was political, not legal. Congress lacked the will to enforce its constitutional authority in foreign policy. An exercise of that will required a challenge to the direction of foreign policy, and the president, drawing on his often self-

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proclaimed authority as commander in chief, was often able to take foreign policy steps that created a *fait accompli* and made the exercise of that will even harder. As long as a condition of permanent cold-war crisis prevailed, it would be difficult to defend the authority of Congress against usurpation by the president and the national security bureaucracy he managed.

The Reagan administration's conduct of Central American policy provided the first sustained test of the post-Vietnam-Watergate formula. It demonstrated the continued willingness of the executive branch to abuse its authority in foreign policy and suggested the limits of legislative reform when not backed by a strong congressional will.

The Imperial Presidency and the Post-Vietnam-Watergate Formula

> In no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be found, than in the clause which confides the question of war or peace to the legislature, and not to the executive department. . . . [T]he trust and the temptation would be too great for any one man. . . . War is in fact the true nurse of executive aggrandizement. In war, a physical force is to be created; and it is the executive will, which is to direct it. In war, the public treasures are to be unlocked; and it is the executive hand which is to dispense them. In war, the honours and emoluments of office are to be multiplied; and it is the executive patronage under which they are to be enjoyed. . . . The strongest passions and most dangerous weaknesses of the human breast; ambition, avarice, vanity, the honourable or venial love of fame, are all in conspiracy against the desire and duty of peace. [James Madison][1]

The Constitution leaves fundamental issues to be settled by practice, precedent, and judicial review. There has been continual dispute over the balance of power in foreign policy making. One of the major conflicts has been over efforts to reconcile the war-declaring power of Congress and the war-making power of the president. The decision to declare war was given to Congress for the reasons Madison outlines above. Yet the Founding Fathers understood that this restriction would not impede the executive from repelling attacks against the country in the absence of a formal declaration of war. Over the decades presidents drew on their constitutional authority as commander in chief to claim increasingly unchecked authority in the case of such "defensive" wars. But what did it mean to repel an attack? Was it just to defend American borders from actual invasion? Did it include preventive wars to stop a possible attack? And who was to determine how likely that possibility was? Was an attack on U.S. citizens or property outside the United States the kind of attack a president could by himself decide to repel? What was the distinction between a "defensive" war and a "preventive war"? Were such wars justified only in areas immediately bordering the United States? Or any place in the hemisphere? Or the world?

The system of checks and balances in the foreign policy arena was in Edwin

[1] Cited in Christopher H. Pyle and Richard M. Pious, *The President, Congress and the Constitution* (New York: The Free Press, 1984), 287.

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S. Corwin's words "an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy."[2] Over more than two centuries of struggle a pattern has emerged: the executive has enlarged its foreign policy powers at the expense of Congress; and Congress has reacted to reassert its constitutional prerogatives when the dangers to its institutional authority have become clear. The long-term effect of such conflicts, however, has been the gradual enlargement of executive power.

The shift in the balance toward the executive began to take on alarming proportions in the cold-war decades that followed World War II. The executive developed a large independent peacetime national security apparatus whose centerpiece was the National Security Council (NSC) created in 1947. Also critical was the establishment of the Defense Department (which integrated all the services) and the giving of legislative authority to a Joint Chiefs of Staff system and to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

As the security apparatus grew and cold-war tensions mounted, the executive branch became increasingly unaccountable to Congress, the press, and the public in the making of foreign policy. Congress generally acquiesced. The rough consensus over foreign policy goals and the seeming imperatives of national security muted fundamental criticism of the shift of power to the executive. The executive branch increasingly bypassed the treaty-making authority of Congress through the use of secret executive agreements. The CIA developed into an apparatus that not only gathered intelligence but secretly carried out foreign policy, often using covert operations to overthrow foreign governments and assassinate foreign leaders. The president, the Pentagon, the CIA, the NSC, and even the State Department felt less obliged to give Congress and the public information about foreign policy issues.

President Lyndon B. Johnson's commitment of half a million U.S. troops to Vietnam under the Tonkin Gulf Resolution demonstrated how far Congress had abdicated its constitutional prerogative. In 1969 President Richard M. Nixon took the executive interpretation of war powers even further than Johnson by authorizing the bombing of Cambodia. The next year, in the face of clear congressional sentiment to terminate the war in Indochina, he authorized a U.S. invasion of Cambodia, claiming authority as commander in chief and invoking the need to protect U.S. troops. A few years later the Watergate revelations showed that the problem of executive secrecy and abuse of power went even further, putting, Henry Steele Commager wrote, other fundamental principles at risk.

> By countenancing burglary, wiretapping, *agents provocateurs*, the use of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency and even the Internal Revenue Service to punish "enemies," Mr. Nixon sought to substitute his own fiat for law.
>
> By attempting to impose, for the first time in our history, prior censorship of the press, by threatening hostile television stations with deprivation of their licenses . . . Mr. Nixon presented the most dangerous threat to the Bill of Rights in the whole of our history.

[2] Edward S. Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers* (New York: New York University Press, 1940), 200.

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> By corrupting presidential elections through the solicitation of illegal contributions, by a systematic campaign of mendacity, trickery and character assassination against opponents . . . Mr. Nixon gravely endangered the integrity of our republican system of government.[3]

The reaction was growing support for impeachment and an attempt to strengthen constitutional democracy. A set of three related commitments—a post-Vietnam formula—were embodied in new laws, procedures, and institutional arrangements. One commitment was to get access to information about executive activities, a necessary condition for checks and balances to work. A second was to restore congressional legislative authority in foreign policy and strengthen congressional checks on potential abuses of authority at home and abroad. A third commitment was to limit the possibilities for political repression and violations of civil liberties and civil rights, about which I have written elsewhere.[4] This article will focus on the first two commitments.

Access to information. The conflict between secrecy and disclosure has had a long history. The recurrent pattern was demonstrated in 1798 when Benjamin Franklin Bache of the Philadelphia *Aurora* published a secret dispatch from the French to the secretary of state in order to show that the French wanted peace and the John Adams administration wanted war. He was arrested for seditious libel, and Congress was spurred to pass the Sedition Act. The issue then and for later generations was not the government's right to secrecy; *The Federalist* No. 64 argued that executive secrecy was vital in diplomatic negotiation and in "the business of intelligence." Rather it was whether or not the suppressed information was really vital or was suppressed in order to prevent an informed citizenry from making its own decisions and to protect the government from public opposition. When Congress passed the Espionage Act in 1917, it sought to prevent its misuse by overzealous presidents when it rejected a provision that would have made it a crime to publish information that "might" be used by the enemy. Instead it demanded proof that the person disclosing information had "reason to believe" it could be used "to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation."[5] Congress's power to gain access to information through investigation was strengthened by a 1927 Supreme Court decision stating that a legislative body "cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislative is intended to affect or change. . . ."[6] But the problem of the balance between secrecy and disclosure deepened during and after World War II with the development and expansion of a classification system for information, a specialized national security bureaucracy with a vested interest in secrecy, and the widespread fear of Communist agents and subversion.

[3] Henry Steele Commager, *The Defeat of America* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974), 155–156.

[4] Morris Blachman and Kenneth Sharpe, "De-Democratizing Foreign Policy: Dismantling the Post-Vietnam Formula," *Third World Quarterly* 8 (October 1986).

[5] Cited in Arthur Schlesinger, *The Imperial Presidency* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), 338.

[6] McGrain V. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927).

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Only a few members of Congress were willing to take up the battle of disclosure versus secrecy during this time. But Congress was shaken out of its lethargy by Vietnam and Watergate.

One legislative response was to require certain critical information. The 1973 War Powers Resolution demanded that the president inform Congress in writing within forty-eight hours of introducing troops (in the absence of a declaration of war) into areas of hostilities or where imminent involvement in hostilities was likely. The reasons for introducing the troops, the legal authority justifying the introduction, and the scope and duration of the commitment had to be specified.

The 1974 Hughes-Ryan Amendment (amended again in 1980) required that the president report in "a timely fashion" all CIA covert operations other than intelligence gathering to appropriate committees. And legislation in 1976 and 1977 created Select Intelligence Committees in the Senate and House respectively. This allowed some oversight and control by the Congress, and there were mechanisms under certain circumstances for public disclosure of the classified information given to the committees.

The ability of the president to make secret executive agreements was limited by the Case-Zablocki Act of 1972, which required all executive agreements to be reported to Congress. In 1974 Congress also required that arms sales be so reported. If the president declared a national emergency, Congress required him to inform it of the specific laws under which he proposed to act, to file with Congress all executive agency rules and regulations, and to account for expenditures. Congress also strengthened the Freedom of Information Act in 1974 to provide for judicial review of decisions by executive agencies to keep all parts of a document classified.

Perhaps more important than the specific statutes was the general commitment Congress made to watch presidential actions more carefully and to use its existing powers as leverage to demand that foreign policy decisions be shared. The greater size and foreign policy expertise of staff members were also important. Such staff provided independent sources of information and allowed concerned members of Congress to use existing mechanisms better to provide oversight of foreign policy.

Restoring Shared Control. The new commitment to get access to information was aimed at allowing Congress increased participation in the making of foreign policy and a greater ability to check executive excesses. Constitutionally, much of the necessary power was already in the hands of Congress: the authority to declare war, to advise and consent on treaties and appointments, and the ultimate "check" through its power of the purse. But Congress was concerned about the various mechanisms or precedents that had developed to allow the president to circumvent congressional control. Of particular concern was an old problem in the struggle over foreign policy—the ability of the president to create situations that *forced congressional acquiescence* and created an antecedent, a *fait accompli*, which limited Congress's will and ability to use its existing powers. Alexander Hamilton had recognized that "the executive in the exercise of its constitutional powers, may establish an antecedent state of things, which ought to weigh in the

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legislative decision," a situation which Madison feared could create a dangerous shift in the congressional balance.[7]

In 1846 President James Polk sent U.S. troops into an area contested by Mexico and Texas. When they were predictably attacked by Mexican soldiers, he forced Congress's hand. In 1907 Theodore Roosevelt sent the fleet around the world in the face of strong congressional opposition, but Congress had to give the funds for fuel and supplies to bring it back. During and after World War II, congressional acquiescence allowed a dangerous growth of the president's prerogative as commander in chief. Corwin wrote after the war:

> there is Presidential initiative *and* Presidential initiative—that type which, recognizing that Congress has powers—great powers—in the premises, seeks to win its collaboration; and that type which, invoking the "Commander-in-Chief" clause proceeds to stake out Congress's course by a series of *faits accomplis*.[8]

In the cold-war years this kind of initiative, in which the president presented Congress with a *fait accompli*, grew more and more common. Presidents involved the United States in full-scale war by first committing troops to foreign lands (Truman in Korea, Kennedy and Johnson in Vietnam) and then arguing that the troops could not be abandoned or that commitments made had to be honored to protect American credibility. Presidents increasingly made secret executive agreements that bound the United States to certain foreign policies without congressional debate and authorization. Presidents ordered covert operations that involved the United States in policies that Congress could disown only at the risk of seeming to undermine national security. By the late 1960s the president had an unprecedented ability to create an antecedent state of things; and the argument that Congress had to stand by presidential commitments had a much more important place in U.S. foreign policy than in the past.

Congress attempted to hold the president accountable by insisting on full consultation and shared decision making *before* the policy die was cast. Some of this was handled legislatively. For example the War Powers Act aimed to "insure that the collective judgement of both the Congress and the President will apply" to the decision to send U.S. troops into hostilities by insisting that the president consult with Congress "in every possible instance" *before* the troops are introduced.[9] The Senate Foreign Relations Committee described the resolution as "an invitation to the executive to reconsider its excesses, and to the legislature to reconsider its omissions, in the making of foreign policy."[10]

Congress also established procedures by which the new access to information

[7] Cited in Schlesinger, *The Imperial Presidency*, 19.

[8] Edward S. Corwin, *Total War and the Constitution* (New York: Knopf, 1947), 33.

[9] The War Powers Resolution, Public Law 93-148, 93rd Congress, 1st sess., J.J. Res. 542, 7 November 1973; reprinted in Pat M. Holt, *The War Powers Resolution, The Role of Congress in U.S. Armed Intervention* (Washington, D.C.: The American Enterprise Institute, 1978), 43-48.

[10] Cited in Holt, *The War Powers Resolution*, 4.

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could be used to insist on participation or to stop the president. For example, the Senate and House Intelligence Oversight Committees could try to dissuade the CIA from continuing covert operations by using their control of authorizations for intelligence activities, or by revealing such operations, or by taking the issue to the House or Senate to pass legislation specifically forbidding or cutting appropriations for the activity. The Clark Amendment in 1976 (abolished in 1985), for example, prohibited assistance for military or paramilitary operations in Angola. Similarly, Congress could block or force the modification of executive agreements by denying funds to implement them.

Perhaps the strongest measure was the provision of the War Powers Resolution that required the unauthorized use of troops to stop automatically. The resolution recognized that a president might have to act without congressional authorization in emergencies, but did not want such extraordinary circumstances to become an ordinary route for circumventing Congress. The War Powers Resolution required the president to terminate any unauthorized use of troops within sixty days unless Congress took affirmative action to approve it. The sixty days starts upon submission of the required report to Congress—a wrinkle that puts the starting of the clock in the hands of the president.

The new formula that emerged after Vietnam and Watergate represented concern both about the *process* of foreign-policy decision making and about the *content* of foreign policy. There was an awareness in Congress, and later in the Carter administration, that Third World turmoil was often caused by local conditions of poverty and repression, and that a "North-South" perspective was more realistic than an "East-West" perspective. Critics of the Vietnam policy were wary of sending U.S. troops to fight in Third World countries where the goals were not clearly defined and the conflict was unpopular at home. Many were opposed to supporting corrupt, repressive regimes and sought instead to condition foreign military and economic aid on a regime's human rights performance.

These new commitments to both process and content allowed Congress to take a more aggressive role in shaping Central American policy than it had in shaping early Vietnam policy. In the Carter administration this was most visible in the compromises and policy changes the administration was forced to accept in order to get congressional approval of the Panama Canal treaties and of economic assistance to the new Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. But a much more serious and sustained test came when the Reagan administration took office. Its willingness to aid repressive regimes facing domestic turmoil troubled many in Congress, and its emphasis on a military strategy in Central America raised the spectre of the involvement of U.S. troops in "another Vietnam." Moderates in Congress were particularly worried that the commitments being made to El Salvador (and later to Honduras and to the Nicaraguan exile army) would eventually draw in U.S. troops. They did not count on the War Powers Resolution alone; they understood that presidential initiatives could make it difficult to oppose the President if he sent troops. They wanted to participate from the very beginning in shaping policy.

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Central America: A Test Case for the Post-Vietnam Formula

The post-Vietnam formula, like the Constitution itself, was open to interpretation. Would Congress share in shaping the overall direction of foreign policy, in the "takeoffs" as well as the "crash landings"?[11] Would Congress be able to prevent the executive from creating a crisis – an antecedent state of things – over which it could not easily exert its constitutional authority? Could Congress expect the executive to be forthright and candid in providing information about what it was doing and why? Would the executive respect congressional statutes and stay within the bounds of the law?

El Salvador

From 1981 until 1984, Congress attempted to participate in shaping El Salvador policy by making military aid conditional on certain requirements. The president had to certify that the Salvadoran government was "making a concerted . . . effort to comply with internationally recognized human rights," was "achieving substantial control over all elements of its armed forces, so as to bring an end . . . to indiscriminate torture and murder," was "making continued progress in . . . land reform," and was "committed to the holding of free elections."[12]

The conditionality requirement was weak: once the president certified, aid was automatically released. But the requirement made clear the broad opposition in Congress to aid for a repressive, reactionary regime; and it underlined the widespread belief that real reform was the only way to stop revolution. Presidential certification every six months also forced a certain public accountability, and the congressional hearings around each certification provided for careful scrutiny of administration facts and stimulated through media coverage public debate and education.

The administration, however, provided false and misleading information in order to certify that the conditions required for aid existed, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Further, it refused to put serious pressure on the Salvadoran military to end its human rights abuses. To pick but one example, it repeatedly denied the well substantiated charges (confirmed by its own internal documents) that thousands of civilian noncombatants were being killed by government forces and "death squads" organized or aided by top military officials.[13] When Congress

[11] Senator Arthur Vandenberg had advised President Truman: "Let us in on the takeoffs if you want us in on the crash landings." Cited in James Sundquist, *The Decline and Resurgence of Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), 300.

[12] U.S. House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 1st sess., International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Section 728(b).

[13] See Jim Leach et. al., *U.S. Policy in Central America: Against the Law?* (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus, 11 September 1984), 9–13; The Central America Crisis Monitoring Team, *In Contempt of Congress, The Reagan Record of Deceit and Illegality on Central America* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1985), 32–37.

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renewed the certification requirement in November 1983, Reagan pocket vetoed the bill while Congress was not in session and, therefore, had no opportunity to override it. The congressional response to such efforts to undercut or eliminate certification was weak. A majority would not support strengthening such legislation, and there was only limited willingness to use the power of the purse to cut aid even when the certification conditions were being violated.

The Reagan administration sought to avoid further scrutiny and opposition by refusing to comply with the requirement of the War Powers Resolution that the president report to Congress within forty-eight hours of when U.S. troops are introduced "into hostilities or into a situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances." While such reporting had also been avoided by Ford and Carter, neither had presented such systematically false information about the actual situation of U.S. troops. The Reagan administration maintained "we are not putting our people in a situation where there is any imminent danger of hostilities."[14] But in fact, U.S. military personnel were stationed in brigade headquarters throughout zones of conflict, traveled to the site of combat, came under fire on at least eight separate occasions by early 1985, flew reconnaissance missions over Salvadoran battlefields, and participated in naval interdiction activities in the Gulf of Fonseca.[15] Congressional critics pointed to the evidence, but they were unable to generate widespread concern.

Congress's ultimate leverage in the foreign policy process is in the power of the purse. From 1981 until mid-1984 a majority in Congress often did seek to limit military appropriations to El Salvador. The President, however, used a number of mechanisms to increase vastly military assistance outside the regular or supplemental appropriations process. In March 1981, for example, he used his defense drawdown authority to tap special funds earmarked for military emergencies and increased congressionally authorized military aid to El Salvador by $20 million. Congress had only appropriated $5.5 million. He then used his authority to reprogram budgetary allocations to send another $5 million in military aid and $44.9 million in economic support funds. For fiscal year (FY) 1982, Congress only appropriated $27 million and turned down an administration supplemental request for another $35 million. But in February 1982, the White House, claiming that the guerrilla destruction of aircraft at the Ilopango air base created an emergency situation, used its special defense drawdown authority to dispatch $55 million to El Salvador—over twice the amount Congress had authorized.

In each case the President was obeying the letter but not the spirit of the law. The special funds he drew on for military aid were put aside by Congress for use in emergency situations at presidential discretion. Although there was no emer-

[14] Langhorne Motley, before the House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, 2 May 1984; cited in Central America Crisis Monitoring Team, *In Contempt of Congress*, 39.

[15] Jim Leach, George Miller, Mark O. Hatfield, *U.S. Aid to El Salvador: An Evaluation of the Past, A Proposal for the Future* (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus, February 1985), 6, 24.

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gency in these cases, the President defined them as such in order to circumvent a congressional debate on supplemental appropriations that he was likely to lose. Similarly, reprogramming—which requires only that the appropriations committees be informed of executive budget reallocations and not object within fifteen days—was designed to give the bureaucracy flexibility in reallocating funds among budget categories, not to provide a way to circumvent congressional debate on controversial aid authorizations. Yet the large volume of often legitimate reprogram requests makes it nearly impossible for the committees to quickly evaluate how funds are being allocated.[16] House leaders eventually grew critical of such circumventions. In 1983, the Appropriations Committee cut the reprogramming request for $60 million down to $30 million. House leaders warned the President not to continue to use his special drawdown authority to fund unauthorized military aid to El Salvador.

The administration tried another tack. In early 1984 it came to Congress with a request for an emergency supplemental appropriation for $93 million; Congress approved $61.75. Secretary of State George Shultz claimed that the Salvadorans were "running out of supplies right now" and other officials stated that "without these funds, the El Salvadoran Armed Forces will either go back to the barracks or collapse."[17] It turned out there was no emergency; $32 million of military aid already in the pipeline could have been diverted if necessary, and much of the emergency supplemental aid was used to expand the army by building new units.[18]

The 1984 and 1985 elections in El Salvador radically changed the character of congressional-executive relations. The election of José Napoleón Duarte, a recognized reformer, reinforced the administration's definition of the government as centrist and reformist. Many moderates grew reluctant to oppose aid, despite evidence that the military, not Duarte, was still the real power in El Salvador and that military corruption and repression were continuing. Congress approved the administration's aid requests. This aid, and particularly the aggressive air mobile tactics it provided, enabled the Salvadoran military severely to limit the guerrillas' offensive capabilities. This, in turn, reassured Congress that the aid was not making U.S. military intervention more likely. The admistration continued to provide misleading and false information about the economic and political situation in El Salvador, the growing isolation of Duarte from his own supporters, and above all the repression by the military. There was some decline in politically-targeted death squad killings, but the White House denied the documented killing and forced

[16] Initially the committees treated all such requests as routine and trusted the executive to use this budgetary discretion reasonably. The first full analysis of the reprogramming abuses was not done until the Senate Democratic Policy Committee Special Report, "Foreign Aid to Central America FY 1981-1987," 18 February 1987.

[17] Leach et.al., *U.S. Aid to El Salvador*, 4.

[18] Ibid., 4-5.

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displacement of civilians by air and ground operations. Congress made few attempts to scrutinize administration claims publicly.[19]

Honduras

Administration attempts to avoid congressional scrutiny and debate by circumventing the normal appropriations process and tightly guarding information were even more serious in the case of aid to Honduras. During U.S. maneuvers in Honduras, for example, the Defense Department used funds out of a budget category called Operations and Maintenance (which is supposed to function as petty cash, not major military financing) to train and equip Honduran forces and to build permanent basing facilities. In 1984 the House Committee on Appropriations protested:

> the Comptroller General found that funds appropriated for operation and maintenance of our armed forces were used for military construction projects, security assistance activities, and civic action and humanitarian assistance. The Committee believes such diversion of funding from properly appropriated purposes is unwarranted and directs that the Department of Defense take such steps as necessary to prevent recurrence of such improprieties in the future.[20]

Furthermore, the maneuvers, which began in August 1981, turned out to be nearly continuous and thus had the effect of permanently stationing 700 to 1000 U.S. military personnel in Honduras and thousands more on ships off the coast—all without congressional consultation or authorization. As the character of these activities became public, some in Congress raised their voices.[21]

Although the issue was generally fought on narrow legal grounds, the larger concern involved the circumvention of Congress on foreign policy decisions of major importance. The administration was in effect using the maneuvers to put military pressure on the Sandinistas and to turn Honduras into a forward basing area for possible use against Nicaragua and perhaps El Salvador. In doing so, it was not only militarizing Honduras, but putting U.S. military personnel geographically close to such areas of high conflict as the Nicaraguan border. Had the administration presented this larger plan to Congress for funding in 1982, it would have been brought under great scrutiny given the concern over war powers. The presence of fifty-five advisers in El Salvador was frequently scrutinized and became an informal limit. When Congress tried to bring such activities under its

[19] See, for example, Kenneth E. Sharpe, "El Salvador Revisited," *World Policy Journal* 3 (Summer 1986): 473–494.

[20] H.R. Rep. No. 1086, 98th Cong., 2d sess. 40–41 (1984).

[21] Representative Ronald Dellums (D. Calif.) and Senator James Sasser (D. Tenn.), for example. See Philip L. Shepherd, "Honduras" in Morris J. Blachman, William M. LeoGrande and Kenneth Sharpe, *Confronting Revolution: Security Through Diplomacy in Central America* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 133.

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scrutiny in 1984 by requiring prior notification as to "the complete U.S. construction plan for the region," the administration supplied as little information as possible.[22] A January 1986 follow-up report by the General Accounting Office showed some compliance with congressional requirements but documented a series of new accounting procedures and mechanisms that allowed further circumvention.[23]

Nicaragua

U.S. policy making toward Nicaragua illustrates graphically how emerging patterns of congressional-executive relations are undermining the intent of the post-Vietnam formula. If one began the examination of congressional participation in Nicaragua policy in 1985 or 1986, it would seem that the administration had at least respected the important procedural commitments of the post-Vietnam formula. The White House came to Congress and asked for money to aid Nicaraguan exiles fighting to overthrow the Sandinista regime. After long public debate, in 1985 Congress approved $27 million in nonlethal military support and logistical supplies, and in 1986, $100 million (70 percent military). But the story began much earlier. Indeed, if the President had come to Congress in 1981 and asked for funds to *create* an exile army to pressure or overthrow the Sandinistas, it would have been very difficult to have secured congressional authorization. What happened in the Nicaraguan case was the creation of an antecedent state of things that made it difficult (although not impossible) for Congress to say no by 1985. The mechanisms by which the administration got the funding that created this situation demonstrate even more clearly than the Honduras and El Salvador cases how secrecy, distortion, and circumvention were used by the executive to avoid accountability, consultation, and debate.

On 23 November 1981 President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 17 and a secret finding that was submitted to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees informing them that $19.95 million in CIA funds would be used to support 500 contras who would infiltrate Nicaragua to interdict purported arms flows to Salvadoran rebels. By so informing these congressional committees, the administration was carefully responding to the letter of the law. These committees did not protest, because the interdiction rationale made sense to members concerned to contain a leftist revolution supported by the Nicaraguans.

While some in the administration may have initially supported the program simply to interdict arms, major actors such as the exiles the CIA was funding, CIA operatives in the field, and hardliners in the administration had a very different purpose—to overthrow the Sandinista regime. This view became even more prevalent as the operation grew in 1982 and 1983. The so-called hard and soft liners,

[22] Leach, et. al., *U.S. Policy in Central America*, 31–32.

[23] Comptroller General of the United States, Report B-213137, "DOD Use of Operations and Maintenance Appropriations in Honduras," submitted to Representative Bill Alexander, 30 January 1986.

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mostly in the State Department, did not approve of attempts to overthrow the Nicaraguan government, but saw building up the contras as a way of creating a credible threat with which to pressure the Sandinistas to bargain over security issues and ultimately over the internal character of their regime. But the broad purposes of Nicaragua policy were not presented to the congressional committees for scrutiny and debate. It was only in the following years, as congressional opposition built, that the administration quietly introduced the pressure logic. The President's public position until the 1985 congressional debates was that "we are not doing anything to overthrow the government of Nicaragua."[24]

An effort to misinform or deceive Congress was always an important element of administration policy. But secret wars are never secret from the people being warred on and are not long secret from Congress and the American public. As early as 4 December 1981, articles began to appear in the American press about the covert U.S. action. They were soon followed by information from Florida about training camps for the contras and then by reports from the field about contra activities. As the press revealed the scope and character of contra activities, the House Intelligence Committee sought to limit American aid to its original purpose. In December 1982, Representative Edward Boland (D. Mass.), chairman of the committee, introduced language (the Boland Amendment) into the Continuing Resolution for fiscal year 1983 prohibiting the use of funds "for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua."[25]

The administration's response was to *expand* contra operations to include sabotage raids on such targets as oil supplies and port facilities. While acknowledging that the aim of the contras might be to overthrow the Nicaraguan government, the administration insisted that it was within the law because *its* purpose in giving the aid was arms interdiction, not overthrow.[26] The Democratic leadership in the House grew angry, and in 1983 the House Intelligence Committee voted to cut off all funds.

The Republican-controlled Senate Intelligence Committee refused to go along with a total cutoff, and a cap of $24 million was put on contra aid for fiscal year 1984. But the administration circumvented congressional spending limits: certain expenses like the mining of Nicaragua's harbors were charged to other accounts; an airfield for the contras was built in Aguacate, Honduras, as a part of a Defense Department exercise and then made available to the contras as a logistics and transportation center; and the Defense Department donated aircraft to transport sup-

[24] Doyle McManus and Robert Toth, "The Contras: How U.S. Got Entangled," *Los Angeles Times*, 4 March 1985.

[25] The language he introduced was the same as the language his Intelligence Committee had already introduced in its confidential statements to the administration shortly before the congressional debates. Boland publicly introduced his amendment to block other legislation that would have cut funds off completely. It was meant to warn the administration that its expansion of the program would not be tolerated; the committee was not yet ready to support the cutoff of all funds.

[26] Leach, et. al., *U.S. Policy in Central America*, 4.

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plies to contra bases and transferred ships, planes, and guns to the CIA at little or no charge.[27]

Some members of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees were particularly disturbed in 1984 when they discovered that the administration had violated the reporting requirements of the 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act by failing to inform the committees of the decision to mine Nicaraguan harbors. In September 1984, Congress learned of a CIA manual entitled "Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare." Its explicit instructions for "neutralizing" Sandinista officials and "creating martyrs" for the contra cause underlined reports from the press and human rights organization about contra terror. In October 1984, the House Intelligence Committee forced the Senate committee, in conference, to accept the Boland Amendment, now carefully worded to avoid administration circumvention:

> During the fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement or individual.[28]

It was agreed that aid could only be restored by a majority vote in both houses after February 1985.

Again the administration circumvented the law. The National Security Council helped organize and advise a *private* aid network to fund the contras. According to some administration officials, the plan was approved both by National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane and the President. Marine Lt. Col. Oliver North, a member of the National Security Council staff, was put in charge. North helped reorganize and coordinate operations of the two main rebel groups, gave tactical advice, helped the contras raise millions in private and secret public funds, and arranged for supplies and contributions to reach the contras.

While there was consternation among contra aid critics and Congress threatened to hold hearings, nothing was done to sanction North and little could be done to undo his work. The White House, in the words of Representative Michael Barnes (D. Md.), stonewalled, refusing, for example, to release requested documents on its management of the private network and circumvention of the Boland Amendment. It was not until the Iran-contra affair broke in late 1986 that Congress and the press began to uncover the full details of the National Security

[27] See, for example, ibid., 5–6. In September 1984, for example, the Defense Department was discovered transferring three Cessna OA2 noncombat aircraft to a top secret Joint Chiefs of Staff operation code named "Elephant Herd." The planes were officially declared "excess" and dropped from the air force's inventory roster. Having officially disappeared, they were then flown to the New York State National Guard, and next to a CIA contractor who fitted the aircraft with rocket pods for combat. They were then delivered, via intermediaries, to the contras. Blaine Harden and Joe Pichirallo, "CIA Said to Supply Planes to Nicaraguan Rebels," *Washington Post*, 15 September 1984.

[28] Jonathan Fuerbringer, "U.S. Aide's Ties to Contras Challenged," *New York Times*, 5 September 1985.

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Council's involvement in circumventing Congress. It became clear that millions of dollars in profits made on secret arms sales to Iran were diverted to supply the contras; that the NSC had been involved in secretly raising millions for the contras from foreign governments (Saudi Arabia, Brunei); and that National Security Adviser Admiral John Poindexter and a top official at the State Department (Elliot Abrams, assistant secretary of state for Latin America) and the CIA (including Director William Casey) were also involved. It was further revealed that the contra operation was the centerpiece of an even larger covert effort labelled "Project Democracy" authorized by President Reagan in the January 1983 National Security Decision Directive No.77; and that North and private individuals had set up "the enterprise," an extra-government agency (described by North as an "off-the-shelf, self-sustaining, stand-alone entity") to finance and carry out intelligence operations all over the world outside normal government control.[29]

Between 1984 and 1986, as the NSC was circumventing the congressional ban, the CIA was also secretly giving the Nicaraguan rebels aid. More than $1.5 million went for "political" operations to finance "security," a radio station, and to seek political and financial support in Europe and Venezuela. The CIA also helped carry out the elaborate contra supply operation run by the NSC (dramatically revealed after a plane was shot down in October 1986 and American mercenary Eugene Hasenfus was captured by the Nicaraguans and put on trial) and actively tried to reorganize and strengthen contra activities in Costa Rica.

Although full details did not emerge until late 1986 and early 1987, by early 1985 there was enough information for Congress to demand that future funding of the "covert" war be openly debated and legislated through normal channels. This debate was different from the one on El Salvador, because Congress viewed rollback much more critically than containment. U.S. involvement in overthrowing a foreign government raised both moral issues and fears of dragging U.S. troops into a quagmire.

When forced to fight openly for aid, the administration's strategy was to insist that there was no alternative to the contras—and that even the negotiations insisted upon by moderates needed the force of the contras to back them up. There were two elements to this strategy. One was a somewhat successful administration effort to impose its definition of reality on the situation. The internal character of the regime in Nicaragua was presented as so abhorrent and the security threat as so great that any opponent of Reagan administration efforts could be delegitimized as soft on both security and communism. The administration did not hesitate to lie and distort reality in order to create the image it wanted.[30] As

[29] John Tower, Edmund Muskie, and Brent Scowcroft, *The Tower Commission Report* (New York: Bantam Books and Time Books, 1987), appendix C, 450-479; Joel Brinkley, "Iran Sales Linked to Wide Program of Covert Policies," *New York Times*, 15 February 1987; Fox Butterfield, "North Says Casey Proposed Using Arms Profit for Fund Kept Secret from President," *New York Times*, 11 July 1987; Elizabeth Drew, "Letter from Washington," *New Yorker*, 31 August 1987, 71-89.

[30] See, for example, Americas Watch, *Human Rights in Nicaragua, Reagan, Rhetoric and Reality* (New York: Americas Watch, July 1985); Joel Brinkley, "Nicaraguan Army: 'War Machine' or De-

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ideology and distorted information replaced fact, rational debate about the means and ends of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua became increasingly difficult. The more the Democrats accepted the purpose of policy as getting the Sandinista regime out of power (as opposed to negotiating security issues, for example), the more difficult it became to offer an alternative other than the contras.

The second element of administration strategy was systematically to scuttle all efforts at negotiated settlements—the efforts of the Contadora countries (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama) for example—that recognized the legitimacy of the Nicaraguan government.[31] By destroying all other alternatives, the contras were made to seem the only alternative.

Important to both elements of this whole strategy, however, was the fact that the contras already existed: this *fait accompli*, brought about covertly, was what gave the administration its leverage in the important votes in 1985 and 1986.

When contra aid came before Congress in April 1985, the House narrowly defeated the administration request. But on 12 June, seventy-three Democrats abandoned the House leadership and joined 175 Republicans in supporting a compromise package that banned lethal military aid and restricted CIA involvement in disbursing the aid. A number of the Democrats were conservative southerners who felt that voting against the aid would make them vulnerable to charges that they were "soft on communism." Alluding to this issue, majority leader Jim Wright (D. Tex.), who himself opposed the aid, said that "to some degree" the country was going through an era reminiscent of McCarthyism. "Nobody wants to be portrayed as friendly toward Communism."[32]

Many moderate Democrats and Republicans reversed their votes because they felt ill at ease at turning down the President's request in April without providing an alternative. "A good many of our guys," said Wright "don't believe in waging war to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua, but they feel some responsibility to those doing the fighting."[33] This was how the administration had defined the issue, and it was reinforced shortly after the April vote when Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega flew to Moscow to ask for more aid. Representative Steward B. McKinney (R. Conn.), who reversed his vote, explained, "There are those of us here who have to recognize the fact that the contra movement against an oppressive dictatorial society does exist. We cannot walk away from it."[34] Others believed that the contras could provide leverage for a negotiated political settlement, which the President claimed he sought. Representative Bill Richardson (D. N.M.),

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fender of a Besieged Nation?" *New York Times*, 30 March 1985; and Central America Crisis Monitoring Team, *In Contempt of Congress*, 11-29; and Blachman and Sharpe, "De-democratising Foreign Policy."

[31] See William M. LeoGrande, "Rollback or Containment?" *International Security* 2 (Fall 1986): 89-120.

[32] Steven V. Roberts, "House Reverses Earlier Ban on Aid to Nicaragua Rebels; Passes $27 Million Package," *New York Times*, 13 June 1985.

[33] Steven V. Roberts, "House Gets Compromise on Rebel Aid," *New York Times*, 9 May 1985.

[34] Steven V. Roberts, "A Consensus on Rebel Aid," *New York Times*, 14 June 1985.

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who switched his vote, said, "I think the President of the United States for the first time is saying that he is for negotiations and meaning it."[35]

By the time the crucial vote for $100 million in contra aid came up in the House in March 1986 (it was defeated 222–210) and in June (it passed 221–209) the hook of commitment had already been sunk. While the majority of Democrats (about 183) opposed any aid, the thirty or so crucial swing votes accepted administration arguments that the contras could not be abandoned and that they were a useful tool for pressing negotiations.

In both June 1985 and June 1986, the arguments that swayed middle-of-the-roaders would not have made sense if a huge contra army had not already been created and if other alternatives had not been undermined or defined out of existence. Administration policies had created the very "antecedent state of things" that the post-Vietnam formula had sought to avoid by insisting that important foreign policy decisions be shared from the beginning by Congress and the president. This situation had been created by the kind of circumvention, secrecy, and deception the post-Vietnam formula had sought to check.

The efforts to win continued funding in late 1987 were still undecided as this article goes to press. The Iran-contra scandal seriously weakened the administration's credibility and angered Congress at the way in which lying, distortion and law breaking had been used to circumvent congressional authority. The peace plan proposed by President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica was signed by the five central American countries in August of 1987 (despite administration opposition) thus creating, at least temporarily, an alternative. The administration's arguments were the same as they had always been—and a crucial element was still the already existing state of things, but one to which Congress had now committed itself. "The Congress of the United States has made a moral commitment to these men," President Reagan argued in a speech to the Organization of American States. "It cannot just walk away."[36]

The Post-Vietnam-Watergate Formula Reconsidered

It took the shock of the Iran-contra scandal—the administration's trading of arms for hostages and the diversion of the profits to fund the contras—to finally move Congress into action against years of executive abuse of authority. Why did the post-Vietnam legislation itself fail to reestablish congressional balance and check such abuses? The implicit answer given by the congressional committees investigating the scandal was that the problem must have been either bad people or bad laws. Is "this unseemly chapter in our history" the result of "well-intentioned, patriotic zealots" asked Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D. Hawaii, chairman of the Senate committee), or are we here today because of the inadequacy of our laws and our Constitution?"[37]

[35] Ibid.

[36] "Reagan on Contras: 'Strive and Struggle,'" *New York Times*, 8 October 1987.

[37] "Closing Remarks by Leaders of Panels: A Litany of Mistakes," *New York Times*, 4 August 1987.

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There is no question that individual character contributed to the violations and abuses. And better laws (tightening the War Powers Act, tougher regulations for CIA oversight, legally limiting the NSC staff to an advisory role) could help tame such individual abuses. But the problem is not simply one of laws. Arthur Schlesinger noted in 1973 that the president, like Gulliver, could break loose of even a thousand small legal strings. "The effective means of controlling the Presidency lay less in law than in politics. For the American President rules by influence; and the withdrawal of consent, by Congress, by the press, by public opinion, could bring any President down.[38]

This conclusion is apt today. When Congress, the press, and the public were willing to exercise political power, the post-Vietnam formula often worked. It helped Congress get access to information needed to participate in the making of foreign policy, and it ultimately helped cut off the private funding network in the aftermath of the Iran-contra revelations. But more often than not, Congress was unwilling to exercise its potential power. It did not demand to participate in ways that would have limited the president's ability to create an antecedent state of things or to break and circumvent the law.

Mistrust of executive information led members of Congress to use existing institutional mechanisms of oversight (requests for GAO reports on contra corruption, committee hearings on misuses of military maneuver and construction funds, etc.) and to create new mechanisms to generate and crosscheck information (the certification procedures on El Salvador). A number of reporters did investigative reports that in turn were used by members of Congress. Further, the requirement that the intelligence committees be informed of covert operations proved very important. Although information on the covert war was publicly available through the press almost immediately after it began, these committees provided an institutional locus for information gathering and accountability. Their recognition that the scope was expanding beyond arms interdiction, and later that serious actions had *not* been reported as the law demanded, led first to committee restrictions on aid, then to support of restrictive legislation on the floor of the House, and finally to a cutoff of funds.

But it is important to note that the public outcry and initial opposition in Congress to the covert war were stimulated by press coverage. The intelligence committees did not initially take leadership: they could have objected to the covert aid, warned the President that they would bring their objections to the floor for debate, and then, if the President still insisted, actively led a floor fight. Instead, these committees allowed themselves to be used by the President to create an antecedent state of things that then limited later debate on the contra war and on other major war-making operations carried out in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Angola.

What of the post-Vietnam commitment to *restore constitutional checks and balances* in foreign policy? Congress only sometimes insisted on full consultation

[38] Schlesinger, *The Imperial Presidency*, 409–410.

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and participation and rarely reacted forcefully to presidential efforts to break or evade the law. Congressional efforts to make the formula work were important in forcing a reluctant President to allow congressional participation in the making of policy toward El Salvador from 1981 to 1984. Congress ruled out the sending of U.S. troops to quell a leftist revolution. And until the Duarte election, Congress used the power of the purse to restrict funding. Congress, however, was unwilling to confront forcefully the actions of the executive that broke the letter of the law, violated its spirit, or circumvented the constitutional prerogatives of Congress. Congress did not blow the whistle on the certification charades or reprogramming circumventions in El Salvador. What happened in Honduras was worse, exactly what the post-Vietnam formula was designed to prevent: the creation of conditions, an antecedent state of things, which committed the United States to a foreign policy without the participation of Congress. But even when Congress discovered that the circumventions and legal violations were creating a *fait accompli*, it did little more than slap the hand of the executive, warn that such actions must not be done again, and put some restrictions on the use of funds. It did not authorize dismantling the bases, nor did it seriously interfere with the use of maneuvers to build infrastructure in Honduras or permanently station U.S. troops there.

The greatest violation of the spirit of the War Powers Act was in the Nicaraguan case. Not only did the contra effort pose an immediate danger of creating an antecedent state of things that could draw in U.S. troops, it also established a dangerous precedent for the conduct of foreign policy. Using covert action as a central instrument of American foreign policy, where the only congressional checks were intelligence committees whose oversight function was never meant to cover generalized war, meant that crucial foreign policies were initiated and conducted in a highly secret, unaccountable way. Misrepresenting the size and mission of the contras (arms interdiction) and failing to meet reporting requirements (the mining, the terror manual) made things worse. When Congress cut off funds, the White House circumvented Congress's power of the purse by helping to organize a private funding network and managing it for over two years.

An important foreign policy commitment was established with minimum scrutiny and public debate. Congress by and large acquiesced and failed to act, even when information was brought to it that private funding was circumventing its decisions and that high members of the National Security Council were helping to coordinate this effort. The few members who protested were unable to get enough support to investigate publicly, let alone stop such executive actions. The President, acting as commander in chief, took incremental actions that slowly created an antecedent state of things. Congress lacked the political will to block the small steps, even though legally it could have done much more. Gradually, commitment by accretion made it more difficult for Congress to share control of policy making.

Conclusion

The failure of the post-Vietnam formula to check executive abuse of authority

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was not simply due to the character of the legislation. Senator Fulbright's 1972 observation is just as true today: "It is not a lack of power which has prevented the Congress from ending the war in Indochina, but a lack of will."[39] We need to explain why Congress has not been more vociferous and forceful in using the institutional mechanisms and authority it has to prevent executive disregard for the commitments of the post-Vietnam formula. There are a number of explanations given in the general literature on Congress and foreign policy: the fragmentation of the foreign policy process within Congress, the president's ability to shape and present information, and the difficulty of rallying congressional opposition to small encroachments of its authority.

There is some truth in all of these explanations, but there is also a more fundamental problem. On the one hand, Congress faces a hard-to-control national security apparatus dedicated to maintaining U.S. hegemony and largely unchallenged by the post-Vietnam reforms. The powerful intelligence and security agencies created after World War II embodied norms of secrecy, speed, unity, and efficiency that were antithetical to constitutional democracy. On the other hand, there is no "anti-imperial" political coalition strong enough to force Congress to check the executive and to enforce legislation against the security bureaucracy.

A coalition to reform substantively the security apparatus must challenge the foreign policy that justifies the existence of the apparatus itself. Arthur Schlesinger has argued:

> The Imperial Presidency was essentially the creation of foreign policy. A combination of doctrines and emotions—belief in permanent and universal crisis, fear of communism, faith in the duty and the right of the United States to intervene swiftly in every part of the world—had brought about the unprecedented centralization of decisions over war and peace in the Presidency.[40]

While the post-Vietnam commitment did include a reluctance to commit troops and some tolerance for leftist regimes, moderates and conservatives still shared the same underlying strategic vision—revolutionary regimes of the left were antithetical to U.S. global interests. The U.S. still had the right and responsibility to maintain its hegemony and to minimize the chances of leftist outbreaks and takeovers. The difference between moderates and conservatives was over means, not ends. Moderates saw local repression and poverty as the causes of revolution and argued for human rights and economic development—a position similar to the old Alliance for Progress. Conservatives saw Soviet-backed intervention and subversion as the causes of revolution. They argued for primarily military responses to Third World revolutions. And no one argued for substantial change in the national security apparatus that planned and administered so much of foreign policy.[41]

[39] Senator J. William Fulbright, *The Crippled Giant, American Foreign Policy and its Domestic Consequences*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), 194.

[40] Schlesinger, *The Imperial Presidency*, 208.

[41] For a detailed discussion see Blachman, et al., *Confronting Revolution*, chaps. 12 and 13.

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When the Reagan administration came into office it inherited the existing security bureaucracy and brought back the conservative version of the strategic vision. It emphasized not simply the containment but rollback of leftist governments ("The Reagan Doctrine"). In this context, the New Right and the Reagan administration could draw on a continued fear of communism and fears of declining U.S. power and hegemony once again to define debate in terms of cold-war assumptions. Such assumptions made it difficult for many of the middle-of-the-road swing voters in Congress to resist the President's persistent demands for a proxy army strategy against Nicaragua. Especially after he created an antecedent state of things, they found themselves trapped between their opposition to communism and their opposition to U.S. troop commitments, between "no more Cubas" and "no more Vietnams." Accepting the end of undermining the Sandinistas and seeing no alternative means except the contras, they were open to persuasion.

If cold-war assumptions make it difficult to challenge the executive on specific issues, they make it extremely hard even to put the restructuring of the national security bureaucracy on the political agenda, let alone to challenge its organization and vision against a well-organized and entrenched right. As long as moderates and conservatives both share the assumption that the United States has the right and responsibility to keep (or get) leftist revolutionary regimes out of power, they are trapped into supporting a chronic cold war and the means necessary to carry it out — a largely unaccountable and uncontrollable imperial president and the security apparatus he manages. As long as cold-war assumptions guide policy, Schlesinger argued, there will be a demand "for concentration of authority, secrecy, speed and discretion in the Presidency."[42] And "in a country chronically at war, as America has been for the last three decades" wrote Senator J. William Fulbright in 1972, "even the most energetic and ingenious means of reasserting Congressional prerogative will of themselves prove insufficient to the maintenance of constitutional government."[43]*

[42] Schlesinger, *The Imperial Presidency*, 298.

[43] Fulbright, *The Crippled Giant*, 241.

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Policy Politics: If We Can't Govern, Can We Manage?

EVELYN Z. BRODKIN

Samuel P. Huntington once suggested that the proper question for the study of politics was not "who governs?" but "does anyone govern?" He and others since have argued that, broadly speaking, no one does, because the institutions of governance are both too weak to manage a modern political economy and too porous to restrict the demands made upon them.[1] Among the results are political deadlock and policy paralysis. While these manifestations of ungovernability are readily apparent, so too has been the tendency to "muddle through" without precipitating the governability crisis that some scholars anticipated.

One might reasonably expect serious consequences to ensue if legislative deadlock prevents policy responses to a changing political economy. But what if policy disagreements that are not resolved legislatively do not end there, as the "paralysis" argument implies, but find alternative forms of expression and resolution? The purpose of this article is to explore an alternative form of policy politics (the politics of what policy should be)[2] that occurs in administrative form, largely be-

[1] See Samuel P. Huntington, "The United States" in M. Crozier, S.P. Huntington, and J. Watanuki, eds., *The Crisis of Democracy* (New York: New York University Press, 1975); Anthony King, "The American Polity in the Late 1970s: Building Coalitions in the Sand" in A. King, ed., *The New American Political System* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978); and James L. Sundquist, "The Crisis of Competence in Our National Government," *Political Science Quarterly* 95 (Summer 1980).

[2] In policy politics, the question at issue is "What should policy be?" In contrast, partisan politics is concerned with which political party will win office, and system politics involves how decision struc-

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yond the legislative limelight. It begins with the proposition that when policy conflicts are not resolved legislatively, they may reemerge in administrative form where they become more manageable. Rephrasing the initial questions, I ask: "If we can't govern, can we manage?"

At a system level, the administrative form of policy politics is significant because it suggests that bureaucracies may have adapted functionally to institutional weaknesses that at times confound legislative attempts to resolve policy conflicts.[3] Such an adaptation also has implications for the institutional mechanisms that link the citizen and the state. At a policy level, this form of politics is significant, because it embodies changes in the structure and terms of conflict that ultimately influence policy outcomes.[4]

This article begins with a brief account of the institutional weaknesses that necessitate alternatives to legislative means of resolving policy conflicts. Second, it considers the resources and processes that enable administrative bureaucracies to manage policy politics. Third, it illustrates these processes with reference to the case of administrative welfare reform.[5] It concludes with questions about the limits to and desirability of this administrative form of policy politics.

Policy Politics in Disarray

Since Huntington and others first declared a "governability crisis" in the mid-1970s, there has been considerable effort to define and analyze weaknesses in political institutions of the state purported to contribute to disarray and even stalemate in the policy-making process.[6] In part, these institutional weaknesses are associated with the decline of political parties, which traditionally provided an institutional means of articulating and aggregating interests. The widely-discussed manifestations of this decline include party decomposition accompanied by political disor-

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tures will be set up. See Aaron Wildavsky, "The Political Economy of Efficiency: Cost-Benefit Analysis, Systems Analysis, and Program Budgeting," *Public Administration Review* 26 (December 1966): 304.

[3] In this sense, policy politics in administrative form serves a latent, system-maintaining function. For a discussion of Parsonian functionalism, see Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, 2nd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1968). To argue, as I do, that this adaptation may be system functional is not to argue that it is normatively desirable.

[4] For the classic elaboration of this relationship, see E.E. Schattschneider, *Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960).

[5] Many of the arguments in this article are derived from my study of administrative welfare reform and in some parts excerpted from my work on that subject. See Evelyn Z. Brodkin, *The False Promise of Administrative Reform: Implementing Quality Control in Welfare* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986).

[6] See, for example, Walter Dean Burnham, "American Politics in the 1980s," *Dissent* 27 (Spring 1980); Huntington, "The United States"; Anthony King, "Overload: Problems of Governing in the 1970s," *Political Studies* 23 (June/September 1975); Christopher Lasch, "Democracy and the 'Crisis of Confidence,' " *Democracy* 1 (January 1981); James O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973); and Sheldon S. Wolin, "The People's Two Bodies," *Democracy* 1 (January 1981).

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ganization and electoral demobilization. When a growing proportion of citizens do not vote or when their votes are disassociated from meaningful clusters of policy issues, the role of elections as a means of linking the citizens to the state becomes highly problematic.

The policy-making capacity of the state is further diminished by the structural and political fragmentation of Congress. Members generally have insufficient incentives and capacity to resolve political conflict over policy in such a way as to establish coherent and responsive national policy. Instead, legislators (especially those in the House) are increasingly oriented toward their subcommittee domains, parochial interests, and to the constituency-service functions that assure them reelection.[7] Walter Dean Burnham describes this phenomenon in terms of the withering of

> . . . traditional partisan channels connecting the rulers and the ruled, across the great fault lines at the center known as "separation of powers" . . . .[The] fragmented pluralism this constitutional structure encourages keeps growing. Political executives, legislators, and judges have every incentive to go into business for themselves and for their clients; and they do.[8]

If Congress cannot resolve policy conflicts and manage the affairs of state, neither can the president. Yet, from the perspective of the governability crisis theorists, the president is the only institutional figure representing a national constituency and potentially in a position to formulate timely and coherent policy responses to national problems.[9] However, presidential authority is limited by the separation of powers. And, as the party system decays, linkages between the "party-in-the-electorate," the "party-in-Congress," and the "party-in-the-White House" also erode. The consequence is that presidential efforts to direct national affairs tend to become bogged down in institutional stalemate.[10]

These weaknesses in the interest-aggregating, conflict-resolving, and policy-making institutions of governance assume critical proportion as the responsibili-

[7] See Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, *Congress Reconsidered,* 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1985); Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *Home Style* (Boston: Little Brown, 1978); and David R. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974).

[8] Burnham, "American Politics in the 1980s," 149.

[9] See Samuel P. Huntington, "Congressional Responses to the 20th Century" in David B. Truman, ed., *Congress and America's Future*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1973) and Huntington, "The United States"; King, "Overload: Problems of Governing in the 1970s"; and Sundquist, "The Crisis of Competence in Our National Government."

[10] The degree to which the administration's legislative strategy has succeeded is a matter of considerable debate. See, for example, Francis Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, *The New Class War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981); Ira Katznelson, "A Radical Departure? Social Welfare and the Election" in T. Ferguson and J. Rogers, eds., *The Hidden Election* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981); John L. Palmer and Isabel V. Sawhill, eds., *The Reagan Record* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984); Fred I. Greenstein, ed., *The Reagan Presidency: An Early Assessment* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983).

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ties of the state increase and the demands of its citizens multiply and intensify. Anthony King refers to this as the "democratic overload,"[11] reflecting both the extension of the state into spheres that were formerly left to individuals and the marketplace and also inadequate restraints on the opportunities for citizens to make demands on the state. According to Huntington's analysis, this produces a crisis of authority resulting from:

> . . . a substantial increase in governmental activity and a substantial decrease in governmental authority. . . . Paradoxically, . . . this working out of the democratic impulse was associated with the shift in the relative balance in the political system between the decline of the more political, interest-aggregating, "input" institutions of government (most notably, political parties and the presidency), on the one hand, and the growth in the bureaucratic, regulating and implementing, "output" institutions of government, on the other.[12]

Others see weaknesses in the political institutions of the state adding up to a crisis of legitimacy.[13] From this perspective, government is unable to act authoritatively, at least in part because it lacks the basis of political support that is maintained by the democratic institutions that link the citizen to the state. Claus Offe asserts that "while the institutional link between the individual and the state has been attenuated . . . , the actual links between the state and the individual become ever more direct.[14] As the state role in social welfare and economic management becomes more intrusive and more transparent, its actions become politicized and difficult to legitimate, particularly as democratic means of acquiring authority decline.

Accepting for the moment that both authority and legitimacy are essential attributes of governance, there are reasons to believe that the American system of governance is in trouble on both counts.[15] First, political forms of interest-aggregation and resolution have deteriorated. Second, the state's role in managing the political economy has become more intrusive and more politicized, particularly as fiscal constraints require zero-sum choices among competing interests. Third, under these circumstances, policy-making institutions are unable to provide coherent or consistent policy direction. Finally, government is apt to have

[11] King, "Overload: Problems of Governing in the 1970s."

[12] Huntington, "The United States," 64.

[13] See, for example, Burnham, "American Politics in the 1980s"; Ira Katznelson, "The Crisis of the Capitalist City: Urban Politics and Social Control" in W. Hawley, M. Lipsky and others, eds., *Perspectives on Urban Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1976) and Katznelson, "A Radical Departure?"; Claus Offe, *Contradictions of the Welfare State* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984).

[14] Claus Offe, "The State, Ungovernability and the Search for the 'Non-Political,' " paper presented at the Conference on the Individual and the State, Toronto, Canada, 1979, 21.

[15] Offe suggests that the "crisis" theories of right and left converge in certain descriptive aspects. For example, he points to "general agreement" on the existence of a crisis, "its symptoms and course of development." For an interesting account of similarities and dissimilarities among so-called crisis theorists, see Offe, *Contradictions of the Welfare State*, chap. 2.

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difficulty sustaining legitimacy when its political institutions cannot manage policy conflict and its bureaucratic institutions cannot deliver on policy promises.[16]

Offe has hypothesized that when the political institutions that link the citizen to the state become attenuated, "alternative political forms both of the articulation of conflict and the resolution of policy issues appear."[17] But how is one to recognize and evaluate these alternative forms? A first step is to specify the attributes of an alternative form of policy politics that would be functionally adaptive to the institutional weaknesses described earlier, that is, one that could avoid contentious political questions, overcome institutional stalemate, and legitimate governmental action.

From the previous discussion, it is possible to derive attributes for an alternative form of policy politics. Among them, such an alternative should be able to: depoliticize and obscure policy making that could otherwise mobilize political opposition; derive legitimacy from nonpolitical sources; and overcome impediments to implementation by working directly through the bureaucracies that deliver public policy. In the following sections, I will consider whether administrative agencies have developed any of these attributes and, if so, whether they make political conflict over policy more manageable.

Policy Politics in Administrative Form

In order to understand how bureaucracies might manage policy politics, one must first understand the relationship between policy making and policy delivery. Although these two processes are often treated as if they were distinct stages of the policy process, this perspective undervalues the role of the bureaucracy as policy maker. It is bureaucratic discretion that provides the opportunities for administrative institutions to make policy, a role that in some circumstances is formally authorized and in others is largely unacknowledged.

Sources of Discretion

Bureaucratic discretion is a feature of the administrative state that deservedly has received a great deal of analytic attention. The New Deal model of administration raised bureaucratic discretion to a virtue, favoring the rationalization of policy decisions on the basis of expertise. Expertise was to be insulated from central political control, as reflected in the popularity of independent regulatory commissions during the New Deal.[18] This idealized Wilsonian vision of government divided

[16] Sundquist discusses some of these problems under the rubric of a "crisis of competence." See Sundquist, "The Crisis of Competence in Our National Government."

[17] Offe, "The State, Ungovernability and the Search for the 'Non-Political,' " 9.

[18] For classic and modern discussions of the New Deal model, see James M. Landis, *The Administrative Process* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1938); and Bruce A. Ackerman and William T. Hassler, *Clean Coal/Dirty Air* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981), especially chaps. 1–2.

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into separate spheres of administration and politics has generally been discredited, leaving the difficult task of accounting for the discretionary activities of administrative agencies both normatively and empirically.

In part, administrative discretion has been incorporated into political theory as part of interest-group politics. Agencies are recognized as participants in bargaining over policy as advocates of a particular constituency or on behalf of bureaucratic interests, such as power, fiscal resources, autonomy, and so forth. Administrative discretion exercised in this context is part of what Emmette Redford refers to as

> . . . subsystem or intermediary politics . . . involving the interrelations of bureaus and other administrative operating agencies, the counterpart congressional committee structure, and the interest organizations, trade press, and lobbyists concerned with a particular area of program specialization.[19]

So pervasive is the bureaucracy's role as a quasi-independent political actor that, according to Theodore Lowi, it has been incorporated within the justifying ideology of "interest-group liberalism."[20]

However, bureaucratic discretion is not limited to matters calling for the provision of expert advice nor to interest-group bargaining. It has a more direct application when the agencies that implement policy, in practice, *make* policy by giving it operational meaning. In part, this is a logical necessity, given the complexity of the tasks that government undertakes through its bureaucracy. However, in part, it is the result of political conditions that effectively have vested greater policy authority in the bureaucracy.

Policy complexity provides a partial explanation for the wide range of bureaucratic discretion. It would be impossible to legislatively delineate policy in such detail that bureaucratic discretion could be eliminated. Nor might that be desirable with respect to flexibility and adaptiveness. There are inherent trade-offs between reducing bureaucratic discretion through specification of rules and regulations, on the one hand, and inducing either rigidity or confusion, on the other hand. For many federal programs, the rules are already so voluminous that their managers become bogged down in paper work. Or, administrative criteria may be so detailed and complex that they are virtually inaccessible to those who must apply them.

It is reasonably straightforward to justify bureaucratic discretion that has the manifest purpose of avoiding rigidity or unwieldiness. However, there is another source of bureaucratic discretion that requires political explanation. That is the discretion that derives from the tacit delegation of policy-making authority by Congress, which Lowi has criticized. He blames it in part on "typical American politicians [who] displace and defer and delegate conflict where possible; they face conflict squarely only when they must." But they prefer to delegate "as far down the

[19] Redford, *Democracy in the Administrative State*, 83.

[20] See Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States*, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1979).

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line as possible."[21] This propensity is expressed in the enactment of vague and ambiguous legislation that, according to Lowi, appears more the product of logrolling and compromise than of authoritative decision making.

Another source of discretion derives from the relative autonomy with which public bureaucrats operate under certain circumstances. This is well documented in the case of "street-level bureaucrats" who deliver services.[22] In the field they find many opportunities to exercise "unauthorized discretion," that is, they may behave in ways that intentionally or unintentionally subvert policy objectives, even loosely defined ones. When bureaucratic interests—for example, in a simpler work routine, in greater power over their clients, or in personal autonomy—conflict with those of management, they have the resources to act on their own behalf, rather than as agents of their organizations.

For example, Michael Lipsky maintains that under certain conditions policy actually is made from the bottom up.[23] The street-level bureaucrats who deliver policy are most likely to make policy as well when their jobs involve exercising substantial discretion, choosing among multiple objectives and tasks, and changing established practice. In this context, lower-level bureaucrats influence policy's shape and substance as they give it operational meaning.

Bureaucratic discretion, regardless of its source, provides the means for administrative agencies to make policy by shaping it as they implement it. The mechanisms through which this occurs are the operational decisions made to convert policy into action. Operational decisions come in many shapes and vary in importance. They may occur through formal processes (regulation) or informal ones (decision rules) and may originate at the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy or at the bottom. In addition, regardless of their form and origin, they may be either systematic or unsystematic in their policy effects. It is only when they are systematic that one can speak of informal bureaucratic policy making. Informal bureaucratic policy making is politically significant because it largely operates outside the reach of most safeguards and most citizens. In contrast, formal policy making is generally subject to procedural safeguards that protect against bureaucratic abuses of discretion and, to a greater or lesser degree, invite public participation and scrutiny.

For example, informal bureaucratic policy making may occur in the form of a production problem. Phillipe Nonet describes how the Industrial Accident Commission (IAC) responded to increased claims for worker compensation by shortcutting its quasi-judicial deliberative procedures.[24] Employing the rationale that

[21] Ibid., 55.

[22] See Michael Lipsky, *Street-Level Bureaucracy: The Dilemmas of Individuals in Public Services* (New York: Sage, 1980).

[23] See Michael Lipsky, "Standing the Study of Public Policy Implementation on Its Head" in W.D. Burnham and M.W. Weinberg, eds., *American Politics and Public Policy* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978).

[24] See Phillipe Nonet, *Administrative Justice: Advocacy and Change in a Government Agency* (New York: Sage, 1969), chap. 2.

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"justice delayed is justice denied," the IAC used a variety of informal tactics to "dissuade, if not prevent . . . parties from asserting their rights" in commission proceedings. Commission members curbed the use of continuances, discouraged cross-examination of experts, and informally pressured claimants to settle privately (which usually meant for less compensation).

Ironically, mechanisms manifestly intended to improve policy delivery by improving productivity may have the most adverse systematic policy effects. For example, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) inspectors must meet productivity requirements that specify a certain number of factory inspections per month. It is a reasonable requirement aimed at insuring that workers are protected from exposure to contaminants, as the law provides. But what if under pressure of productivity requirements, an OSHA inspector takes shortcuts on inspection visits, failing to follow up suspect but not overtly impermissable factory practices, or shortening testing time for monitoring air quality so that contamination cannot be detected? Now, what if cuts in OSHA's budget have been distributed so as to drastically reduce the number of inspectors? One might well assume that if productivity pressures intensify across the board, shortcuts will become common practice among the beleaguered inspectors. Although the coping responses of those street-level bureaucrats occur individually, in the aggregate they would follow a consistent pattern and produce systematic policy effects.[25]

The most important lesson to draw from these examples is that apparently unsystematic and uncoordinated bureaucratic behaviors, manifestly neutral administrative processes, or minor changes in administrative routine may produce systematic policy effects. As Charles Lindblom has pointed out, even small-scale, incremental policy changes may produce substantive and non-incremental policy effects.[26]

Discretion as a Resource

Thus far I have examined the relationship between policy delivery and *de facto* policy making within administrative agencies. Formal policy making (statutory) sets the boundaries within which informal policy making (bureaucratic) occurs.[27] However, these boundaries are blurred when legislation is vague and broadly worded and when Congress delegates difficult choices to the agencies that implement policy. The actions that administrative agencies take to operationalize policy are imbued

[25] For an interesting analysis of the policy effects of OSHA inspection practices, see Jonathan A.K. Cave and Carol Adaire Jones, "Regulatory Standards: Re-examining the Cost/Benefit Critique," paper presented at the Annual Research Conference of the Association for Public Policy and Management, Austin, Texas, October 1986.

[26] See Charles A. Lindblom, "Still Muddling, Not Yet Through," *Public Administration Review* 39 (November/December 1979).

[27] See Martin Rein and Francine Rabinowitz, "Implementation: A Theoretical Perspective" in Burnham and Weinberg, eds., *American Politics and Public Policy.*

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with political significance because they embody policy choices. If administrative agencies were to manage policy politics, then they ought to be able to reduce the volume and difficulty of issues, limit participation, and provide an alternative to political forms of conflict resolution. I will offer some broad generalizations about how administrative agencies may perform these functions more or less effectively.

Administrative agencies are able to limit participation in policy making, in part by transforming policy making into a series of apparently uncoordinated, diffuse, operational activities. As the preceding examples indicate, policy making that occurs as a by-product of bureaucratic routine, lower-level coping mechanisms, and informal decision rules is difficult to identify analytically, much less challenge politically. This, of course, is a virtue in terms of managing political conflict over policy. Bureaucratic policy making circumvents the pitfalls of explicit policy making (such as that which occurs in the legislature) precisely because it is incremental and obscured.

Administrative agencies also reduce the volume and intractability of issues by transforming them into non-issues. For example, they tend to avoid making explicitly allocative decisions. But they nevertheless distribute governmental benefits and services as a consequence of operational decisions that are manifestly nonpolitical. In addition, administrative agencies may work in tandem with politicians who try to depoliticize policy choices by reframing them to appeal to widely-shared values. For example, campaigns against "fraud, waste, and abuse" have been used quite effectively to implement administrative changes that cut social entitlements.[28] Because the manifest purpose of campaigns against fraud, waste, and abuse is virtually unarguable and its latent, political functions difficult to observe, activities occuring as part of antifraud campaigns are relatively well insulated from political opposition.

In addition, policy making that occurs in the administrative arena is participation-limiting, because when conflict is transferred to that arena it is also transformed and the salient issues redefined as administrative, technical, or scientific. On this point, Offe asserts that "as soon as an issue is institutionally defined as requiring scientific advice and expertise, the scope of legitimate participants is drastically reduced."[29] Even those who argue that "participation [is] good for the soul of the citizen . . . [and] necessary for the viability of democracy" have difficulty reconciling this view with the technical intricacies involved in resolving "technically intensive public policy disputes."[30] Harvey Brooks, writing on this issue, concludes that

> . . . it is unrealistic and impractical to appeal every issue—especially complex, technically oriented issues—to a public process. To be meaningful, public participation must

[28] See, for example, Brodkin, *The False Promise of Administrative Reform*; and Evelyn Brodkin and Michael Lipsky, "Entitlement Programs at the Local Level: Quality Control in AFDC as an Administrative Strategy," *Social Service Review* 34 (March 1983).

[29] Offe, "The State, Ungovernability and the Search for the 'Non-Political,' " 9.

[30] Harvey Brooks, "The Resolution of Technically Intensive Public Policy Disputes," *Science, Technology and Human Values* 9 (Winter 1984): 46.

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be conducted on a highly selective basis, thereby promoting experts as the principal actors in most public policy decisions involving technical information.[31]

Although political opposition may mobilize around a technical issue, as has occurred in cases of environmental standard setting and risk management, the battle tends to be defined scientifically. Even when courts appear to have intervened decisively in such cases, they may effectively end up turning the matter back into the hands of the bureaucrats, because they fail to fully grasp the technical issues at stake.[32]

Finally, if administrative agencies provide an alternative to political forms of policy resolution, it is not only because they can make policy without seeming to, but also because they can legitimate their actions by representing them to be nonpolitical. One would expect the greatest degree of nonpolitical legitimation to be required for those administrative activities that are most visibly policy-relevant, such as regulation. The array of technical trappings within which environmental regulations are made (cost-benefit analysis, risk assessment, and so forth) may be necessary to provide nonpolitical justification for allocative decisions as well as to provide information to decision makers.[33]

To summarize, when contentious policy issues are transferred to the administrative arena, administrative agencies have the opportunity and the need to manage policy politics as they manage policy delivery. Administrative activities may be undertaken in the name of a manifestly nonpolitical purpose. They even may appear to be ad hoc and initiated at the lower reaches of the bureaucracy. Nevertheless, these activities may produce systematic policy consequences, which in the aggregate *become* policy. Administrative agencies make policy politics manageable by depoliticizing policy choices, limiting participation in the policy-making process, making policy without appearing to, and legitimating their activities on the basis of widely held, nonpolitical values.

This is not to suggest that some cynical conspiracy underlies all administrative activity. Quite the contrary, administrative agencies may manage policy politics even when bureaucrats within them are both manifestly and actually working toward the nonpolitical purpose they purport to be or even when their behaviors would appear to be, in the aggregate, nonpurposeful. An example of the latter would be standard operating procedures that emerge as a by-product of mechanisms that street-level bureaucrats develop to cope with multiple demands. Even these behaviors, viewed at a broader level, may have systematic effects that serve a latent, political function. Take the case of welfare workers who cope with burdensome caseloads by treating clients in a perfunctory way or even rudely. The

[31] Ibid., 49.

[32] See R. Shep Melnick, *Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air Act* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution).

[33] See Stephen R. Thomas and John C. Bailar, III, "What Are We Doing When We Say We're Doing Risk Analysis?" in A.D. Woodhead, C.J. Shellabarger, V. Pond, and A. Hollaender, eds., *Assessment of Risk from Low-Level Exposure to Radiation and Chemicals* (New York: Plenum, 1985).

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effect of such behaviors may be to discourage requests for help and, thus, effectively "ration" access to ostensibly available social entitlements.[34]

On the other hand, at times public officials consciously and systematically manipulate the bureaucracy in pursuit of political objectives. Striking examples are contained in descriptions of the administrative presidency strategy detailed by Richard Nathan.[35] The essential premise of this strategy is that policy objectives can and should be pursued through bureaucratic means and that this process can be directed from the White House. Nathan credits the Nixon administration with first devising this strategy to counter what it perceived as congressional and bureaucratic resistance to the President's policy objectives. The administrative presidency strategy envisioned making policy from within administrative agencies by influencing their routine operations, thereby avoiding legislative scrutiny and obscuring the thrust of disputed presidential policy initiatives. As Nathan explains:

> Nixon came to the conclusion sometime in 1971 that in many areas of government, particularly domestic affairs, *operations is policy*. Many day-to-day management tasks for domestic programs—for example, regulation writing, grant approval, and budget apportionment—are substantive and therefore involve policy. The White House counterbureaucracy could not penetrate deeply enough into the operations of government on any kind of systematic basis to effect these essentially managerial processes. Gaining greater control over agency policy setting and managerial processes was the aim of Nixon's administrative presidency strategy in his second term.[36]

In this case, the "benefits" of managing policy politics would not be primarily diffuse or system-functional. Rather they were intended to accrue directly to the executive. The administrative presidency strategy reemerged during the Reagan administration, which despite its more successful legislative initiatives also pursued its policy objectives by administrative means.[37] The continued use of this strategy also underscores a growing appreciation of the tactical, political value of the bureaucracies that deliver policy. It also may be taken to indicate that the bureaucracy's role in managing policy politics is not merely a short-term phenomenon.

The management of policy politics may be part of an intentional, directed strategy. However, it may be even more pervasive, and arguably more politically significant, as part of an undirected but systematic response to weaknesses in the political institutions of policy making. This undirected, administrative form of policy politics is more difficult to examine empirically. However, precisely because it is less visible, it may be the more functional in terms of the difficulties of governability discussed earlier.

[34] See, for example, Jeffrey Prottas, "The Cost of Free Services: Organizational Impediments to Access to Public Services, *Public Administration Review* 41 (September/October 1981).

[35] See Richard Nathan, *The Administrative Presidency* (New York: John Wiley, 1983).

[36] Ibid., 45–47.

[37] For a general discussion of the Reagan administration's use of this strategy, see Nathan, *The Administrative Presidency*, chap. 6. For an interesting analysis of this strategy as applied to environmental policy making, see Norman J. Vig and Michael E. Kraft, eds., *Environmental Policy in the 1980's* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1980).

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Up to this point, I have treated administrative policy politics as if it were an ubiquitous phenomenon. However, not all circumstances are apt to be either conducive to or require the management of policy politics. First, the capacity of administrative agencies to shape policy depends on the extent to which they exercise discretion over policy delivery. Thus, one condition for the management of policy politics is that of bureaucratic discretion, which may be formally authorized, tacitly authorized, or unauthorized (as, most notably, in some forms of street-level behaviors). A second condition is the existence of a nonpolitical frame of reference to legitimate bureaucratic policy making. This may be inherent in administrative tasks, particularly those that require technical evaluations of complex issues (for example, environmental risk analysis) or it may be attributed (for example, invoking norms of administrative efficiency to justify welfare-income reporting procedures that effectively restrict benefits to those who are less procedurally astute).

Third, as noted earlier, the need for alternatives to legislative policy making is greater when there is substantial political disagreement over policy choices. To the extent that "ungovernability" is chronic, the preconditions for administrative policy politics are apt to be generally present. However, the salience of issues to various interests and to the political economy, more broadly, will vary over time. One would expect the transfer of policy politics into administrative form when cross-cutting political currents stalemate legislative efforts to make substantive shifts in significant areas of policy.

An Administrative Response to Political Crisis: The Case of Welfare

One can see the congruence of need and opportunity in the administrative response to the "welfare mess" that evolved over the course of the 1970s. Between 1965 and 1970, welfare caseloads more than doubled (from 4.3 million to 9.6 million recipients) and costs tripled (from $1.6 to $4.8 billion). This explosion in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program signaled a "welfare crisis" to those who believed that the costs were too high and rising and that welfare promoted undesirable social dependency. However, there was considerable political support for an expanded social welfare state, which was manifested in Congress's extension of entitlements to medical care and food assistance in the early 1970s.

This situation constituted a political crisis of sorts for the federal government, which was obligated to pay for increased state welfare spending that it did not directly control. The federal government reimburses states for about half of their welfare costs. The Nixon administration was unable to secure a legislative majority for comprehensive welfare reform that, among other things, would have capped federal welfare expenditures. Legislative welfare reform raised contentious issues of who is entitled to support, how much, and on what terms—precisely the types

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of issues that have defied political resolution throughout welfare's history.[38] Part of the administrative strategy employed by Nixon in his second term involved efforts to circumvent legislative obstacles and begin to curb the provision of welfare administratively. This strategy, as it evolved in the case of welfare, incorporated both directed and undirected bureaucratic policy making and depended on the transformation of welfare cuts into nonpolitical (that is, politically manageable) form.

As a mechanism for policy change, the Nixon administration turned to a common managerial tool—performance monitoring. Middle-level officials at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) crafted quality control—a system for monitoring the accuracy of state welfare payments—into an instrument for indirectly influencing states to become more restrictive in the provision of welfare. The political significance of the administrative reform process launched under the rubric of quality control cannot be fully appreciated unless it is analyzed as part of policy politics.

Quality control's manifest purpose was to achieve fiscal accountability—an objective with which few would argue. Through this instrument HEW could monitor state welfare payments and withhold federal reimbursement for those that it deemed to be improper. However, quality control also served a latent, political function, partly reflected in its design. It penalized states only for overpayments and payments made to ineligible individuals. It was not used to hold states accountable for underpayments, erroneous denials, unreasonable delays, or administrative practices that discouraged applications. Quality control did not produce systematic policy effects during the short second term of the Nixon administration. However, over the course of the decade, it indirectly influenced the implementation of state-level administrative reforms that limited welfare eligibility to those poor families who could surmount procedural and other bureaucratic obstacles of ever-increasing difficulty.

Although quality control was part of an intentional strategy conceived at the top of the policy hierarchy, its effectiveness depended, paradoxically, on the uncoordinated responses of street-level bureaucrats in hundreds of local welfare offices to new demands that administrative reform imposed at the workplace. For example, welfare workers translated administrative concern for procedural uniformity into demands that welfare applicants routinely produce scores of documents of dubious relevance to their eligibility. Applicants who could not meet these procedural demands, whether reasonable or not, were denied welfare.

Arbitrary and unfair casework practices were not new to the welfare system. But before administrative reform they were unpatterned. Welfare clients might benefit from overly generous or careless practices or might suffer harm from hostile or negligent caseworkers. However, administrative reform introduced systematic

[38] See Gilbert Steiner, *The State of Welfare* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971).

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bias into the welfare delivery process that, consistent with quality control criteria, traded errors of liberality for errors of stringency.[39] Behaviors directed toward the helping aspects of welfare policy were virtually displaced as workers responded to incentives to maximize measured attributes of performance, namely procedural uniformity and productivity. At the same time, worker discretion to make unreasonable procedural demands, even to the point of harrassment, was virtually unchecked.

If one were to evaluate administrative reform from a managerial perspective, one might well regard reform as a success. Between 1973 and 1982, state error rates, as measured by quality control, declined nearly 60 percent. If one were to evaluate reform from a standard implementation perspective, one might conclude that good intentions of management reformers were distorted by lower-level bureaucrats. According to this view, the client-harming behaviors of welfare workers would appear to be uncoordinated and their consequences unanticipated. However, if one were to evaluate administrative reform as a form of policy politics, what would this perspective reveal? First, as detailed elsewhere,[40] administrative reform in effect redefined and made more restrictive the meaning of welfare as an entitlement by adding substantial procedural hurdles to financial and categorical requirements.

Second, this redefinition, implemented indirectly under the auspices of quality control, largely avoided direct conflict over what welfare policy should be. Government actions were taken administratively and were framed within relatively limited consensual objectives, stressing costs and managerial control. Even the critical choice of penalizing only excess state welfare payments—disregarding underpayments and erroneous nonpayments—was justified on the apparently neutral grounds of securing state accountability for the disbursement of federal funds.

Third, administrative reform appealed to diverse interests, including those concerned with reducing fraud, waste, and abuse and controlling entitlement costs, as well as persons concerned with restoring legitimacy to welfare programs and improving the process of obtaining assistance for the poor. Quality control could appear to satisfy these diverse interests because it did not overtly breach the integrity of theoretical entitlement to welfare promised by statute and supported by legal precedent. Rather, it seemed designed to protect this promise.[41] But in practice, quality control appears to have initiated a process of effective disentitle-

[39] "Errors of liberality" refers to worker mistakes that result in clients receiving benefits they should not. "Errors of stringency" refers to instances in which clients entitled to assistance receive too little or none. These terms are adapted from John Mendeloff, "Welfare Procedures and Error Rates: An Alternative Perspective," *Policy Analysis* 3 (Summer 1977).

[40] See Brodkin, *The False Promise of Administrative Reform*.

[41] Although there is considerable and mounting evidence that administrative reform systematically reduced accessibility to welfare for poor families, the full extent of "disentitlement" has yet to be measured. (See Brodkin, *The False Promise of Administrative Reform*, chap. 6.) Federal and state governments have largely ignored suggestions that they assemble data indicating the effects of procedural requirements on access to welfare or the scope and magnitude of "errors of stringency."

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ment. Its adverse effects were unmeasured and unobserved, leaving quality control's manifest legitimacy unimpaired.[42]

Fourth, because quality control did not manifestly undermine theoretical entitlement, government institutions and officials were insulated from the effects of their actions. In this sense, quality control ironically eroded the government accountability that it was ostensibly intended to guarantee.

Fifth, through quality control, federal authorities could indirectly influence state administrative practices without directly encroaching on areas of nominal state authority. Performance measurement backed by fiscal sanctions proved to be a relatively potent, if imperfectly cast, instrument for penetrating a decentralized bureaucracy and systematically restricting the provision of welfare.

As an alternative to stalemated legislative policy politics, administrative reform could be effective in fashioning a response to the welfare explosion because reform's manifest purposes—administrative accuracy and fiscal accountability—were nonpolitical; it operated through technical and administrative processes, which masked allocative choices; and its systematic effects, produced largely through apparently uncoordinated, lower-level behaviors, were unmeasured and generally unrecognized.

What Kind of Politics Is This?

When politics is described as unmanageable, it indicates among other things that conflicts are broad in scope and institutional processes for settling them are inadequate. Put bluntly, there are too many difficult issues, too many active participants, and too few opportunities for authoritative resolution and action. I have offered the proposition that administrative agencies have adapted to weaknesses in the political institutions of governance, weaknesses that result in policy stalemate and disorganized political conflict. That adaptation involves the transformation of policy politics from its more contentious, democratic form into an administrative form that is more manageable.

If converting policy politics into administrative form constitutes a way of ordering policy politics, it is important to be clear about *how* that order is achieved. First, it involves changing the arena and terms of conflict, transferring political conflict from legislative and electoral institutions to administrative agencies. There it is transformed into a technical or nonpolitical form. Second, this form of policy politics limits the scope of conflict by depoliticizing it and obscuring the role of administrative agencies in determining its outcome. Third, policy making, disguised as policy delivery, is rationalized according to managerial criteria, in part through the use of sophisticated technical tools such as quality control, risk assessment,

[42] Advocates of entitlements as a "new property right" expected quality control to protect due process in their distribution. See, for example, Jerome L. Mashaw, "The Management Side of Due Process," *Cornell Law Review* 59 (June 1974).

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cost-benefit analysis, and so forth. Nevertheless, as Melvin Anshen noted with respect to one technical tool, program budgeting, "the central issue is . . . nothing less than the definition of the ultimate objectives of the Federal government as they are realized through operational decisions."[43] Fourth, managed policy politics avoids political disorder by drawing legitimation from the association of administrative activities with nonpolitical values.

Management is, in many ways, an appropriate symbolic referent for the nonpolitics of the postindustrial age. As a political symbol, it structures perceptions, invokes commonly shared beliefs, and evokes specific types of reactions. The administrative system, according to Murray Edelman, is a "symbol and ritual," which among other functions "serves as legitimizer of elite objectives."[44] Management as a symbol is imbued with the attributes of rationality, control, and political neutrality. It is these attributes that suggest management as an antidote to disorganized and unmediated political conflict that characterize ungovernability. Overt attempts to impose order on this system, perhaps through the exercise of centralized authority, are apt to make the society simultaneously more repressive and more unmanageable. However, the indirect ordering of politics and policy through administrative means offers the potential for political control while minimizing the threat of a reaction to that control.

More generally, there is a growing body of literature that recognizes administration as a new form of political control. For example, Lowi has argued that "administration is rationality applied to social control."[45] Christopher Lasch has noted a "shift from political to administrative control in which issues allegedly too abstruse and technical for popular understanding fall under the control of professional experts." He points to the growth of a professional civil service, regulatory commissions, and government agencies of all types as evidence of this shift.[46] Also, Sheldon Wolin has commented on the "rise of the manager, the counterpart to the apolitical citizen." "The new [managerial] type," he writes, "was remarkable for ruling without the appearance of it. The manager combined professional skill with selflessness, low visibility, and a pronounced aversion to public discourse. His unthreatening, technical mien helped to conceal the authoritarianism inherent in the idea of 'strong Presidents.' "[47]

Manageability acquired in this way is not without its limits as an adaptation to ungovernability. The management of policy politics would appear, at best, to be a temporary "solution" to ungovernability because it fails to treat its under-

[43] Wildavsky, "The Political Economy of Efficiency," 303.

[44] Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972), 68.

[45] Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*, 21.

[46] See Lasch, "Democracy and the 'Crisis of Confidence.' "

[47] Wolin, "The People's Two Bodies," 19. Interesting studies in other areas of social policy that suggest the importance of institutional structure and professional discretion on informal policy making can be found in Michael Lipsky, "Bureaucratic Disentitlement in Social Welfare Programs," *Social Service Review* 58 (March 1984); and Deborah A. Stone, *The Disabled State* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984).

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lying problems. Furthermore, this form of policy politics must necessarily be indirect and incremental in order to remain relatively invisible.[48] This implies limits on the state's capacity to respond to problems of great magnitude and immediacy.

Even if the management of policy politics is in some respects functional, it may be undesirable from a normative perspective. I would argue that political order and policy direction achieved by limiting participation and disguising the political agenda is inherently undemocratic. It depends on building a "substitute consensus," which Offe defines as a "consensus that does not result from a democratic process as formally provided for by democratic institutions, but a consensus resulting from informal, highly inaccessible negotiations among poorly legitimized representatives of functional groups."[49] I also would concur with Edelman that "technical competence and efficiency are vices, not virtues, when they supplant continuing discourse about values."[50]

Moreover, as long as the formal structure of government provides opportunities to mobilize in political opposition (however atrophied the mechanisms of procedural democracy), then managed policy politics and other adaptations that fail to revitalize the linkages between the citizen and the state offer only a tenuous alternative to governance. It may be possible to manage for a while, but in the long run better management will not make better politics.

[48] For examples of the limits to the "administrative presidency strategy" see Norman J. Vig's discussion of the Reagan administration's efforts to undermine environmental protection statutes in "The President and the Environment: Revolution or Retreat?" in Vig and Kraft, eds., *Environmental Policy in the 1980s*; and Robert Pear's report on the backlash against efforts to purge social security disability rolls under the rubric of cleaning out "frauds and cheats." See Robert Pear, "U.S. Plans to Ease Disability Criteria in Social Security," *New York Times*, 7 June 1983. These examples underscore the importance of incrementalism and invisibility to this strategy as well as the character of its target population. Environmentalists and individuals receiving disability allowances were better able to fight off attacks on their programs than were the more vulnerable welfare poor.

[49] Offe, "The State, Ungovernability and the Search for the 'Non-Political,' " 10.

[50] Murray Edelman, "The Future of American Politics" in Mark E. Kann, ed., *The Future of American Democracy* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983), 238.

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Congress, Public Opinion, and Synfuels Policy

M. E. AHRARI

In July 1980, President Jimmy Carter signed the Energy Security Act of 1980, a presidential action that was the culmination of the making of synfuels policy. Despite the initiatives taken by President Gerald Ford in 1975 and 1976 to persuade Congress to pass a large-scale federally supported synthetic fuels program, the House of Representatives killed his proposals on both occasions. In June 1979, however, under a supply shortfall stemming from the Iranian revolution, the House passed a synfuels bill. One month later, Congress passed the act, which was aimed at making massive federal investment in the production of synthetic fuels. However, with accession to office by President Ronald Reagan in January 1981, the United States initiated a drastic reduction in its commitment to synthetic fuels.

Toward the end of 1983, the Reagan administration not only was considering a $3 billion reduction in appropriations for the Synthetic Fuels Corporation (SFC) but also was contemplating its possible dismantlement.[1] The preceding measures make the life spans of an elaborate synfuels policy and the SFC much shorter than those which policies and organizations in the American political system tend

[1] *Major Legislation of the Congress*, 98th Congress, no. 4 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, January 1984).

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to enjoy.[2] A complete treatment of this policy appears elsewhere;[3] the focus of this article is on the roles of "publics," public opinion, and Congress, both in the making and in the unraveling of synfuels policy.

The Analytical Framework

The publics of an issue and a policy. According to Roger Cobb and Charles Elder, for the conversion of an issue into public agenda, it should be expanded so that it captures the attention of "identification groups," "attention groups," "attentive public, " and portions of the "general public." Members of identification groups are most likely to be the first segment of the audience to be mobilized if a conflict involving any of their members arises. The attention groups are the second segment of the audience to enter a conflict. Members of this group are disinterested in most issues but are informed about and interested in certain specific issues.[4] James Rosenau provides the clearest description of the nature and role of the attentive public, the third segment of an expanding conflict. He notes that members of this group are more inclined to participate in the opinion-making process and serve as "critical audience" for opinion makers as they discuss and debate various aspects of a policy.[5] The general public, the final potential audience of an expanding conflict, is the most difficult to mobilize. Cobb and Elder underscore the important role played by the first three publics during the agenda-building phase of an issue, but this article will identify the importance of these publics even after the transformation of institutional (that is, governmental) agenda into public policy. The reason for continuing to identify the first three publics as important is based upon the contention that once the institutional agenda involving an issue is transformed into public policy, a substantial part of its previous publics—identification and attention groups in their entirety and portions of attentive and general publics—becomes its clientele when implementation of that policy takes place. With the passage of time, this clientele emerges as a "subgovernment" or an "iron triangle"[6] as a result of an alliance formation between the publics,

[2] For instance, see Herbert Kaufman, *Are Government Organizations Immortal*? (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1976). Also consider the following: " . . . few programs or policies are terminated; few bureau agencies, or departments are eliminated. Indeed, efforts at termination occasionally lead to expansion of resources." Douglas Bothun and John C. Comer, "The Politics of Termination: Concepts and Process," *Policy Studies Journal* 7 (Spring 1979): 540–553.

[3] M. E. Ahrari, "Synfuels Policy: A Case Study in Crisis Decision Making," an unpublished monograph. Also, Ahrari, "A Paradigm of Crisis Decision-making: The Case of Synfuels," *British Journal of Political Science* 17 Part I (January 1987): 71–91.

[4] Roger W. Cobb and Charles Elder, *Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda-Building* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), 106.

[5] James N. Rosenau, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1961).

[6] For an original discussion of this concept see Douglas Cater, *Power in Washington* (New York: Random House, 1964), 17–22. For the most recent and multifaceted discussion of this concept, see Randall Ripley and Grace Franklin, *Congress, the Bureaucracy and Public Policy*, rev. ed. (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1980).

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an appropriate congressional committee or subcommittee, and a federal agency. The establishment of an iron triangle on a policy serves as a guarantee that the policy will not become a victim of increasing "policy congestion"[7] at the federal level and will not come unraveled or be phased out.

Role of public opinion. Public opinion—which is a functional expression—is usually a diffused concept in the sense that conceptual or empirical distinction between strength of commitment of supporters or opponents may be hard to pin down on a sustained basis. There is no certainty that expression of public opinion is based on any amount of information on the issue or policy involved. But public opinion is still vital, because the mere availability of raw numbers about those who support, oppose, or are indifferent about an issue or policy might serve as clear signals to the decision makers to formulate their own position. Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro observe, "Policy tends to move in the same direction as public opinion most often when the opinion change is large and when it is stable—that is, not reserved by fluctuations."[8] However, when the polls on a particular issue portray public opinion as largely uninformed or fluid, the decision makers—especially the legislators—might not feel the urgency to act on an issue until a crisis situation emerges. And with the dissipation of a crisis, if public opinion remains weak concerning actions that legislators took on the issue under crisis, they may not perceive an unraveling of their action as invoking public reprisal.

Congressional reaction to a crisis situation. Robert Eyestone states that crises in general are appropriate occasions for innovative approaches. The politicians' "perceived necessity to respond promptly to the crisis" forces them to abandon their usual resistance to untried approaches. "When any delayed response is guaranteed to fail, the adoption of uncertain expedients may suddenly become feasible."[9] A crisis, however, is hardly ever the best occasion for producing good policies because of the absence of eminently sensible normal biases and delays that play an important role in "the careful forging of the consensus through reasoned consideration of the issue and its possible resolutions." Actions taken during crisis, continues Eyestone, "probably should not have been taken, and *would* not have been taken except for the urgency of the moment."[10]

The making of synfuels policy may best be explained by the ambivalent-majoritarian response, especially on the part of those legislators who did not view the policy to be a proper or a good response, yet proceeded to vote for it in the wake of the second oil crisis in 1970. However, this ambivalence underscored the impermanence of synfuels policy, as the erstwhile supporters of this solution (or

[7] Hugh Heclo, "One Executive Branch or Many" in Anthony King, ed., *Both Ends of the Avenue: The Presidency, the Executive Branch, and Congress in the 1980s* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1983), 26–58.

[8] Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy," *The American Political Science Review* 77 (March 1983): 175–190.

[9] Robert Eyestone, *From Social Issues to Public Policy* (New York: John Wiley, 1978), 154–155.

[10] Ibid., 154. (Emphasis in original.)

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at least a substantial number of them) did not raise much hue and cry when, with the dissipation of the oil crisis in 1981, the Reagan administration proceeded to introduce massive cutbacks to a number of synfuels development projects. A majority of these legislators went along with these cutbacks because, in the words of Eyestone, they "resurrected their precisis prejudices" about the synfuels development.[11]

In comprehending the conceptual relationship between various publics, public opinion, and congressional response to a crisis situation, one must consider how legislators interpret actual and perceived reactions of various publics and public opinion polls. On some issues, as in the case of synfuels, public opinion by remaining docile may not provide a sense of policy direction to decision makers, even in a crisis condition. However, in such instances, the heightened visibility of that issue (because of the crisis) allows identification and attention groups to promote their version of agenda and policy proposals in the legislative arena. The prevalence of crisis makes up for the absence of support from attentive public and portions of the general public. The heightened visibility of the issue creates a sense of urgency and immediacy for some sort of action on the part of legislators. In such an environment, the semblance of action outweighs the substance of action in its importance. And the need to create a policy, regardless of whether that policy is a realistic one or is really aimed at resolving the crisis at hand, becomes extremely crucial. Public option per se may not be given credit for policy actions taken during the crisis on such issues. However, the legislators' perception of penalties for failure to act in conjunction with fervent activities of identification and attention groups may lead to the creation of policy actions.

Synthetic fuels and the role of publics. The issue of synthetic fuels was placed on the congressional docket in a decisive fashion in 1979 as a result of an "external trigger mechanism," that is, the political turmoil in Iran, the impact of which in the United States emerged in the form of the second oil crisis. Consequently, synfuels as an issue did not have to rely on the various publics that play an extremely crucial role in an expansion of an issue into institutional agenda.[12] Once the institutional agenda of an issue is transformed into public policy and implemented, a substantial portion of that policy's public becomes its clientele, the recipient of tangible (in the form of subsidies, jobs, etc.) and intangible (in the form of civic satisfaction, civic pride, or *noblesse oblige*-related gratification) benefits. And with the passage of time, this permanent corps of supporters plays a vital role in the formation of a "subgovernment" on that issue. The creation of a subgovernment guarantees a policy longevity, if not permanence, in that the subgovernment would make sure that the political system continues its commitment to the policy at its core. Either prior or subsequent to the passage of House Resolution (HR) 3930 and Senate (S) 932, the closest the synfuels option ever came to establishing stable

[11] Ibid., 155.

[12] For a discussion of trigger mechanism and transformation of institutional agenda into public policy, see Cobb and Elder, *Participation in American Politics*, 84–86.

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publics and a permanent corps of supporters was to sustain the loyalty of a few groups. These included those legislators who consistently pushed for the passage of HR 3474 in 1975, of HR 12112 in 1976, and of HR 3930 and S 932 in 1980; those oil experts who were supportive of commercial synfuels development; and those oil entrepreneurs who were to become the chief beneficiaries of such a development. These groups were a coalition of identification and attention groups, whose size in a non-crisis or a crisis environment was not sufficient for the passage of synfuels legislation. Even at the peak of the second oil crisis, the coalition did not expand much because of the docile character of public opinion. Some credit for the making of synfuels policy goes to the intense activities of identification and attention groups in the legislative arena for the passage of S 932 in the House and the Senate; but most of the credit goes to the legislators' perception of the necessity for some sort of action and their perception of penalities in the absence of action. The emergence of a synfuels subgovernment would have taken place only if synfuels policy were to be implemented over a period of the next several years. However, the groundwork for the initiation of various commercial-scale synfuels development programs was barely begun before synfuels policy became a victim of changing political and economic realities within and outside the United States. Jimmy Carter, who was the moving force behind a large systemic commitment to synfuels development, lost the election. Reagan, the champion free marketer, entered office in 1981, at the time the international oil market began to show an abundance of supplies and attendant downward pressure on oil prices. The cumulative effects of these events not only took the air out of the synfuels balloon before its performance could have been tested, but also created a deep sense of confusion within the rank and file of the synfuels coalition in Congress. When the smoke cleared, those legislators who were previously leaning toward synfuels went back to withholding their support until scientific knowledge was capable not only of developing technologies for a cheaper production of synfuels but also of resolving health and environment-related questions regarding industrial production of synfuels. Those legislators who previously doubted the feasibility of commercial-scale synfuels development or were critical of it (those who consistently voted against HR 3474, 12112, and even HR 3930 and S 932) returned to their original position. With an abundance of oil supplies, the synfuels option had to fall back on its consistent backers, the identification groups whose numbers were not sufficient for winning in the legislative arena. Cobb and Elder hypothesized, "When conflicts [over an issue] are confined to identification groups, formal agenda status is most likely to be attained only when disputants threaten to disrupt the system."[13] Since in this article various publics for an issue are identified even after the transformation of institutional agenda into public policy, it is prudent to state in the line of Cobb and Elder's hypothesis that the recurrence of a crisis situation (which is potentially disruptive in nature) involving energy sup-

[13] Ibid., 152–153.

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plies is a necessary precondition for the synfuels option to regain a high systemic priority.

The Role of Public Opinion

The energy issue is a classic exmaple of how a confluence of contradictory views in a pluralistic society creates incessant confusion. Up until the 1960s, the American public was encouraged to consume cheap and plentiful energy. Even though U. S. crude oil production peaked in 1970 and the American dependence on foreign sources had been on the rise since then, a majority of the public was not aware of this reality at the time of the imposition of the Arab oil embargo in October 1973. Thus, the oil embargo shocked the American public. Since then, three presidents have warned the public of the continually dwindling nature of indigenous energy sources and a resultant growing American dependence on external energy supplies. For example, President Richard Nixon, in his 7 November 1973 speech in which he spelled out the parameters of Project Independence stated, "We must . . . face up to a stark fact: we are heading toward the most acute shortages of energy since World War II." President Gerald Ford, on 16 January 1975 warned: "This nation and, in fact, the world must face the prospect of energy difficulties between now and 1985." Referring to the seriousness of the energy situation in a major speech on 17 April 1977 President Carter said, "The energy crisis has not yet overwhelmed us, but it will if we do not act quickly." In the same national address, Carter characterized the American struggle with the energy problem as the "moral equivalent of war" and stated that the alternative to his energy proposals aimed at reducing America's energy dependence on foreign oil "may be a national catastrophe."

Yet between these presidential warnings the national media reported a plethora of statements made by the energy experts, statistical studies produced by a variety of credible organizations, and a string of official statements, a number of which either contradicted each other or questioned each other's positions on the seriousness of the energy issue. Because of the abundance of these statments in the annals of public record, a systematic presentation is impossible. One is forced to be selective, and the reader is warned of the bias of selectivity, which would be corrected only by a detailed examination of the *New York Times Index* or any other indices of the elite newspapers.

Amidst growing reports of energy shortages in America, the *New York Times* of 17 April 1973 reported, "There is no physical shortage of energy resources in either the United States or the world for the foreseeable future and yet Americans may spend the rest of this decade coping with brownouts and blackouts and perhaps even rationing of gasoline, heating oil, and natural gas." The same day Morris Adelman, a well-known petroleum expert, was quoted as saying that the world energy crisis or energy shortages are a fiction. But belief in this fiction is a fact, continued Adelman; it makes people accept higher oil prices as imposed by nature when they are really fixed by collusion. On 4 January 1974 and during the peak of the oil embargo, the *New York Times* editorially asserted that the response of

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FIGURE 1 — PROPORTION RESPONDING THE OIL SHORTAGE IS REAL VS. CONTRIVED


Real
Contrived
Percent of Respondents
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A
T →
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
Embargo Ends
Ford's State of the Union
Year and Month of Survey
Carter's NEP Speech

Source: Barbara C. Farhar et al., ***Public Opinion About Energy: A Literature Review***

the Nixon administration to the oil shortage and embargo showed a lack of understanding of the mystery-shrouded market it was trying to control. As evidence of readily available oil, the editorial quoted a federal report that stated that 700,000 barrels of Arab oil had landed in the United States in December despite the embargo. The editorial also noted that full tankers were waiting off shore for space to unload and that storage facilities were filled to capacity while gasoline and heating oil shortages pinched consumers. In closing, the editorial observed that no expert agreed on the meaning of these factors. In March 1975, Nobel Laureate economist Paul Samuelson wrote in *Newsweek*, "Bluntly, there is no need for us to do anything to mitigate the long-run energy problem in this recession year of 1975. Most of what could be done now would endanger the solutions of both our recession problem and our inflation problem. Why rock the boat?" The *New York Times* on 18 April 1977, quoted Ralph Nader as saying, "There is not an energy supply crisis [but rather] an energy monopoly crisis."[14]

How did the American people respond to this confluence of contradictions? As reflected in Figure 1, when the United States first experienced a dramatized

[14] These quotes were cited in Barbara C. Farhar, Patricia Weis, Charles T. Unseld, and Barbara A. Burns, *Public Opinion About Energy: A Literature Review*, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 1979), 54–55.

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TABLE 1

Rating of "Energy Crisis" or "Energy" in the "most important problem" List, 1973–April 1985

Dates of Surveys	*Energy Crisis/Energy**
16–19 February 1973	Not at all mentioned.
4–6 May	4%
7–10 September	8%
4–7 January 1974	46% (This survey was preceded by Nixon's 7 November 1973 speech in which he outlined the 'Project Independence.' 'Energy Crisis' topped the list of the most important problems.)
June**	6%
July	33% (Second on the list of the most important problems).
September	6%
October	Less than 3 percent mentioned the energy crisis.
November	3%
28 February–3 March 1975	7%
18–21 July	5%
2–5 January 1976	Not at all mentioned.
23–26 April	Not at all mentioned.
22–25 October	Not at all mentioned.
18–21 March 1977	23%
21–24 October	17%
14–17 April 1978	8%
7–10 July	4%
27–30 October	3%
4–7 May 1979	33%
12–15 October	22%
25–28 January 1980	12%
28–31 March	8%
12–15 September	4%
7–10 November	4%
30 January–2 February 1981	5%
8–11 January 1982	2%
1983–April 1985	Not at all mentioned.

Question: "What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?"

*Prior to the 14–17 April 1978 survey, Gallup poll described the energy issue as "energy crisis" since then, however, it is referred to as "energy" or "energy problems."

**When exact date of survey was unavailable, month of publication of poll was used.

Source: *The Gallup Opinion Index*, 1973–April 1985

version of energy shortages in the wake of the oil embargo, an overwhelming percentage of Americans who were polled (75 percent in February 1974) perceived shortages as contrived. However, this majority began to dwindle with the passage of time: 66 percent in April 1974, 47 percent in June 1975, 46 percent in November 1976, and between 33–39 percent in 1977. At the same time, the number of those who believed in the reality of energy shortages grew significantly from a low of 18 percent in February 1974 to a high of 56 percent in 1977. These data, when

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examined closely, underscore a sobering reality. Between 1973 and 1978, most people did not believe there was an "energy crisis" but perceived, instead a serious energy problem. From 1973 until the end of 1975, about a third of the public defined the energy situation as "very serious." After 1975, the number of those who viewed the energy situation as "somewhat" or "fairly serious" dropped slightly, "ranging from 39 to 43 percent of the samples." In general, since 1973, about 75 to 80 percent of the public consistently viewed the energy situation as at least somewhat serious.[15]

The preceding findings indicate that the importance or urgency attached to the energy issue by the American people remained inconsistent throughout the 1970s. A longitudinal examination of the list of the "most important problems" facing the United States from 1973–1981, a frequently asked question of the Gallup poll, further confirms this phenomenon. Table 1 illustrates that the energy issue did not even enter the list of the "most important problems" until May 1973. Even then, only 4 percent of the respondents mentioned it. In a January 1974 poll, which was preceded by Nixon's 7 November speech and was taken when the oil embargo was in place, the public awareness of energy as the most important problem reached an all time high of 46 percent. However, between June 1974, when the oil embargo was history, and October 1976, the energy crisis gradually faded away from people's memories as a nettlesome issue. It reappeared as an issue in March 1977, when newly-elected President Carter was getting ready to issue his much-ballyhooed National Energy Plan (NEP). Subsequent to this event, the energy issue once again lost its importance in the public's perception until May 1979, when the country was experiencing the effects of the second oil crisis in the form of gasoline shortages in various regions. And following the previous pattern, the energy issue continued to lose its importance.

Jimmy Carter was the first president whose leadership style and use of platitudes were aimed at underscoring the obduracy of the energy problem. Even substantively, his energy plan was quite elaborate and was aimed at economizing on the use of energy in America. How did the American people respond to Carter's disciplined energy proposals? The initial public response to NEP was generally favorable: 55 percent of the respondents were favorable, while 30 percent had an unfavorable reaction. The public was more evenly divided on the "hardship perception" of Carter's proposals: 34 percent of the respondents thought he was requiring "too many sacrifices"; 31 percent viewed his program as geared "at about the right level," and 25 percent thought that Carter should have been even more demanding. The Gallup report noted that "Carter failed in . . . communicating the urgency of the energy problem."[16] In the aftermath of Carter's energy speech, the percentage of those who viewed the energy situation as "very serious" went up only by 3 percent.

An important reason for the public's failure to share Carter's perception of the

[15] Ibid., 57–66.

[16] *The Gallup Opinion Index*, June 1977, 12–16.

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TABLE 2

Seriousness of Energy Situation

Question: "How serious do you say the energy situation is in the U.S.—very serious, fairly serious, or not at all serious?"

Dates of Surveys	Very Serious	Fairly Serious	Not at all Serious	No Opinion
3–6 August 1979	47%	35%	16%	2%
1–4 June	37	36	24	3
23–26 February	43	42	13	2
31 March–3 April 1978	41	39	15	5
18–21 November 1977	40	42	14	4
30 September–3 October	40	40	16	4
5–8 August	38	43	13	6
3–6 June	40	42	12	6
29 April–2 May	44	41	12	3
		Carter TV speech on energy.		
1–4 April	41	39	16	4

Source: *The Gallup Opinion Poll*, September 1979.

seriousness of the energy issue might have been their pervasive lack of knowledge of it.[17] Another crucial problem Carter encountered was that of believability of the seriousness of the energy problem (Table 2). His "moral equivalent of war" speech on 17 April 1977, did very little to heighten the level of seriousness. Table 2 indicates that these responses remained more or less unchanged even during February 1979, when the public consciousness of the second oil shock was on the rise. It was not until August that the "very serious" category of response made a significant jump (47 percent). Even when the people were finally convinced of the seriousness of the energy shortages, they remained highly skeptical about their reality. In a survey administered in September 1979, only 22 percent of the people viewed the shortages as real, and a whopping 70 percent perceived them as contrived.[18]

The enormity of confusion, which was the hallmark of public opinion about the nature of energy shortages and the pervasive lack of knowledge of the American people about the U. S. energy dependence were also reflected in the absence of strong preferences about energy alternatives. The thrust of the opinion surveys reported here relate to perceptions of the quantity of reserves and their locations in the United States. Because the United States has an abundance of indigenous supplies of coal, coal was perceived as an "effective source" and as an alternative

[17] Ibid., 17–19.

[18] Ibid., September 1979, 17.

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TABLE 3

Reagan's Handling of Energy

Dates of surveys	*Approve*	*Disapprove*	*No Opinion*
30 July–2 August 1982	33%	48%	19%
11–14 June	34	48	18
2–5 October 1981	39	39	22
26–29 June	43	35	22
8–11 May	44	31	25
3–6 April	42	34	24
13–16 March	37	39	24

Source: *The Gallup Report*, August 1982, 19.

that was likely to lessen American dependence on foreign oil.[19] At the same time, people were concerned about the deleterious effects of coal on the environment. Surveys also reported similar environmental concern over shale oil. Westerners reported a high concern about air pollution and were less enthusiastic about oil shale exploration than others. When it came to the measure of people's assessment of various energy options, the survey findings are less conclusive for two reasons. First, each energy supply technology was "perceived as having both positive and negative aspects." Coal: "plentiful but environmentally undesirable"; nuclear energy: "effective but having undesired side effects such as waste disposal problems"; and, solar energy: "environmentally and economically desirable over the long term but with high initial costs." Second, no data was available on which of the above factors "were more important to the public in evaluating energy supply sources."[20]

In the early 1980s, when the issue of energy no longer remained problematic, the Gallup Report started to ask its respondents whether they approved or disapproved of Reagan's handling of the energy situation. Table 3 indicates that people remained more or less evenly divided in their approval or disapproval of Reagan's performance.

Useful here are two significant points made by Page and Shapiro in their study on the effects of public opinion on policy. "Policy tends to move in the same direction as public opinion most often when the opinion change is large and when it is stable—that is, *not reversed by fluctuations*."[21] Their second point concerns the notion of salience:

> Salience can be measured more directly, although still not perfectly, by the proportion of respondents answering "don't know" or "no opinion" to survey questions. When the proportion of "don't know" is relatively low—that is, when more people are willing to

[19] Farhar et al., *Public Opinion About Energy*, 3.

[20] Ibid., 7.

[21] Page and Shapiro, "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy," 181. (Emphasis added.)

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Figure 2 — RATING OF ENERGY CRISIS/ENERGY IN THE "MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM LIST: 1973 - 1981
Question: What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?"



offer a preference—it is a sign of more public interest and attention and perhaps also stronger, more intensely held opinions.[22]

Table 1 indicates that in general public opinion on energy was far from stable. Rather, public concern was heightened only when the emergence of energy shortages or as an outcome of presidential endeavors to focus public attention on this issue. However, on the question of salience, the energy issue scored better between 1977 and 1979 than it did between 1981 and 1982. Table 2 shows that "no opinion" percentages mostly stayed within the range of 2–4 percent (with three exceptions, when it was as high as 6 percent). Cumulatively, one can infer from the data contained in Tables 1 and 2 that while the public consistently thought that the energy issue was salient, the instability of public opinion failed to convey clear enough notions of public preference. This failure of public opinion was most apparent on the question of alternate sources of energy, especially the synfuels option. In the terminology of Page and Shapiro, *synfuels policy failed to move in the direction of public opinion because the latter lacked either stability or direction.* In 1981 and 1982, however, as shown in Table 3, "no opinion" percentages remained between 19–25 percent, a clear sign that energy no longer remained an issue of high public interest.

From the preceding emerges an entirely unfavorable picture of the American people's perception and comprehension of the dynamics of the energy issue. Despite considerable attempts by three presidents to educate the public concerning

[22] Ibid.

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the seriousness of the energy problem, despite the abundance of information on the dynamics of energy problems in America, despite the fact that the United States twice experienced energy shortages during the 1970s, not only did the American people in general remain unpersuaded about the seriousness of the energy problem, but also their skepticism concerning the reality of energy shortages remained high. When one searches for the rationale for such attitudes, it becomes painfully clear that in a knowledge-oriented society like the United States, knowledge about energy issues has not been the forte of the Americans. A combination of a low level of knowledge and considerable skepticism about the reality of energy shortages, perhaps because of contradictions related to the energy problem in the media, appear to be the reasons underlying the sustained docility of public opinion on energy issues. In the available data, this docility is glaringly obvious in the lack of strong popular preference for energy alternatives, including synfuels. In the absence of strong public preference for any specific energy alternative, the paralysis of pluralism, which is the normal *modus operandi* of the American political system, prevailed. And the synfuels option was examined, in the words of Eyestone, under "normal biases and delays," while the House of Representatives in 1975 and 1976 attempted to carefully forge "consensus through reasoned consideration of the [energy] issue and its possible resolutions (including the synfuels option)."[23] It was not until the emergence of the effects of the second oil crisis that Congress abandoned its normal *modus operandi*. At that time, the combined outcome of the heightened visibility of the energy issue, the legislators' perception of a need to take some sort of action, and the fervency of activities of identification and attention groups led to the making of a synfuels policy. The crisis coalition, which was responsible for the passage of HR 3930 and S 932, was not put together as a result of concrete public demands. Thus, the dissipation of the effects of the second oil crisis also led to the disintegration of this coalition without any fear of reprisal from its constituents, thus allowing the Reagan administration to hand over the synfuels option to the market place. And true to its previous style, public opinion remained docile on the sideline.

The Dynamics of Congressional Responses

The non-crisis responses. In his 1975 State of the Union message, President Ford asked Congress to provide new incentives for the commercial development of 1 million barrels per day (b/d) of synfuels by 1995. A fulfillment of this goal would have required construction of at least twenty major synfuels plants.

In June of that year, Sections 102 and 103 of HR 3474 set the parameters of House debates concerning the proposed initiation of commercial-scale synfuels production in the United States. Section 102 described in-situ shale oil development, and Section 103 contained a detailed description of a proposed loan guarantee. HR 3474 would have authorized the Energy Research Development Adminis-

[23] Eyestone, *From Social Issue to Public Policy*, 154.

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tration (ERDA) to extend up to $6 billion in loan guarantees to private companies willing to undertake the commercial production of synfuels. Both of these sections were inserted by the Senate Interior Committee without any specific hearings on loan guarantees. The Interior Committee's action drew much criticism from the House members as Section 103 became a lightning rod of controversy. In an unusual move, the House Rules Committee granted a rule under which the House was allowed to vote separately on motions to take Sections 102 and 103 out of the bill. The rhetoric of the proponents and opponents of this bill was characteristic of the non-crisis environment involving energy that then prevailed. The supporters of loan guarantees described them as symbiotic arrangements where the investors were extracting reasonable profits with a minimum cost and risk to the tax payers. The opponents of Section 102 and 103, an unusual coalition of liberals and conservatives, did not disagree with the need for synfuels development. What they objected to, however, was the extent of federal commitment. A remarkable feature of the rhetoric used by the supporters and the opponents of HR 3474 was that the former emphasized the urgency of action on synfuels programs, since they promised energy self-sufficiency for America. The opponents' rhetoric, on the other hand, was characterized by a marked absence of any mention of urgency involving synfuels programs. The opponents scored a final victory when the House voted down both Sections 102 and 103.

HR 12112 was the second piece of legislation considered by the House in a non-crisis environment. In March 1976, President Ford renewed his request for congressional action on synthetic fuels. This bill was very similar to HR 3474, and this similarity once again became the rallying point for the legislative opponents of commercial synfuels development. Finally, on 23 September, HR 12112 was also defeated by the House.

In summary, during the House consideration of HR 3474 and HR 12112, "normal biases and delays"[24] of policy process, alluded to by Eyestone, dominated the deliberative process. For the proponents of these measures, the synfuels option held great promises of long-range energy independence from insecure foreign energy sources. On the other hand, for the opponents of these proposed legislations, who were in complete agreement with the proponents concerning the potential promise of synfuels, committing enormous resources to the commercial scale development of synthetic fuels prior to the resolution of various environmental and health-related uncertainties and unknowns associated with synfuels was entirely unacceptable. So they continued to withhold their support, reminding the proponents that these proposed laws were too risky, unrealistic, and wasteful under the present state of technological knowhow.

The "crisis" responses. In October 1978, as a result of growing political strife, Iranian oil workers went on strike. The oil output in Iran dropped from a peak of 6 million barrels per day to 1.2 million barrels per day by the middle of December. For the United States, the loss of imports from Iran remained at 500,000

[24] Ibid., 155.

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b/d, partly because America began to diversify its sources of supplies from other oil states, which raised their production. It was not the magnitude of the loss of supplies from Iran that created the second oil crisis in America. Rather, it was an intermingling of bureaucratic bottlenecks and adoption of crisis phraseology by Carter and his energy secretary, James Schlesinger. The fledgling Department of Energy's mishandling of the distribution of supplies resulted in shortages first in California and then in the Northeast, dramatizing the appearance of supply shortages as worse than they really were. The Federal Trade Commission's unsubstantiated contention that the gasoline shortages might have been contrived and Carter's zig-zagging over the public relations of energy policy made their own contribution to worsening the public perception of the prevalence of an energy crisis. Equally important, the political fall-out from the ouster of the shah of Iran was a reminder of American vulnerability to such future incidents in the Middle East. Collectively, these factors led to the creation of a crisis environment.

By June 1979, Congress was clearly responding to "the costs of failing to act,"[25] alluded to by Eyestone. On June 15, the House initiated action on HR 3930. This legislation required the Department of Defense to purchase by 1984 the equivalent of 500,000 b/d of synfuels. The government was instructed to provide potential suppliers of synfuels with loans to build plants, loan guarantees to obtain commercial loans, or guarantees to purchase fuel produced by these entrepreneurs at prices that would cover all their costs.[26] On June 26, the legislation was passed by a "crisis action coalition" by 368–25. HR 3930 turned out to be the beginning of the political system's massive commitment that was soon to follow.

On 15 July, President Carter, under growing supply shortages and mounting attacks on his leadership, unveiled his energy package in a national broadcast. At the heart of this package was an $88 billion, ten-year commitment to the production of synthetic fuels. This legislation, referred to as S 932, was passed after much wrangling as the Energy Security Act of 1980 and was signed by President Carter in June of that year. It was passed by yet another "crisis action coalition" (the House, 317–93; and the Senate, 78–12).[27]

A number of environmental and health-related uncertainties associated with mass production of synfuels still prevailed. Moreover, technical knowledge enabling the economical production of synfuels on an industrial scale was nonexistent. In view of the preceding variables, the synfuels option remained a highly controversial one. It was the congressional need to react to the second oil crisis

[25] Ibid., 154.

[26] *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports (CQWR)*, 9 June 1979, 1099–1101.

[27] During floor debates on HR 3930 and S 932, the legislators freely used phrases that underscored their perception of the crisis. Even though I did not intend to perform content analysis of these speeches, I have made the following counts of various phrases only thumbing through the first 24 pages of the House debate on HR 3930. References to the U.S. dependence on foreign oil = 127; reference to actions demanded by people = 28; reference to the energy crisis that then prevailed = 51; reference to constraints on U.S. foreign policy maneuverability due to oil dependence, risks to national security, and economic stability = 84.

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that provided an instantaneous popularity for the synfuels programs, since this option was free from the unpredictabilities related to oil supplies from the Middle East. The crisis coalition and especially those legislators who had consistently opposed HR 3474 and HR 12112 voted for S 932 only by temporarily shelving their concern over the technological, environmental, and regulatory constraints and even health-related uncertainties involving synfuels. And since those grave problems remained unresolved, it was only a matter of time before the synfuels option was to lose a number of its supporters.

The year 1981 brought such antecedents to the surface. The industrial countries were forced to be more prudent about their energy use, partly because of enormous capital drain from their economies because of intermittent quantum leaps in crude oil prices during 1979 and 1980 and partly because of an amalgamation of economic recession and institutionalization of conservation. In the United States, the effects of energy consciousness were becoming quite apparent. In January 1981, the American Petroleum Institute reported that the United States imported 18 percent less crude oil in 1980 than it had in 1979. This decline was reported to be the largest year-to-year decline ever in crude oil imports. The cumulative effects of all of these factors emerged in a significant dwindling of energy demands in the United States and other industrial countries. In the November election of 1980, the American people voted out Jimmy Carter, who had equated the ongoing struggle in the American domestic arena of coming to grips with the energy problems to the "moral equivalent of war." They elected Ronald Reagan, who was a true believer in letting the marketplace determine the parameters of energy policy.

Reagan's free-market approach to energy resulted in a drastic reversal of Carter's energy priorities, including a lukewarm support for federally-subsidized synfuels programs. During his first week in office, the new President fired Carter's nominee for the chairmanship of Synfuels Corporation, John Sawhill. However, it was 2 April before he nominated Edward Noble as the new chairman. Reagan's director of the Office of Management and Budget, David Stockman, who had been an ardent opponent of synfuels programs in his previous capacity as a congressman from Michigan, tried to rescind $5 billion from the already-appropriated funds for synfuels development. As Reagan's energy policy began to jell, it became clear that the administration was determined to trim a number of commercial-scale projects previously backed during the Carter years, to eliminate or restructure federal financing of at least half a dozen major demonstration projects approved by the Carter administration, and to renegotiate certain projects with a view to persuading private industry to assume at least 50 percent of the overall costs. It should be clearly understood that the Reagan administration would not have been successful in rearranging federal priorities on energy and especially in demoting the synfuels option if the international energy environment were not characterized by a supply surplus and an attendant downward pressure on the prices of crude oil. With the disappearance of an energy crisis, the security of supplies related to the indigenous synfuels option (an overriding reason underlying the quick passage of HR 3930 and S 932) also lost its glamour. The reemergence of surplus

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supply conditions led to the resurfacing of the nagging uncertainties long associated with massive development of synfuels.

In the U. S. Congress, support for synfuels did not vanish altogether. Only its ambivalent supporters, who formed the substantial portion of the crisis action coalition, changed their minds. Congressman Jim Wright and other Democrats continued to exhort the Reagan administration not to abandon the synfuels option. However, in the prevalence of a "normal" energy market, they were unable to retain the primacy accorded the synfuels option under the energy "crisis."

Conclusion

It is important to consider what the significance of synfuels policy is to the American policy process. The case of synfuels policy seems to suggest that crisis conditions appear to be necessary and sufficient for the political process to produce a policy decision. For a variety of reasons, decision makers are likely to act even when they do not receive clearcut signals from the public as to what their responses ought to be. The case of synfuels policy also enables us to comprehend under what conditions a policy is likely to have a short life span. In order to fully understand the potential impermanence of a policy, we should return to two concepts presented earlier—subgovernment and policy congestion.

The literature on bureaucracy provides ample evidence of how crucial the support of a congressional committee (or a subcommittee) and client groups really is to the continued existence of an agency and to policies implemented by that agency.[28] The congressional committee serves as a vehicle for providing the needed appropriations, which is vital not only for an agency's continued existence but also for its prospective expansion. Consequently, federal agencies have established an excellent record of making sure that they do all the right things to keep the appropriate congressional committees on their side.

Similarly, federal agencies also have an equally impeccable track record of organizing their "infrastructure of interest groups support."[29] For instance, the Department of Labor played a crucial role in the development of trade unions. The department of Agriculture was equally active in the evolution of the American Farm Bureau. In both instances, it is not difficult to understand the pragmatic reasons for the activities of these agencies. An expansion of their respective clientele automatically led to widening of the scope and nature of their demands and expectations, which in turn enabled these agencies to expand the realm of their organizational jurisdiction and political support. This attempt on the part of agencies to establish an infrastructure of interest-group support has problems of its own and

[28] For instance, see Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967); Francis E. Rourke, *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy*, 3rd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984); and Harold Seidman, *Politics, Position and Power: The Dynamics of Federal Organization*, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

[29] Rourke, *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy*, 48.

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is beyond the scope of this study.[30] The point of emphasis here is that having a powerful client group promises a definite political payoff to an agency not only concerning the sustenance of policy but also regarding the expansion of the scope of policy that that agency is implementing. In the case of synfuels, neither the synfuels policy nor the Synthetic Fuels Corporation was in existence long enough for the creation of a synthetic fuels subgovernment.

It seems that in the 1980s, as a result of crowded governmental agenda, the permanence of a policy is virtually guaranteed so long as the problem that that policy is aimed at resolving remains highly visible. Put differently, the permanence of a policy can only be guaranteed as long as the problem it is aimed at resolving outlasts other problems that are competing for attention of the top decision makers. This high visibility of an issue enables the president and legislators to sustain their support of the policy. On the contrary, if the conditions that led to the formation of a new policy change drastically, then the need to maintain that policy and political support for the policy itself is also likely to dissipate equally drastically. If the supporters of a new policy under altered conditions do not band together to convert their newly-won political battles into long-range victory (in the form of establishing subgovernments), the opponents are likely to regroup in order to unravel and dismantle both the policy and the agency that administer it. That is precisely what seems to have happened in the case of synfuels. The world oil market since 1981, in a marked contrast to supply shortages and high prices that prevailed in 1979 and 1980, was characterized by an abundance of supplies in tandem with low oil prices. The soft oil market made federal commitment to capital-intensive synfuels totally unnecessary. This situation also made it considerably easier for the Reagan administration to reduce drastically the commitment of the federal government and to introduce substantial cutbacks in the administrative responsibility of the Synthetic Fuels Corporation. In fact, the continued unravelling of the synfuels policy was further assured, when on 19 June 1985, the House Energy and Commerce subcommittee voted to abolish "wasteful" Synthetic Fuels Corporation (HR 935).[31] Toward the end of 1985 Congress decided to abolish it.

[30] Ibid., 49–50.

[31] "House Panel Oks Bill to Abolish 'Wasteful' Synfuels Corporation," *CQWR*, 22 June 1985, 1222.

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Decisions on American Armed Intervention: Lebanon, Dominican Republic, and Grenada

H. W. BRANDS, Jr.

Like many standards of international conduct, the principle of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other nations has often been honored more in the the breach than in the observance, not least by the United States. For half a century since Theodore Roosevelt's corollary to the Monroe Doctrine gave way to the Good Neighbor policy of his cousin Franklin, the United States has officially espoused nonintervention as a diplomatic norm; yet from the Truman Doctrine to the Reagan Doctrine, American presidents have consistently claimed the right to protect the interests of the "free world" against communism, even when such protection implies intervention abroad. A strong argument can be made, and often has been, that the United States has been more interventionist since it adopted nonintervention as stated policy than it ever was before. Still, styles change, and with the exceptions of Korea and Vietnam, which constitute a class by themselves, the distinctive tactic of Big Stick diplomacy—the landing of marines—has fallen into relative disuse. Postwar American intervention has typically been covert (through the CIA) or indirect (through military and economic aid). Overt and direct applications of military force have been rare. Again excepting Korea and

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Vietnam, the most notable cases are three: Lebanon in 1958, the Dominican Republic in 1965, and Grenada in 1983.[1]

That unapologetic intervention has fallen on hard times is largely due to the anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist revolution of the postwar years. With nonintervention an international shibboleth, the diplomatic drawbacks of intervention have usually seemed larger than the potential gains. In the three cases of intervention cited, American leaders recognized the troubles they invited by sending in troops; but still they chose to deploy. Why they did is the subject of this article.

What follows is an analysis of the decision-making process that led to intervention. The perspective is American: that is, the emphasis is on what American officials thought and what they thought they knew at the time they decided to intervene. Whether their perceptions were accurate and whether the interventions accomplished what they hoped are important but different questions, and they are not of concern here. The first and longer part of the article consists of an examination of several important factors common to the chains of events leading to the three decisions to intervene. The second and shorter part comprises an attempt to weigh the significance of the factors examined and to sketch the outline of a theory of American intervention.[2]

The Pattern of Instability

In each of the three interventions, the decision to send in troops was made against a background of instability. This instability was both regional and local; in each case local turmoil was a reflection, and in some ways a distillation, of regional troubles.

The pattern of regional instability preceding the intervention in Lebanon in July 1958 needs little explanation. In living memory, no area has been more consistently judged the world's tinderbox than the Middle East. Following the Suez crisis of 1956, the Eisenhower administration feared a vacuum of western influence in

[1] These three cases do not exhaust the list of potential candidates for analysis, of course. The intervention in Lebanon in 1982 and after comes readily to mind. However, to keep the study manageable in size and to prevent giving excessive weight to the actions of the Reagan administration, the more recent Lebanon intervention has been excluded.

[2] For an introduction to the theory and practice of American intervention, see the following: Andrew M. Scott, *The Revolution in Statecraft: Intervention in an Age of Interdependence* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1982), esp. chaps. 7 and 8; Richard A. Falk, *Legal Order in a Violent World* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), esp. chap. 5; Robin Higham, ed., *Intervention or Abstention: The Dilemma of American Foreign Policy* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1975); D. A. Graber, *Crisis Diplomacy: A History of U.S. Intervention Policies and Practices* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959); Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, eds., *Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978); Richard A. Falk, ed., *The Vietnam War and International Law*, 4 vols. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968–1976), various selections; Richard J. Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World* (New York: New American Library, 1968); Herbert K. Tillema, *Appeal to Force: American Military Intervention in the Era of Containment* (New York: Crowell, 1973).

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the region; its response was the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957, which declared in effect that the United States considered the Middle East worth fighting for.

In Lebanon, the instability of the region was compounded by the precarious nature of that country's politics, based on an intricate design for power sharing among the country's various religious groups. Camille Chamoun, Lebanon's Christian president, embraced the Eisenhower Doctrine and several months later indicated that he planned to amend the Lebanese constitution to allow his own reelection. This brought to a boil the simmering discontent among the country's Muslim majority, who looked not to the West but to the east and south—especially to Cairo and to the Arab nationalism of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. In April 1958, a U.S. State Department intelligence report described Lebanon's Muslims as "increasingly restive" under Chamoun's openly prowestern policies, and it predicted "widespread public disorder" if Chamoun persisted in his reelection scheme.[3]

In the case of the Dominican intervention of April 1965, the regional instability again requires little explanation: Central America and the Caribbean have been a concern to United States leaders since the nineteenth century. Fidel Castro's victory in Cuba in 1959 heightened American worries that the region might slip out of control; the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 seemed convincing evidence of the high stakes involved. Lyndon Johnson's troubles in the Caribbean basin began in early 1964 with anti-American riots in the Panama Canal Zone. This storm eventually blew over, but not before reminding the Johnson administration of the uncertain position the United States occupied in the affections of the people of the region.

Local instability in the Dominican Republic had worried American leaders since the assassination of long-time dictator Rafael Trujillo in May 1961. Out of the confusion following Trujillo's death, elections were eventually held, but the winner, Juan Bosch, proved a disappointment to the Kennedy administration; the American ambassador, John Bartlow Martin, went so far as to suggest that Bosch might be a "deep-cover Communist." Following Bosch's overthrow in 1963, the new American ambassador, W. Tapley Bennett, soon established friendly ties with Donald Reid Cabral, the leader of the ruling junta. Though Bennett liked him, many of Reid's compatriots did not; beset by a failing economy, Reid soon came under attack from several directions. While popular sentiment moved toward the restoration of Bosch, leftist groups called for more sweeping reforms; and the army, disaffected by Reid's attempts to curb corruption, appeared little disposed to come to his rescue. When reports leaked out of Reid's intention to cancel or rig elections scheduled for the autumn of 1965, the country seemed primed for an explosion. Ambassador Bennett, who had a flair for colorful reportage, cabled Washington: "Little foxes, some of them Red, are chewing at the grapes."[4]

[3] Report 7784: "Political Crisis in Lebanon," 15 April 1958, Office of Intelligence Research and Analysis, Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

[4] Martin in John Bartlow Martin, ed., *Overtaken by Events* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966),

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The regional instability behind the Grenada intervention was a continuation of the same pattern of restiveness that surrounded the Dominican affair. By the time Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, though, American attention focused on two countries especially: El Salvador and Nicaragua. In the opinion of the new administration, the former was fighting for its democratic life: the latter had already joined the Moscow-Havana axis and was actively seeking further converts.

Grenada entered the picture as an example of what the Reagan administration feared might happen to the rest of the region if radicalism were allowed to flourish. Under Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, Grenada had moved toward closer relations with Cuba and had begun accepting Cuban military aid. By 1982, the Reagan administration was becoming increasingly alarmed at what the President called "the tightening grip of the totalitarian left in Grenada." A visit by Bishop later that year to Moscow did not help matters, nor did the construction of what the Reagan administration judged to be a suspiciously long airport runway. "Who is it for?" Reagan asked rhetorically, and then answered his own question: "The rapid buildup of Grenada's military potential is unrelated to any conceivable threat. . . . The Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada, in short, can only be seen as power projection into the region." Suddenly, in October 1983, Bishop was overthrown in a coup that brought to power individuals thought to be even more radical, notably the former deputy prime minister, Bernard Coard. Bad as the situation had seemed under Bishop, it now appeared to be getting worse.[5]

The Not-so-hidden Hand

In each of the three interventions, American leaders detected beneath the local unrest the influence of a malign presence just over the horizon. In Lebanon, the individual thought to be pulling strings was Nasser; in the Dominican Republic and Grenada, Castro.

In the case of Lebanon, the unsettling influence of Nasser had been felt by American leaders at least since the Suez affair, but the Egyptian president's presence became especially noticeable in the spring of 1958 as the tension in Lebanon increased. A visit by Nasser to Damascus prompted what American intelligence analysts described as a "pilgrimage" by tens of thousands of Lebanese Muslims to listen to the principal spokesman for Arab nationalism. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, describing Nasser's role in Lebanon's troubles, declared, "The master-

347. W. Tapley Bennett in Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, eds., *Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise of Power* (New York: New American Library, 1966), 513. The best account of the events in the Dominican Republic is Piero Gleijeses, *The Dominican Crisis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

[5] *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1982* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), 1983), book 1, 213; *Public Papers: Reagan, 1983* (Washington: GPO, 1984), book 1, 440. Useful comments on the Grenada intervention and the events leading up to it can be found in Eldon Kenworthy, "Grenada as Theater," *World Policy Journal* 1 (Spring 1984): 625–647; and Michael Rubner, "The Reagan Administration, the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and the Invasion of Grenada," *Political Science Quarterly* 100 (Winter 1985–1986): 627–647.

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mind is very apparent." Allen Dulles, the director of the CIA, agreed, saying that "the hand of Nasser" was "clearly apparent." At a meeting with the two Dulles brothers, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Nathan Twining concurred that if the United States failed to take strong action, "Nasser would take over the whole area." Eisenhower, referring to the threat that turmoil in the Middle East posed to western access to oil supplies, told Vice President Richard Nixon that the Lebanese crisis was the result of "the struggle of Nasser to get control of these supplies—to get the income and the power to destroy the Western world."[6]

What Nasser was to the Eisenhower administration's perceptions of the Middle East, Castro has been to American perceptions of Latin America ever since the Cuban leader came to power. While the general charges leveled against Castro are well-known and require no repetition here, the more specific allegations regarding his involvement in the Dominican Republic and Grenada are worth notice.

The Dominican crisis began in earnest with an uprising against Reid on 24 April 1965. Within twenty-four hours, the CIA reported that Communist elements were making rapid inroads into the leadership of the rebellion; and over the next three days, CIA officials tracked with concern the activities within the provisional rebel government of a number of individuals with known connections to Cuba and Castro. Ambassador Bennett seconded the assessment of the intelligence community when he asserted that all the "valid elements" of the democratic left had fled or gone underground and that "the issue here now is a fight between Castro-type elements and those who oppose it [sic]." In Washington, Secretary of State Dean Rusk told congressional leaders that law and order had broken down in Santo Domingo as a result of the arming of civilians by the "Castro-trained Communist supporters" of the rebel leadership. CIA chief William Raborn added that there had been "positive identification" of three "ring-leaders" of the rebels as "Castro-trained agents." To Johnson, the Dominican crisis was part of the same cold war struggle the United States had been fighting for two decades. The President told Undersecretary of State George Ball and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara that "We have resisted communism all over the world—Vietnam, Lebanon, Greece. What are we doing under our doorstep?" Johnson insisted on strong action so that, as he put it, "Castro cannot take over."[7]

[6] Report 7784, 15 April 1958, Office of Intelligence Research and Analysis, Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives. Dulles telephone conversation with William Knowland, 16 July 1958, box 8, Telephone Calls Series, Dulles Papers, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. Memorandum of conference, 14 July 1958, box 11, Subject Series, White House Office of the Staff Secretary Papers, Eisenhower Library. Memorandum for the record, 14 July 1958, *Declassified Documents Reference System (hereafter DDRS)* (Washington, D.C.: Carrollton Press, 1976), R-628H. Staff notes, 15 July 1958, International Series, Eisenhower Papers as President, Eisenhower Library.

[7] CIA situation report, 25 April 1965, box 5, History File, National Security File, Johnson Library, Austin, Texas; and various field reports in the same place. Santo Domingo to State Department, 28 April 1965 (1:43 p.m.), box 4, ibid. (Here and below, understood words and punctuation omitted from telegrams have been reinserted.) Minutes of meeting with congressional leadership, 28 April 1965, box 1, Meeting Notes File, Johnson Papers, Johnson Library, Notes of meeting, 30 April 1965, box 13, Valenti Notes File, Office Files of the President, Johnson Library.

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The worries of the Johnson administration about Castro in the Dominican Republic of 1965 were matched by those of the Reagan administration regarding Grenada nearly twenty years later. Castro's influence in leftist movements in Nicaragua and El Salvador had seemed clear to Reagan and his advisers from the time they took office; within a year, the President was speaking of Grenada in the same terms. In February 1982, Reagan described the "dark future" for Central America that was being foreshadowed by "the poverty and repression of Castro's Cuba" and "the tightening grip of the totalitarian left in Grenada and Nicaragua." When the coup of October 1983 ousted Bishop, the hand of Castro seemed to be tightening its grip still further. The administration's assessment was that whether Castro had played a direct role in Bishop's overthrow or not, he would certainly benefit by it. Two days after the American landing, Reagan declared that Grenada was "a Soviet-Cuban colony being readied as a major military bastion to export terror and undermine democracy." Another official, who preferred not to be identified, summarized administration sentiments regarding the decision to intervene with the comment, "There was no way this administration was going to miss a chance to kick Fidel where it hurts and take one back from the communists."[8]

The Rush of Events

In each of the three cases examined, tension built up over a period of months and with it the perceived threat to American interests. But tension is a normal state of affairs in much of the world, and the interests of a global power like the United States are always at risk. What was required to put the troops into motion was an event or series of events that convinced Washington that decisive action could no longer be delayed.

The situation in Lebanon stabilized somewhat following the May 1958 crisis that evoked Chamoun's tentative request for help. Eisenhower had been prepared to approve Chamoun's request, believing that the time had come to halt what he called the "pattern of gangsterism" sweeping the world; but before he could act, the tension eased, and the worst seemed to have passed. Then, in the second week of July, a military coup in Baghdad toppled the prowestern government of Iraq, sending shock waves throughout the region. The shah of Iran was convinced that the coup was the work of Nasser, whom he described as the "heart of the octopus which is gradually strangling the Middle East." Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion concurred, characterizing Nasser as a tool of the Soviet Union. From Riyadh, King Saud called for intervention by the Baghdad Pact, adding that if the West did not act, he would be forced to throw in his lot with Nasser. In Beirut the Lebanese government was on the verge of panic. Chamoun's foreign minister, Charles Malik, later declared flatly, "Lebanon's life was at stake." Chamoun con-

[8] *Public Papers: Reagan, 1982*, book 1, 213; *New York Times*, 27 October 1983; *Time*, 7 November 1983, 42; *Newsweek*, 7 November 1983, 75.

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curred, telling the American ambassador: "I feel that Lebanon is in real danger. . . . I want your assistance. . . . Not by words—but by action."[9]

In the Dominican crisis, the decision to intervene was precipitated by what appeared to the American embassy as a rapid deterioration of the position of antirebel forces on the afternoon of 28 April 1965. During the previous few days the Johnson administration had resisted pleas from the Dominican military for troops, believing that such assistance would cause the United States to be cast, as chargé d'affaires in Santo Domingo, William Connett, put it, "in the role of an interventionist power opposing a popular revolution of democratic elements overthrowing an unpopular unconstitutional regime." This reluctance to get directly involved persisted until the afternoon of 28 April, when all at once the antirebel resistance appeared to be crumbling. As late as three o'clock, Ambassador Bennett considered the deployment of American troops unnecessary, but within two hours he reversed his position. After receiving reports from all over Santo Domingo that junta forces were becoming disorganized, dejected, and in some cases hysterical, Bennett rushed a cable to Washington declaring that only American intervention could arrest the complete disintegration of the government. Said Bennett, "[T]he time has come to land the marines."[10]

In the Grenadian intervention, the Reagan administration watched during the third week in October 1983 what it took to be the rapid slide of Grenada downward into leftist chaos. Following his arrest a few days before, Bishop reemerged apparently triumphant on 19 October when a crowd of several thousand supporters overwhelmed his guards and swept the prime minister to a rally in St. George's. From there, the crowd and Bishop continued to the headquarters of the army, where according to eyewitness accounts troops loyal to the new regime opened fire. A dozen people were killed, and Bishop was seized, to be executed shortly after. A twenty-four hour curfew was announced, with the warning that violators would be shot on sight. In Washington, the murder of Bishop and what Reagan called the "barbaric shoot-to-kill curfew" seemed to indicate that the moment for action had arrived. On 20 October the President ordered a group of marines bound for Lebanon to be diverted to the eastern Caribbean. The following day an American consular officer from Barbados flew to Grenada to assess the situation. On 22 October an urgent appeal for American action arrived in Washington from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. During the next forty-eight hours,

[9] Eisenhower telephone conversation with Dulles, 14 May 1958, box 10, Telephone Calls Series, Dulles Papers, Eisenhower Library. Teheran to State Deparment, 19 July 1958, box 5, Subject Series, White House Office of the Staff Secretary Papers, Eisenhower Library. Ben-Gurion to Eisenhower, 24 July 1958, box 7, White House Memoranda Series, Dulles Papers, Eisenhower Library. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956–1961* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), 270. Charles Malik Oral History, Mudd Library, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J. Camille Chamoun Oral History, Princeton.

[10] Santo Domingo to State Department, 26 April 1965 (10:08 a.m.), 28 April 1965 (3:16 p.m.), 28 April 1965 (5:16 p.m.), box 4, NSC History File, National Security File, Johnson Library.

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Reagan consulted with top American diplomatic and military officials; on 24 October, the President gave the order to proceed with the landing.[11]

The Aura of Legitimacy

Because of the official American tradition of nonintervention, each of the three administrations sought to cloak intervention with the appearance of legitimacy. This was not always a straightforward matter; nor was the appearance of legitimacy universally convincing.

Chamoun's request for American troops provided the legitimation for the intervention in Lebanon; a request for assistance from an elected president was deemed sufficient justification for intervention. As Eisenhower put the matter in his public explanation of the purposes of the landing, Lebanon was exercising with American support its "inherent right of collective self-defense," as defined in the charter of the United Nations.[12]

In the case of the Dominican intervention, an invitation from the country's rulers preceded the intervention, as Ambassador Bennett was careful to point out in the urgent cable calling for marines. In this case, though, the inviting authorities were unelected, and so there was serious question regarding how much weight this invitation could be expected to bear. For this reason, the Johnson administration sought from the moment the necessity of intervention was perceived, to bring the Organization of American States (OAS) into the picture. Turning to the OAS was essentially a matter of form; the organization was notified rather than consulted about the American landings. Indeed, so extraneous was the OAS that the original draft of Johnson's announcement of the intervention contained no mention of the organization; the omission was corrected only after it was pointed out at Johnson's briefing of congressional leaders. Still, despite the President's disdain for the OAS, captured in his notorious comment that it "couldn't pour piss out of a boot if the instructions were written on the heel," better the OAS than nothing.[13]

In the Grenadian intervention, the legal authorization, such as it was, came in the form of a request by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) "to restore order and democracy" on Grenada. The OECS was chosen as the legitimizing agent primarily because neither the OAS nor the smaller Caribbean Community would support intervention. Even the request of the OECS was open to some question, since in the first place the request that the United States "acceded to" was in fact drafted in the American State Department, and second, the charter

[11] *Time*, 7 November 1983, 27; *Department of State Bulletin*, December 1983, 68–70; *New York Times*, 30 October 1983; *Newsweek*, 7 November 1983, 75.

[12] *Department of State Bulletin*, 4 August 1958, 181.

[13] Santo Domingo to State Department, 28 April 1965 (5:16 p.m.), box 4, NSC History Series, National Security File, Johnson Library. Meeting with congressional leaders, 28 April 1965, box 1, Meeting Notes File, Johnson Papers, Johnson Library. Johnson on the OAS in Philip Geyelin, *Lyndon B. Johnson and the World* (New York: Praeger, 1966), 254. On the role of the OAS, see Jerome Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), 67ff.

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of the OECS specified that collective action could only be taken with the unanimous consent of the member states, of which Grenada, whose acting government obviously did not consent, was one.[14]

Americans in Danger

Beyond such legitimacy as was provided by requests for intervention or the involvement of an international body, each administration could and did fall back on the claim that intervention was necessary to protect the lives of American citizens. With the waning of the unabashed interventionism that marked American hemispheric relations in the first third of the twentieth century, sending the marines to protect American property became rather passé. Rectifying unjust seizure of property was now a job for diplomacy and international courts, or for the CIA. American lives in danger, however, could still be counted on to stir support and silence critics, at least in the United States.

In his address announcing the landing of American troops in Beirut, Eisenhower dwelt for a moment on the violence that had accompanied the coup in Baghdad. Setting the tone for his discussion of conditions in Lebanon, the President described the "great butchery" in the Iraqi capital. "Many of the leading personalities were beaten to death or hanged and their bodies dragged through the streets," Eisenhower told his television audience. Though the President had no such graphic details regarding the situation in Beirut, the violence there being primarily potential, Eisenhower's juxtaposition of the two cases made a threat to Americans in Beirut seem plausible. In any event, he went on to say that a primary reason—he was careful not to say *the* primary reason—for the intervention was "to protect American lives."[15]

In the Dominican intervention, the Americans-in-danger theme was even more apparent; Johnson administration officials were fully convinced that the threat to American lives was very serious. Several hours before he requested marines, Ambassador Bennett described an incident at a hotel in Santo Domingo in which a large number of Americans, "mostly women and children," had been terrified by rebel irregulars searching for their enemies. As the situation deteriorated, the threat to Americans seemed to increase proportionally. In the cable in which he called for troops, Bennett flatly declared, "American lives are in danger." Johnson used precisely those words a few hours later in his televised explanation of the intervention. The President added that the Dominican military authorities had announced that they could no longer guarantee the safety of Americans and that American assistance was needed for that purpose.[16]

[14] *New York Times*, 26 October, 27 October, 30 October 1983.

[15] *Department of State Bulletin*, 4 August 1958, 183–184.

[16] Santo Domingo to State Department, 28 April 1965 (12:59 a.m.), 28 April 1965 (5:16 p.m.), box 4, NSC History Series, National Security File, Johnson Library, *Department of State Bulletin*, 17 May 1965, 738.

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In the Grenadian case, the protection of American lives was also cited as the primary reason for intervention. Reagan characterized the new rulers of Grenada as "a brutal gang of leftist thugs," and he described how they had "violently seized power, killing the Prime Minister, three Cabinet ministers, two labor leaders and other civilians, including children." The President admitted that there were other objectives involved in the American landing, but he declared that the purpose "of overriding importance" was "to protect innocent lives."[17]

Bureaucratic Consensus

Considering the noninterventionist public stance of the United States and the consequent fact that military intervention invites the perception of American hypocrisy, a noteworthy facet of each intervention was the near-unanimity of support within each administration. Although the weeks and months preceding each intervention witnessed a weighing of the advantages and disadvantages of military action, as each crisis mounted opinions coalesced and dissent dissolved. The claim of consensus must not be pushed too far. In none of the three cases was support for all aspects of the timing, means, and objectives of intervention absolute. Complete consensus is almost never found in large bureaucracies; the American national-security establishment is no exception. The State Department, the Pentagon and the military, and the CIA—to name three of the major contenders for influence—have different missions and different orientations. These differences did not disappear entirely in the interventions described. The striking fact, though, is that at the decision-making level, on the basic decision of whether or not to deploy, consensus reigned.

During the spring of 1958, when the question of assistance to Lebanon first arose, John Foster Dulles described the numerous ill consequences of American intervention. "[I]f we should go in," he told Eisenhower, "we must expect a wide reaction—the pipelines to be blown up, the [Suez] canal denied to us, and a wave of feeling against us throughout the Arab world." Allen Dulles agreed with this gloomy assessment, adding that since "the situation might collapse within twenty-four hours," a decision ought to be postponed. Though Eisenhower at this point leaned more toward intervention, he too believed that no decision should be made at the moment, and for several weeks the question of intervention hung fire. With the Baghdad coup in July, however, hesitation vanished. As soon as the news of the coup reached Washington, the Dulles brothers met with Nathan Twining of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the three agreed that for the United States to fail to act would lay open the entire Middle East to Nasser. Inaction, they believed, would endanger American military installations in the region and gravely damage American prestige around the world. At a White House meeting a short while later, Eisenhower concurred. Following brief summations by his chief intelligence, dip-

[17] *New York Times*, 26 October 1983.

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lomatic, and military advisers, Eisenhower turned to Twining and asked, "How soon can you start, Nate?" To Twining's reply that operations could be set in motion at once, the President said, "Well, what are we waiting for?"[18]

In the Dominican crisis, the consensus for intervention formed rapidly in the hours preceding the deployment of troops. Prior to the late afternoon of 28 April 1965, the Johnson administration had refused repeated requests from the antirebel military leaders for American forces. However, with a suddenness that critics of the intervention would equate with panic, the administration swung around to intervention. Bennett's cable calling for deployment of troops emphasized that this request reflected not merely his own opinion but that of all the responsible officials associated with the embassy. Bennett wrote "[T]he country team is unanimously of the opinion that . . . the time has come to land the marines." When this cable reached Washington, it was carried to a meeting where Johnson and his top foreign-policy advisers—Rusk, McNamara, Ball, and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy—were discussing Vietnam. All agreed that the administration had no feasible choice but to follow Bennett's advice. When Johnson met with congressional leaders two hours later to explain the situation, he laid particular emphasis on the consensus behind the decision to intervene. At two separate points in this meeting, the President declared that intervention was the "unanimous" recommendation of all officials in the policy stream, from the ambassador in the Dominican Republic through the secretaries of state and defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[19]

Regarding Grenada, a detailed rendering of Reagan administration thinking prior to the decision to intervene is not yet possible. Reports indicate, though, that Secretary of State George Shultz and National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane were among the leading advocates of intervention from the time news of Bishop's death reached Washington. Other officials worried that intervention would fuel a new wave of anti-Americanism in Latin America; Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger and Joint Chiefs Chairman John Vessey apparently wanted more time to study

[18] Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower,* vol. 2 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 464–465. Memorandum for the record, 14 July 1958, *DDRS*, (R)628H. Robert Cutler, *No Time for Rest* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), 363–364. On the emergence of consensus in this situation and in later crises in the Middle East, see Alan Dowty, *Middle East Crisis: U.S. Decision-Making in 1958, 1970, and 1973* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). Though Nathan Twining supported intervention, some of the individual service chiefs apparently worried that a commitment to the Middle East would weaken America's military posture elsewhere. See Emmet John Hughes, *The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years* (New York: Atheneum, 1963), 263.

[19] Santo Domingo to State Department, 26 April 1965 (7:26 a.m.), 28 April 1965 (3:16 p.m.), 28 April 1965 (5:16 p.m.), box 4, NSC History Series, National Security File, Johnson Library. George W. Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern* (New York: Norton, 1982), 328. Minutes of meeting with congressional leadership, 28 April 1965, box 1, Meeting Notes File, Johnson Papers, Johnson Library. In the case of the Dominican Republic, the consensus for intervention gained impetus in part from the Johnson administration's winnowing out of dovish types on the Vietnam issue. In this context, though, George Ball's support of intervention in the Dominican Republic is significant, for Ball was perhaps the administration's foremost skeptic on Vietnam.

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the amount of resistance to be expected. However, as the situation in Grenada continued confused and apparently threatening, such differences as had existed gave way to consensus. Among the President's closest advisers, support for intervention appears to have been unanimous. Said one Reagan aide, "There were no divisions whatsoever within this White House – no second guessing on anything." Another asserted, "Everyone was gung-ho." In the administration generally, according to a *Newsweek* article based on discussions with administration officials, there was a "total absence" of dissent. Though such participant claims of solidarity have to be handled carefully, the existence of a basic consensus for intervention seems clear.[20]

Congressional Acquiescence

In each of the three interventions, the president was careful to let Congress in on the decision before it was announced by means of a briefing of influential congressional leaders. In each case the purpose of the meeting was more to inform than to consult; however, the meeting also allowed the administration to gauge the degree of opposition that might be expected from the legislative branch. Despite the serious diplomatic and perhaps military ramifications that intervention might have, and despite the fact that a certain degree of criticism would later arise on Capitol Hill, in none of the three cases did congressional leaders make strong objection at an early stage when it might have had some effect.

To a great extent, Eisenhower spiked the guns of potential critics in advance with congressional approval of the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957. Though the idea embodied in the Middle East Resolution of that year initially ran into some opposition in the Senate, it ultimately became law, committing the legislative branch as well as the executive to the defense of the Middle East against communism. When Eisenhower summoned the congressional leadership to the White House in the wake of the coup in Baghdad, this commitment provided a powerful precedent arguing for intervention. At this meeting, the President and the two Dulles brothers stressed the danger to the western position in the Middle East if strong action were not taken. Although Eisenhower and his advisers could not demonstrate that the threat to Lebanon was exactly the "overt armed aggression from a nation controlled by international communism" envisioned by the Middle East Resolution, the legislative leaders, after expressing some reservations, apparently decided that Eisenhower's actions fit the spirit, if not the letter, of the law. Reassured by Eisenhower's statement that he would take full responsibility for the in-

[20] *Time*, 7 November 1983, 27; *Newsweek*, 7 November 1983, 82. Though Weinberger went along with the intervention, his support was less than enthusiastic. (See *New York Times*, 7 November 1983.) The defense secretary's reservations about the use of military force in general later gave rise to his widely-publicized six-part test for deployment of troops abroad. (See *New York Times*, 29 November 1984.)

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tervention, the legislators chose not to challenge the judgment of the former supreme commander and general of the army that troops were necesary.[21]

Johnson had not laid the groundwork for congressional cooperation in advance, but within two hours of Bennett's call for marines, the President began applying the Johnson treatment to his former colleagues from the Senate and their counterparts from the House. Following briefings by Rusk, McNamara, and CIA Director William Raborn, and after hearing Johnson read from Bennett's dramatic telegrams, the legislators raised no objections to intervention. Not that they were disposed to dissent; indeed they were almost enthusiastic. Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen spoke of the necessity of going to "the heart of the matter"; he urged Johnson to make sure that the measures taken were "vigorous and adequate"; and he declared, "I will stand up for you." House Speaker John McCormack thought it "obvious" that the situation in the Dominican Republic was "not consistent" with the national interest; he asked rhetorically whether the United States could afford "another Castro of this sort." At the end of this meeting, when Johnson asked for objections to the intervention, no one responded. Perhaps the most noteworthy measure of congressional approval was a statement by Senator J. William Fulbright—later a vocal critic of the intervention—who told Johnson on leaving an even more thorough briefing a few days later: "This has been the most informative meeting we have ever had. I feel much better informed. I support you fully."[22]

In the case of the intervention in Grenada, congressional leaders were summoned to the White House on 24 October 1983, the evening before the landings began. As in the previous cases, the meeting was primarily a matter of courtesy, since the decision to intervene had already been made. Still, the Reagan administration presented an opportunity to object, and no one chose to take advantage of it. Charles Percy, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, later said of the meeting that "no objections were raised, only questions." House Speaker Thomas O'Neill, a veteran Reagan critic, had a slightly different perspective on the matter, but his summary of the meeting did not differ materially from Percy's. Said O'Neill, "We weren't asked for advice. We were informed what was taking place. I have no intent to get into any type of dialogue critical of my Government at this time." This was O'Neill's rendering after leaving the White House; another account indicated a softer touch during the meeting. According to this version, O'Neill patted the President on the shoulder and said, "God bless you, Mr. President, and good luck."[23]

[21] Memorandum of conference, 14 July 1958, box 3, Subject Series, White House Office of the Staff Secretary Papers, Eisenhower Library. Robert A. Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 100.

[22] Minutes of meeting with congressional leadership, 28 April 1965, box 1, Meeting Notes File, Johnson Papers, Johnson Library. Congressional briefing, 2 May 1965, box 13, Valenti Notes Series, Office Files of the President, Johnson Library.

[23] *New York Times*, 26 October 1983; *Newsweek*, 7 November 1983, 82.

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Bad Memories and Noises Off

Each of the factors contributing to intervention described thus far relates more or less directly to the crisis that evoked intervention. However, it is vital to remember that for each president involved, the place where intervention occurred was but one small country in a world of responsibilities. Each president brought to his deliberations regarding intervention memories of what had gone wrong in the past and what was going wrong concurrently—or might soon go wrong—elsewhere.

For Eisenhower, as indeed for his entire generation of policy makers, the paradigm governing American diplomacy was "Munich." Though Eisenhower was not so explicit in equating Nasser to Hitler as were others, notably British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, Eisenhower firmly believed that aggression of any form had to be resisted immediately. Beyond remembering Munich, Eisenhower in 1958 was in the middle of a year that his foremost biographer would describe as "the worst of his life." The launching of the Russian Sputnik the previous autumn had called into question Eisenhower's leadership in the space and weapons race; within months, "gaps" had been discovered in satellites, bombers, missiles, science, and education. And then, while the nation was turning to Eisenhower to see what he would do to reverse the trend, the President suffered a stroke. While recovering, his administration was hit hard by influence-peddling charges against White House Chief of Staff Sherman Adams, who later was forced to resign. With Eisenhower's age showing and his right-hand man on the way out, many wondered whether the administration was capable of decisive action.[24]

Johnson in 1965 also labored under the burden of Munich, but he had a different analogy readier to hand: Cuba. The primary objective of Johnson's Latin American policy, like that of several other presidents, was the prevention of "a second Cuba." At the same time, Johnson had another major worry on the other side of the globe: Vietnam. In February 1965, Johnson had ordered the beginning of Operation Rolling Thunder, the bombing of North Vietnam. In March and April the build-up of American ground forces had begun. At the end of April, just as the situation in the Dominican Republic reached the crisis stage, Johnson was preparing to go to Congress to request additional appropriations to prevent a Communist victory in South Vietnam.

Reagan, like Johnson, had one particular nightmare and one major ongoing problem. The nightmare was Iran; when Bishop's death was followed by the round-the-clock curfew and the closing of Grenada's airport, Reagan administration officials feared a taking of hostages from among the large group of Americans on the island. Having ridden to office on charges of his predecessor's incompetence in handling the Iranian affair, Reagan did not intend to experience such a predicament himself. Reagan's major ongoing problem was the Middle East, specifically Lebanon. A few weeks before the Grenada intervention, Congress had hotly debated the President's plan to station more than 1,000 marines in Lebanon as part

[24] Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, vol. 2, 486.

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of an international peacekeeping force. Though the administration had managed to gain congressional approval, the margin of victory was uncomfortably narrow. In late September many Americans expressed alarm as American forces openly began taking the side of the Lebanese army against its rivals and as American ships bombarded rebel positions in the hills above Beirut. On 23 October, while the Reagan administration pondered its response to events in Grenada, a terrorist driving a truck full of explosives demolished the American marine headquarters in Lebanon, killing 241 American soldiers.

Conclusion

The discussion above has indicated several common elements surrounding the decisions to send troops to Lebanon in 1958, to the Dominican Republic in 1965, and to Grenada in 1983. The discussion below is an attempt to account for these parallels and assess their importance and to offer the outline of a theory of intervention.

In each of the three cases instability at the local level provided both the motive and the opportunity for intervention. The motive followed from the basic fact that the United States is a status-quo power: instability by its nature is usually judged threatening. In Lebanon and the Dominican Republic, American troops intervened to preserve the local status quo against disruption by forces considered dangerous to American interests. In Grenada, the decision to intervene was made with the intention of restoring the status quo ante Bishop.

Instability provided the opportunity for intervention in that in an unstable and fluid situation the possibility of tipping the balance in a direction favorable to the United States was increased; or to put the matter differently, the desired outcome could be achieved with a modest expenditure of resources and prestige. In Lebanon and the Dominican Republic, American officials acted to preempt takeovers by undesirable elements; Eisenhower and Johnson recognized that rooting out radical regimes once entrenched would be difficult militarily and nearly impossible politically. In Grenada, unfriendly elements were already in power, but only tenuously so; a small push and they would be gone.

Regional instability seems to have played a role beyond the contribution that it made to troubles at the local level. Regional turmoil, whether in the Middle East or in the Caribbean basin, acted as a sounding board for events in the locality, both before and—it was hoped—after intervention. To the Eisenhower administration, Lebanon's troubles were merely manifestations of the deeper danger of Nasser's radical pan-Arabism. To Johnson and Reagan, turmoil in the Dominican Republic and Grenada were symptoms of the disease that Castro had introduced to the region. In large measure, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, and Grenada were taken as tests of American resolve to defend American interests in critical regions. If America failed to act, the entire area would be at risk; on the other hand, a resounding American victory would give pause to enemies and heart to friends.

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The importance of the not-so-hidden hand of Nasser in Lebanon and of Castro in the Dominican Republic and Grenada lay in its powers of simplification. At one level, blaming regional troubles on one bad man makes it easier for an intervening administration to sell intervention to the American public. Villains are less difficult to understand than the complicated wellsprings of popular unrest that usually underlie revolutionary situations. At a second level, less conscious but perhaps no less important, this simplification process also works within the minds of those making the decisions for intervention. Any president has a limited amount of time to devote to study of the problems of a Lebanon or Dominican Republic or Grenada. Even to country and area specialists, the issues involved are complex and often confusing. To a nonspecialist president, confronted with numerous other problems and the need for a decision at once, the presence of a familiar—even if unfriendly—face makes matters more comprehensible than they would otherwise be. Devils and conspiracies are always with us, for solid psychological reasons.

The fact that events rushed to the crisis stage was instrumental in the creation of a bureaucratic consensus supporting each intervention. In such hurried conditions the ever-present bureaucratic imperative to avoid bucking a majority is enhanced. In a more protracted decision-making process, the quagmire analogy is apt; a step-by-step approach allows time for reflection and defection. Sudden decisions, on the other hand, are better compared to jumping off cliffs, and here togetherness appears to be the rule. Furthermore, in confusing circumstances in which reports from the front are unclear or contradictory, the natural reaction of bureaucrats, whose *raison d'etre* is national security, is to prepare for the worst. Better to risk a public-relations defeat and assure strategic victory than to suffer a strategic setback innocent of intervention.

In some measure the same considerations apply to congressional acquiescence in intervention, though here the imperative is less bureaucratic than political. For congressional leaders opposition to an intervention that seems even remotely justified is politically hazardous. The costs of obstructing an intervention that later proves warranted usually outweigh the benefits of preventing an unnecessary action.

However, consulting Congress is not entirely a formality, for on occasion congressional leaders do say no. Eisenhower certainly was aware of this fact; when considering American intervention in Indochina in 1954, he had broached the idea with congressional leaders and had been rebuffed.[25] Johnson's incremental approach to Vietnam was largely due to concern that Congress would not support a faster build-up. Reagan had experienced a close call with Congress on the question of sending troops to Lebanon. Each of these counterexamples again makes

[25] This is not to say that congressional opposition was entirely responsible for Eisenhower's decision against military intervention in Indochina. The President himself was skeptical of the possibility of success at reasonable political cost; congressional opposition confirmed him in his skepticism. The best study of decision making on Indochina is George C. Herring and Richard H. Immerman, "Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu: 'The Day We Didn't Go to War' Revisited," *Journal of American History* 71 (September 1984): 343–363.

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clear the importance for intervention of events rushing to a climax. When the need for a decision can be seen approaching from a distance, opposition has time to form and a president can hardly avoid consulting at least the leaders of Congress; when decisions are demanded immediately, an administration can often get by with announcing a *fait accompli*.

The significance of the aura of legitimacy is very great in one sense, in that for an avowedly noninterventionist country like the United States, it is the diplomatic *sine qua non* of intervention. In another sense, though, it matters little; for, as the examples suggest, a fig leaf of one sort or another can usually be found.

The Americans-in-danger theme falls into the same category, in part because it is the ultimate legitimizing rationale, and in part because any country of interest to the United States government is bound to harbor at least a few Americans. Almost any violent or potentially violent challenge to the status quo is likely to present at least a presumption of threat to American lives, not least because Americans are often seen as the quintessential representatives of the status quo. Furthermore, this rationale is irrefutable even after the fact, for once the troops have gone in, it is impossible to say what would have happened had they not.

The importance of bad memories and offstage commotion cannot be overemphasized. The specter of past mistakes and of their grim consequences, whether military, diplomatic, or political, pushes presidents in the direction of landing the marines first and asking questions later. Beyond this, intervention is in many ways an essentially symbolic act, meant for a larger audience than the people of the country of the intervention. Eisenhower intervened in Lebanon to demonstrate that the United States was more than a negative influence in the Middle East—an idea that had crossed some minds after Suez—and to prove that the many commitments that Eisenhower and Dulles had undertaken around the world would be met. When Johnson sent troops to the Dominican Republic, his action was a statement about American resolve in the Caribbean, but its significance for Southeast Asia could not be missed. For Reagan, Grenada offered an opportunity to act forcefully and to achieve a victory—however small—at a moment when the region of more immediate concern, the Middle East, presented only frustration and defeat.

So what does all this mean with respect to a theory of intervention? Explanations of past events are one thing; theories of human action certainly ought to be able to account for that which has already occurred. But any more ambitious theory ought to have some predictive value as well. Does the discussion above provide any clues as to when and where future intervention might take place?

While recognizing the obvious fact that human nature, especially under political, military, and diplomatic stress, is notoriously unpredictable, the answer to this last question is: probably yes. The parallels described above would appear to indicate, first, that intervention by American troops is most likely to occur in a country and a region of chronic or at least protracted instability—in a place where the military and diplomatic costs of intervention are likely to be outweighed by its probable broad impact. Second, a decision in favor of intervention is facili-

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tated by the presence nearby of an individual on whom the troubles of the region can be blamed, consciously or otherwise. Third, the deployment of troops is most likely when, within the pattern of instability, events rush to a climax, forcing the bureaucrats together and outracing congressional opposition. Fourth, the availability of some legitimizing authority makes diplomatic explanations more convenient, although such authority is usually not difficult to find. Fifth, the presence of endangered Americans – also usually available – makes intervention easier to justify, especially to the domestic American audience. Finally, the shadow of past failures and present problems elsewhere predisposes presidents toward the kind of symbolic action that intervention in small countries like Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, and Grenada, essentially is.

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The Electoral Connection Meets the Past: Lessons from Congressional History, 1789–1899

ELAINE K. SWIFT

As with the puzzle that all dynamic, complex political organizations present, the modern U.S. Congress has fascinated scholars with the number and variety of its pieces: the decline of involuntary congressional turnover; the increase in members who make Congress their career; the weakening of institutional leadership; the decrease in party voting and other manifestations of party discipline; and the growth in individual legislator's staff, perquisites, and other resources. To solve this puzzle would require making sense of a variety of trends in virtually every dimension of legislative life including members' accountability to the electorate, legislative voting patterns, internal organizational structure, and distribution of institutional and political power.

David Mayhew's remarkable 1974 book, *Congress: The Electoral Connection*, not only took up the task, but gained wide and lasting acceptance as one of the most important theories of the contemporary Congress. According to Mayhew, the key to the congressional puzzle lies in understanding members' goals of careers in Congress and by extension their goals of reelection. How is it that incumbents are able to win reelection and so make Congress their professional base? Mayhew sketches his argument, an application of rational choice theory, as follows:

> I shall conjure up a vision of United States congressmen as single-minded seekers of reelection, see what kinds of activity that goal implies, and then speculate about how

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congressmen so motivated are likely to go about building and sustaining legislative institutions and making policy.[1]

Mayhew describes the kinds of activity these career-oriented and thus reelection-oriented members of Congress engage in as credit claiming, position taking, and advertising. Credit claiming includes pursuits such as casework and pork barreling for which a legislator can stake out individual responsibility. Position taking is assuming a stand with little or no follow-up action, while advertising is establishing an image with minimal issue content.

To facilitate their goals of congressional careers and the election-oriented activities they require, incumbents have shaped a Congress suitable to their ambitions. Congressional offices, committees, and subcommittees provide them with the resources and personnel needed to pursue their strategies. More critically, weak parties in and out of Congress leave incumbents the required political freedom to tailor issue stands and voting records. To get elected, members "build a power base that is substantially independent of party."[2] Once in Congress, they find party leadership is nominal at best and party voting, while still significant, "however defined, has been declining since the turn of the century."[3]

Critics of Mayhew's theory have raised two central questions. First, some have disputed whether members of Congress pursue careerism over other goals. Careerism, they argue, is a proximate goal;[4] one of many goals;[5] or a goal that grows less important as a member's tenure increases.[6] Similarly, others have also taken issue with the theory's treatment of legislative activity. Some have argued that responsible legislating remains a significant part of a member's job;[7] while others have explored Congress's institutional capacity for national policy making.[8]

Besides the descriptive criticism, others have asked whether the explanation actually accounts for one critical piece of the congressional puzzle—incumbents' electoral success. Donald A. Gross and James C. Garand argue that the trend of an increased number of safe seats for incumbents began in the 1890s, predating the widespread existence of conditions and factors associated with an electoral-connection Congress, such as increased amounts of institutional resources and perquisites. In direct tests of the political efficacy of the constituency-centered strate-

[1] David R. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 5–6.

[2] Mayhew, *Congress*, 26.

[3] Ibid., 103.

[4] Rochelle Jones and Peter Woll, *The Private World of Congress* (New York: The Free Press, 1979), 9–10.

[5] Steven S. Smith and Christopher J. Deering, *Committees in Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984), chap. 4.

[6] Richard Fenno, *Homestyle* (Boston: Little Brown, 1978), 216–224.

[7] Arthur Maass, *Congress and the Common Good* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), chap. 4.

[8] James L. Sundquist, *The Decline and Resurgence of Congress* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981), part two.

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gies that Mayhew identifies, Thomas E. Mann and Raymond E. Wolfinger[9] and John R. Johannes and John C. McAdams[10] found that different credit-claiming activities made no appreciable contribution to incumbents' victory margins.

This article poses a third important question: do the paradigm's predictions on congressional behavior and organization hold true? As Samuel Huntington observes, for a theory to be accepted and useful, one of the major criteria it should meet is that it should account for both continuity and change.[11] If it fails to do so, it fails to account for conditions that are an intrinsic part of political experience.

Putting the electoral-connection theory's predictive power to the test is eased by its monocausality—members' career goals have molded Congress as an electoral connection. The theory, therefore, explains Congress's past and future as well as its present mainly in terms of changing career goals. While Mayhew is ambiguous on the history of how and when careerist ambitions began to shape the institution, Morris Fiorina's similar theory suggests that it at least in part can be traced to the efforts of turn-of-the-century members to produce a legislature hospitable to members' aims for careers in Congress. And so the 1910 revolt against the Speaker of the House "can be interpreted as an attempt by the rank and file to reduce the uncertainty surrounding a congressional career."[12]

Mayhew pegs Congress's future to members' pursuit of their career goals. A prospective shift in current behavioral and organizational patterns is unlikely so long as individual objectives remain static. Nonetheless, he recognizes other sources of congressional change that he discusses in terms of "four theoretically interesting 'reform recourses' to which Americans have turned or thought about turning": strengthening the presidency, stepping up muckracking, regulating campaign finance, and increasing political parties' abilities to provide leadership and enforce discipline both in Congress and in the political system as a whole.[13] None, however, are as powerful a congressional influence as rational pursuit of career goals. Presidents' and muckrakers' power is limited, because they check, but do not alter, the goal-driven congressional dynamic; while electoral laws and party reform have the potential to directly affect Congress, they have not fulfilled their potential either currently or historically.

[9] James C. Garand and Donald A. Gross, "Changes in the Vote Margins for Congressional Candidates: A Specification of Historical Trends," *American Political Science Review* 78 (March 1984): 17–30. Thomas E. Mann and Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Candidates and Parties in Congressional Elections," *American Political Science Review* 74 (September 1980): 617–632.

[10] See John R. Johannes and John C. McAdams, "The Congressional Incumbency Effect: Is it Casework, Policy Compatibility, or Something Else?" *American Journal of Political Science* 25 (August 1981): 512–542; and McAdams and Johannes, "Does Casework Matter? A Reply to Professor Fiorina," *American Journal of Political Science* 25 (August 1981): 581–604.

[11] Samuel P. Huntington, "Paradigms of American Politics: Beyond the One, the Two, and the Many," *Political Science Quarterly* 89 (March 1974): 12.

[12] Morris Fiorina, *Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 6.

[13] Mayhew, *Congress*, 168.

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How can Mayhew's predictions of an electoral-connection future be fairly tested in the limited time that has elapsed since they were made? Even granted such a short period, some important and unexpected changes have taken place: the voluntary retirement rate has significantly increased and various congressional reforms have centralized more power in the Speakership and party caucus. But all in all, Congress has continued to develop true to theoretical form: members still aim for multiterm tenure in Congress and so pursue goals of reelection; at the same time, the thrust of congressional reforms has enhanced tendencies toward individualistic behavior and a decentralized institution.

Before conclusions can be drawn about the explanation's predictive ability, however, a longer time period is needed. How to provide one? Following Mayhew's example, but pushing the time line back, I will conjure up a vision of the members of the pre-Jacksonian Congresses from 1789 to 1829 as being single-mindedly ambitious about their political careers. I will offer evidence that they pursued these careers through activities similar to Mayhew's modern members and were aided in their pursuits by a weak party system and a supportive congressional infrastructure.

By drawing an analogy between the pre-Jacksonian and contemporary Congresses, my intent will not be to offer an electoral-connection interpretation of the congressional past. Rather, it will be to show that although the main outlines of Mayhew's theory can *arguably* be applied to both the modern and early Congress, it fails to explain important changes in congressional behavior and organization. More specifically, having established a pre-Jacksonian analogue, I will then show that an electoral-connection theory fails to account for an individual and institutional partisan orientation that began in the Jacksonian era and continued for most of the rest of the century. This suggests that career goals may not be the key to explaining Congress either past or present.

Methods

Because of the long time frame this article encompasses, I have necessarily adopted the following research methods. First, I have restricted my attention to the U.S. House, because the bulk of secondary sources is devoted to it. Although it would have been preferable to have given explicit attention to the Senate, major sources on Senate history indicate that the article's conclusions on the House can also be applied to it.[14]

Second, because of the difficulty of collecting original evidence on the use of Mayhew-type electoral strategies by all pre-Jacksonian congressmen, I have con-

[14] Including Barbara de Boinville, ed., *Origins and Development of Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1982); Noble E. Cunningham, *The Process of Government Under Jefferson* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978); George Haynes, *The Senate of the United States* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1938); and Clara Hannah Kerr, *The Origin and Development of the U.S. Senate* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Andrus and Church, 1895).

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fined my attention to a sample of members whose patterns of use were relatively accessible to research: the 118 House authors of 261 circular letters collected in editor Noble Cunningham's *Circular Letters of Congressmen to Their Constituents, 1789 to 1829.*[15]

What were these letters? In many ways forerunners of today's district newsletters, the letters themselves were two to four pages long. Posted under congressional franks, they contained news of national politics, particularly congressional affairs. The letters were sent by members of all political stripes and parties. Some timed their letters to arrive near election day, and many included a reminder that the member was seeking reelection. While some authors protested that their correspondence was not political, every opinion advanced defended the position taken by the author.[16]

The authors, who include 112 representatives who wrote 250 letters, 5 delegates who wrote 7 letters, and one delegate later elected as a representative who wrote one letter as a delegate and three as a representative, are in many ways a diverse group. According to Cunningham, there is, for example, "no apparent correlation between the writing of circular letters and the role played by a member of Congress,"[17] with authorship embracing the active and prominent such as Federalist leader Robert Goodloe Harper of Maryland as well as the relatively obscure such as John Heritage Bryan of North Carolina.

In two ways, however, the authors have much in common. First, although exact figures on party identification are difficult to arrive at, the authors appear to be mainly Republicans. The authors' party affiliation, however, is typical of the House of this period. After 1802, according to Richard Hofstadter's estimates, "there was no time . . . when the Federalists held more than 30 percent of the Senate (in 1815–1817) or more than 37 percent of the House (in 1813–1815)."[18]

More distinctive are the authors' regional affiliations: of the 118, only six were from the North, while the rest were divided between the South and the West. Cunningham speculates that the regional concentration is due in part to the isolation of southern and western congressional constituents, not only from the nation's capital but also from one another. Perhaps more important reasons lie in electoral practice and local political conditions. Elections in these regions were usually held on a district versus at-large basis, not only establishing a more personal connection between congressmen and constituents, but also making mailings more feasible. Local political conditions of weak or nonexistent parties were coupled with regional acceptance of open and direct electioneering to render the letters and other entrepreneurial electoral activities politically valuable.[19]

[15] Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., ed., *Circular Letters of Congressmen to Their Constituents, 1789–1829* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978).

[16] These and other details on the letters can be found in Cunningham, ed., *Circular Letters*, introduction.

[17] Ibid., xxiii.

[18] Richard Hofstadter, *The Idea of a Party System* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 173.

[19] Cunningham, ed., *Circular Letters*, xxiv-xxvii.

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While the regional affiliations of these letter writers make them a generally nonrepresentative group, as I will later discuss in more detail, secondary sources confirm that they were more typical of their contemporaries in two critical respects. First, the chief political characteristic of their regions—weak political parties—was also characteristic of the country as a whole. In addition, their career goals, strategies to achieve those goals, and congressional constraints on achievement were not unusual in the early House.

Patterns of Political Position Holding

Turning to the application of Mayhew's electoral-connection model to the pre-Jacksonian House, 1789 to 1829, let us begin at the same point where Mayhew begins his analysis: political ambitions. How were the political ambitions of early congressmen similar to today's members? Certainly not in their pursuit of reelection—the high turnover rates of the early Congress have been oft-explored.[20] Less well-known is the Jeffersonians' particular brand of political ambition—holding various elective or appointive political positions at different governmental levels both before and after House service. Thus, regardless of whether members' post-congressional careers consisted of elective or appointive office, they needed to build and maintain back-home support for the following reasons. First, even if they subsequently held only appointed positions or elective offices with entirely different sets of constituents, it would be unlikely that they could foresee this possibility while in Congress. In the fluent political career patterns of the early nineteenth century, the conservative strategy would be to maximize the present base of support in order to increase the flexibility needed to pursue future political prospects. But second, even if members' could foresee that their constituencies' support would never directly be useful to them again, their political reputations and thus their chances at other offices would probably be higher if they retired as popular incumbents able to win reelection if they so desired.

For specific information on the political positions held by the letters' authors, I compiled a list of the posts they held according to the *Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1789–1971*[21] and the *Dictionary of American Biography*,[22] substantiating any ambiguous career information with primary and secondary research. Although this method provides a fairly good estimate of the number of positions that the letter writers held, it has some significant limitations owing to its main sources, the *Directory* and the *Dictionary*. In addition to the fact that the biographical entries in both are brief, the *Directory's* inaccuracies

[20] See, for instance, Morris P. Fiorina, David W. Rohde, and Peter Wissel, "Historical Change in House Turnover" in Norman J. Ornstein, ed., *Congress in Change* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), 24–57.

[21] *Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1789–1971* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971).

[22] Allen Johnson, ed., *Dictionary of American Biography* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943).

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TABLE 1

Governmental Level and Number of Political Positions Held by Circular Letter Writers According to Stage of House Officeholding

Stage of House Officeholding[1]	*Governmental Level and Number of Political Positions*							
	Local	*State*[2]	*Federal*	*Senate*	*Judiciary*	*Military*	*Misc.*	*Total*
Before Congressional Office	24	162	21	1	35	67	3	313
After Congressional Office	1	99	47	12	16	22	11	208
Total	25	261	68	13	51	89	14	521
%	5	50	13	3	10	17	3	101[3]

[1]Because of their limited number, positions held during House office were included with positions held after congressional office.

[2]This category also includes colonial and territorial positions.

[3]The percentages do not add up to 100 because of rounding.

are well-known, acknowledged even by its foreword. While the *Dictionary* was more reliable because its information was often based on primary research, it does not routinely include all former members of Congress. Only 47 out of the 118 circular letter writers were featured.

Data on the offices held by the letter writers were organized into the categories used in the most complete study of House career patterns to date—Allan Bogue, Jerome Clubb, Carroll McKibbin, and Santa Traugott's analysis of the career patterns of all House members who served between 1789 and 1960.[23] The categories are elected or appointed local, state or territorial, federal other than U.S. senatorial, U.S. senatorial, judicial, military, or miscellaneous. The local category includes town, municipal, or county positions. State or territorial, federal, and U.S. senatorial offices are self-explanatory. Judicial office encompasses all judicial posts in the local, state, or federal legal system, ranging from county court clerk to circuit prosecuting attorney to federal judge. Similarly, the military category embraces commissioned officers at local, state, and federal levels. Miscellaneous posts include offices as diverse as Texas Republic officials and political party convention delegates.

What then does the count of letter writers' positions reveal? As summarized in Table 1, there was a clear pattern of members holding one or more political positions both before and after House service. Prior to House service, members

[23] Allan G. Bogue, Jerome M. Clubb, Carroll R. McKibbin, and Santa A. Traugott, "Members of the House of Representatives and the Process of Modernization, 1789–1960," *Journal of American History* 63 (September 1976): 275–302.

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held a total of 313 political posts or an average of about 2.7 positions per congressman. Of the offices held, over half were state posts, about a fifth military commissions, and the rest fairly evenly divided among local, federal, and judicial positions. Position holding before House tenure was well-distributed among the letter writers as a whole. The *Directory* notes no prior political experience for only 10 of the 118 authors.

After House service, members held 208 offices or an average of about 1.8 positions per person. State office remained the principal employment, accounting for nearly half of the total number of positions. Federal office attracted more post-House than pre-House politicians, while local, judicial, and military positions attracted fewer post-House than pre-House members. The major difference between pre- and post-House careers, however, lies in the distribution of offices among members. The *Directory* mentions no subsequent political office for thirty-nine members or nearly four times the amount in the pre-House period. Upon closer inspection of *Directory* biographies, the number of those retiring from politics after House tenure is not as significant as it may seem. Of the thirty-nine, nine died in office and four lacked complete biographical entries, meaning that the *Directory* does not account for fifteen or more post-House years.

All in all, the chart profiles a group composed of very active politicians. Was this, however, typical of House members of the time? Statistics gathered from the *Directory* by Bogue et al. indicate that it was. Before congressional office, an average of about 31 percent of all pre-Jacksonian members had held local political positions, 72 percent state political positions, 12 percent federal political positions, 13 percent judicial positions, and 32 percent military commissions. For only 17 percent, the *Directory* lists no prior political position. After congressional office, an average of about 14 percent of all members held local political positions, about 35 percent state positions, about 16 percent federal positions excluding the Senate, and about 17 percent judicial positions. About 11 percent were elected to the Senate. For almost 43 percent of the congressmen, the *Directory* notes no further political service. The authors list no figures for post-House military service.[24]

Party and Institutional Conditions

As Mayhew observes, career-oriented behavior requires not only personal motivation, but also the freedom and resources to engage in it. Freedom comes in the form of lax party discipline, both on the state and congressional levels. Circular letter writers in the years 1789 to 1829 enjoyed both. The overwhelming majority of the authors were from the South and the West, areas particularly distinguished by the absence of party organization. Parties, where they existed in the South, were largely informal organizations. Congressional candidates commonly nominated themselves or were selected by loosely organized conferences, conventions,

[24] Ibid.

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or nominating committees. Campaigns were relatively limited, mainly restricted to either partisan groups or the candidate and his backers circulating handbills and political correspondence. In the West, politics was Republican in name, but usually conducted on a factional or nonpartisan basis. As in the South, nominations for congressional office were made by either the candidate himself or by partisan gatherings, and campaigns were also limited to distributing various types of campaign literature or political correspondence.[25]

Weak state parties, however, were by no means confined to the South and West. More recent scholarship emphasizes just how nonsystemic the first party "system" was, even in the more politically advanced New England and Middle States regions. From his analysis of secondary sources Ronald Formisano, for example, infers that in New England, only Massachusetts and Connecticut featured somewhat developed party organizations for a substantial period of the Jeffersonian era.[26] In the Middle States of New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, the level of organization varied, but nowhere was it high. New York's party organizations, which were among the most developed, nominated candidates and mobilized voters. Even so, "most organization was ad hoc, conducted as elsewhere through existing social networks"[27] and failed to evolve into a two party system.

In the House, neither congressional party leadership nor party voting were strong. Party leadership for most of this period was exercised by members selected and controlled by different administrations to advance executive, not necessarily congressional, policies and goals.[28] Most Speakers other than Henry Clay were partisan, but abdicated party leadership to administration spokesmen. Even Clay, although he pioneered the use of the Speakership as a party position, was far from politically invincible. In five out of the seven major policy controversies he prominently participated in, he failed to secure House majorities.

For a substantial portion of the Jeffersonian era, party voting collapsed. From

[25] Discussion on southern and western party politics is based on Richard P. McCormick, *The Second American Party System* (New York: Norton, 1966), chap. 2; and Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., *The Jeffersonian Republicans in Power* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1963), chap. 8.

[26] Ronald P. Formisano, "Federalists and Republicans: Parties, Yes—System, No" in Paul Kleppner et al., eds., *The Evolution of American Electoral Systems* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981).

[27] Ibid., 51–52.

[28] For information on party leadership in the House, I have relied on Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., *The Jeffersonian Republicans* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957); Cunningham, *The Jeffersonian Republicans in Power* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963); Cunningham, *The Process of Government under Jefferson* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978); William N. Chambers, *The Democrats in American Politics* (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1972); and Chambers, ed., *The First Party System: Federalists and Republicans* (New York: John Wiley, 1972). In this and other sections of this article, I have made careful use of James Sterling Young's *The Washington Community, 1800–1828* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1966), steering away from reliance on those facts and conclusions that have been vigorously criticized in Allan G. Bogue and Mark Paul Marlaire, "Of Mess and Men: The Boardinghouse and Congressional Voting, 1821–1842," *American Journal of Political Science* 19 (May 1975): esp. 221–229; and Cunningham, *The Process of Government under Jefferson*, esp. chaps. 12 and 13.

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1816 to about 1825, or during the Era of Good Feelings, parties and thus party loyalties were prostrated.[29] Even in the years preceding 1817, the longest period of continuous party voting in the pre-Jacksonian era, what strength parties had was interrelated with sectional and other influences. According to Rudolph Bell's analysis of 602 foreign policy roll-call votes taken between 1789 and 1812, one of the most thorough of any behavioral studies of the pre-Jacksonian House, although "party affiliation appears to be consistently related to . . . winning and losing coalitions," to a significant degree, "it emerged as a vehicle for the political expression of salient socioeconomic and geographically circumscribed forces. Party unity was nearly always a means, not necessarily an end."[30] In congressional behavior manifested in ways other than roll call votes, James Sterling Young finds partisanship weak or absent. In five out of six congressional nominating caucuses for which attendance figures exist, three were boycotted by Republican majorities and two by substantial party minorities of 39 and 43 percent each. In addition, in Speakership elections between 1798 and 1827, nine out of thirteen featured anywhere from one to nine candidates, not the two usually running in a competitive two-party House system.[31]

While a weak party system provided the letter writers with freedom, congressional committees provided them with valuable resources. Although the standing committee system was still developing in the pre-Jacksonian era, some committees had already acquired constituency-oriented reputations such as the Committee of Commerce and Manufacture, which was dominated by "commerce men"; the Committee of the Post Office and Post Roads, which was established in response to demand for increased postal services; the Committee on Claims, which handled most federally-related petitions; and the Committee on Public Lands, which processed land claims and determined policy on the sale of public land.[32]

Most of the other resources essential to contemporary career-oriented Representatives were nonexistent in the pre-Jacksonian era. Nonetheless, some were already in place and exploited by early members. Members took advantage of the frank to send their letters. Until 1804, when stricter regulations were instituted, some members may have had their letters printed on government stationery. In addition members also distributed government documents and newspapers to their constituents at government expense.[33]

Credit Claiming and Advertising

How then did these circular letter writers directly advance their career ambitions? Two strategies stand out: credit claiming and advertising. Credit claiming typi-

[29] George Nielsen, "The Indispensable Institution: The Congressional Party During the Era of Good Feelings," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 1968, 29 and 235.

[30] Ibid., 387.

[31] Young, *Washington Community*, chap. 6.

[32] Cunningham, *The Process of Government under Jefferson*, chap. 10.

[33] Cunningham, ed., *Circular Letters*, introduction.

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cally mentioned or implied legislative or bureaucratic liaison action or service on behalf of constituents either on an individual, group, or district basis, or more indirectly, on a statewide or sectional basis. Advertising notified constituents of upcoming constituency visits; reminded them of additional material, such as copies of laws, distributed separately by the members; or called their attention to constituency communications published in newspapers.

In counting credit claims I observed the following rules. First, the claims had to involve actual legislation or ombudsman work. Political rhetoric or speculation on future legislation was not noted. Second, where legislation was involved, only the piece of legislation itself, not the efforts on its behalf, was counted. Bureaucratic liaison work was similarly treated: the task, not the advocacy, was tabulated. Third, because credit claiming is a definitionally parochial activity, claims were counted only if they mentioned or implied benefits or service performed on behalf of a district, state, territory, and/or section of the country. Each claim's geographic constituency was recorded.

As Table 2 shows, credit claiming was not an unusual item in circular letters. As the figures on totals summarize, 455 claims in all were counted for an average of about two claims per letter. One hundred and fourteen or almost half of the 261 letters in the sample contained at least one claim. Seventy out of the 118 members in the sample, or about 60 percent, wrote the letters that had claims in them.

In the other columns of Table 2, the 455 claims were categorized by topic. In order of the number of claims, they were: land, internal improvements, economics, military, Native Americans, Post Office, and judiciary. Miscellaneous contains the forty-seven claims that remained after categorization.

Land-related credit claiming amounted to 118 claims, a little over a quarter of the total number of claims counted. Most of the claims here involved legislation and bureaucratic liaison work on issues and problems related to public lands and land titles. Representative Joseph Duncan of Illinois made a typical claim:[34]

> I framed the bill so as to enable settlers to select their donation tracts upon such land only as may have been two years in market, which embraces all the land that has ever been offered for sale in the State. As to the charge that I have mounted this bill to ride into office, it gives me no concern.[35]

Thirty-seven letters written by twenty-four members provided the 118 claims counted, with each letter containing an average of about three claims. The claims were fairly evenly divided among three geographic constituencies: thirty-five claims were directed to sections; thirty-seven to territories; and forty-two to states. Three were jointly targeted towards states and sections. Only one was district-directed.

Internal improvements was the second largest tabulation with ninety-one claims in all. It was also one of the more controversial issues of the time entailing as it did a significant federal role in local projects that ranged from constructing canals

[34] All excerpts appear as they do in Cunningham, ed., *Circular Letters.*
[35] Ibid., 1466.

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TABLE 2

Number and Public Policy Category of Credit Claims By Circular Letter Writers

Congress	Number and Public Policy Category of Credit Claims								
	Land Policy	*Internal Improvements Policy*	*Economic Policy*	*Military Policy*	*Native American Policy*	*Postal Policy*	*Judiciary Policy*	*Misc. Policy*	*Total*
1789–91	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	1
1791–93	–	–	–	–	–	2	–	–	2
1793–95	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	1
1795–97	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	1
1797–99	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0
1799–1801	5	–	2	1	–	3	5	4	20
1801–03	2	1	2	–	–	–	–	–	5
1803–05	5	–	–	–	3	2	1	2	13
1805–07	5	2	1	2	2	1	1	–	14
1807–09	–	–	2	2	1	–	1	–	6
1809–11	–	1	3	5	–	–	–	–	9
1811–13	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0
1813–15	10	1	32	6	1	5	2	6	63
1815–17	12	2	3	8	3	3	–	6	37
1817–19	8	1	–	13	4	3	–	1	30
1819–21	4	1	1	–	–	1	1	2	10
1821–23	7	2	3	1	1	–	1	2	17
1823–25	14	21	12	2	3	–	1	4	57
1825–27	18	21	2	3	3	3	3	5	58
1827–29	28	38	13	4	8	3	2	15	111
Total	118	91	77	48	29	27	18	47	455
%	26	20	17	11	6	6	4	10	100

and roads to clearing rivers, sounds, and inlets. Unsurprisingly, western members such as Representative James Clark of Kentucky were among the most active in advocating it:

> If there be one question in which the prosperity of Kentucky is more deeply concerned, and as to which her policy has been less varied, or her wishes more animated, than another, it is the great question of Internal Improvements. Aware that, unless artificial facilities of transportation are brought in aid of the natural advantages, the luxuriance of soil must be comparatively a barren blessing. . . .[36]

The ninety-one claims related to internal improvements were made in thirty-eight letters for an average of about two claims per letter. Most claims involved states with thirty-two state-specific; nineteen state- and section-specific; and three both state- and district-specific. Twenty-one claims were directed to territories and

[36] Ibid., 1396.

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twelve to sections. As with land claims, only one internal improvement claim was aimed at a district. In addition, three were both district- and section-directed.

Then as now, members of Congress were deeply interested in economic issues. Seventy-seven claims were counted, with claims touching on issues that ran the gamut of early American economic policy: domestic taxes, tariffs, banks, and the effects of the Jeffersonian embargo. Representative John Scott of Missouri described his efforts on a banking issue:

> The condition in which those indebted to the Bank of Missouri were placed by the failure of that Bank, is but too well known . . . To enforce the payment of those debts in the wretched state of the currency of the country, and the almost total absence of all specie, must result in the total ruin of many, and the injury of all indebted. To prevent this calamity, I used my exertions and obtained an order from the Treasury Department to suspend all executions on judgments already entered.[37]

Compared to land and internal improvement claims, fewer economic claims were made, but more letters made them: forty members advanced economic claims in forty-nine letters for an average of about one per letter. Economic claims were also different in their geographic orientations. Substantially more claims, twenty-two in all, were district-oriented plus two claims that were district- and section-targeted, and two that were district- and state-targeted. Twenty-five were aimed at sections, sixteen at states, and seven at sections and states and three solely at territories.

Military claims were a varied lot. Members took credit for, among other matters, securing military pensions, pay, and land warrants, and providing additional troops and posts to different areas. Ohio Representative James Kilbourn, for example, claimed credit for military posts:

> The most prominent measure perhaps, which, as your representative, I have had the honor to propose, is a plan of defence and protection of the Northwestern frontier of the U.S. by granting donations of land to actual settlers within, and erecting a line of fortified posts, immediately upon the north and western boundaries of this state and the territories west of us.[38]

Forty-eight military claims were made by twenty authors in twenty-six letters. Predictably, twenty-three or almost half of the claims were directed toward the more western areas, the territories. Four were directed to districts, fifteen to states, five to sections, and one to a section and a state.

Claims related to Native American affairs numbered only twenty-nine, but nonetheless succeed in outlining the usually hostile relationship between Native Americans and the United States in this era. Credit was claimed for removal of Native Americans from public lands, appropriations for carrying out various treaties, and the extinquishment of Native American titles to land. Twenty-one letters by fifteen authors contained the twenty-nine claims counted. About half

[37] Ibid., 1267.
[38] Ibid., 903.

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of the claims or fifteen out of twenty-nine were state-directed. In addition, two were aimed at both states and sections and one to a state and district. Eight were directed to territories and three to sections.

Postal affairs was one of the less numerous categories of credit claiming. Twenty-seven claims were counted, among them one made by Representative George Campbell of Tennessee:

> A post road has been established from Knoxville to Athens, in Georgia, and another from Burville to Wayne court house, in Kentucky—and a post road, which we succeeded, in having established at the last session, from Knoxville to the Tombigby settlements, is continued. These post roads will very much facilitate communications, by means of the mail, with our state.[39]

Besides announcing the opening of post roads, as in Campbell's letter, postal claims also mentioned favorable rates, construction of post offices, and better delivery service.

Twenty-two letters by sixteen authors contained the twenty-seven postal-related claims. Twelve were directed to territories and ten to states. Of the remaining five, two were aimed at districts, two at both districts and states, and one at both a district and a section. That the letters included relatively few postal-related claims is surprising. The Post Office "was the one real service agency of the early republic"[40] and enjoyed tremendous growth in this era. At least some of this growth can be attributed to congressional interest, with enthusiasts like Representative Lewis Williams of North Carolina declaring in 1829:

> It will be perceived that the increase in this [post office] establishment has been very great; but I would be willing to see it further extended, 'till every neighbourhood, nay almost every citizen should be accommodated with a post office at his door, if he should think it proper to have it so.[41]

While the judiciary may seem an unlikely area in which to claim credit, eighteen judicially-related claims were counted. Most of the claims dealt with the organization of the judicial system in the new states and the territories. Sundry claims included reviving charges against a judge and appointing additional judges. The eighteen claims counted were made in eighteen letters by twelve members. Ten were directed at states, four at territories, three at sections and one at a section and a state.

Miscellaneous is a grab bag of forty-seven claims. Six claims touched on aspects of territorial government, six others on constitutional amendments of benefit to constituents, and four on statehood issues. The other thirty-one were composed of claims on assorted subjects including disaster relief, the Yazoo controversy, and state boundaries. The claims were made in twenty-eight letters by twenty-two authors. Most were directed to territories and states or twenty-one claims and

[39] Ibid., 434.
[40] Cunningham, *The Process of Government under Jefferson*, 147.
[41] Cunningham, ed., *Circular Letters*, 1489–1490.

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TABLE 3

Number and Category of Advertising
By Circular Letter Writers

Congress	Number and Category of Advertising			Total
	Constituency Communications	*Constituency Visits*	*Newspaper Subscriptions*	
1789–91	–	–	–	0
1791–93	–	–	–	0
1793–95	1	–	–	1
1795–97	9	1	–	10
1797–99	7	1	–	8
1799–1801	5	2	1	8
1801–03	–	–	–	0
1803–05	1	–	–	1
1805–07	–	–	–	0
1807–09	9	1	–	10
1809–11	4	–	–	4
1811–13	–	–	–	0
1813–15	2	1	2	5
1815–17	1	–	1	2
1817–19	1	2	1	4
1819–21	–	–	–	0
1821–23	1	1	1	3
1823–25	–	–	1	1
1825–27	1	2	–	3
1827–29	3	2	–	5
Total	45	13	7	65
%	69	20	10	99[1]

[1]The percentages do not add up to 100 because of rounding.

eighteen claims respectively. Five were targeted to sections, two jointly to sections and states, and one to a section and a district.

Congressional advertising is divided into three categories. The first, constituent communications, were reminders of material sent or distributed to constituents, including newspapers, copies of bills and laws, and other official documents. Visit advertising were notices of upcoming constituency appearances. Newspaper advertising called readers' attention to letters, notices, or congressional proceedings published in newspapers.

My main rule in tabulating advertising was that only the advertising activity, for example publicizing an editorial letter in the newspapers, was counted and not the circulation such an item received. It did not make a difference in the tabulation whether the announcement was made in one or three newspapers.

As Table 3 shows, the letters contained significantly less advertising than credit claiming. Sixty-five examples in all were counted. Thirty-one members wrote the forty-five letters that contained the advertising.

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By far, most advertisements or forty-five instances were constituent communications. Typical of the references to communications was this one by Representative Joseph Desha of Kentucky:

> [B]y an examination of the President's messages of the 22d of March, and the 8th of November, 1808, and the accompanying documents, (of which I have distributed upwards of thirty copies of each through the district,) it will be found that our government has acted justly and impartially. . . .[42]

The limited amount of communications advertising mentioned in the letters, however, seems to underestimate the amount done by pre-Jacksonian representatives as a whole. Most, according to Cunningham, "regardless of whether they published speeches, addresses, or circular letters, furnished their constituents with copies of documents published by Congress."[43] In addition, copies of laws and newspapers were often distributed by members. Beginning in 1799, 5000 copies of each session's laws were printed for state distribution. Before 1802 unofficially, and between 1802 and at least 1829 officially, every member received three daily papers to distribute to his constituents.[44] Newspapers were an especially important means of advertising, containing as they did the most complete coverage of congressional debates in the period.

Only thirteen announcements of upcoming visits were counted. These were made by thirteen members in thirteen letters. While some announcements were terse, others elaborated on the reasons behind the visits, as in the letter of Matthew Lyon of Kentucky:

> [A]s soon as this letter is forwarded, I purpose to be on my way to Kentucky, and to pay a visit to your county, where I hope to be able, personally, to converse with my constituents, respecting their political concerns, and to shew to them, that I have well understood, and faithfully attended to their interests and that of the nation.[45]

As with mailings, however, there is evidence that visits were more regularly undertaken. According to circular letter writer Joseph White of the Florida Territory, "[i]n the thickly inhabited districts of the States, it is the habit of the Representative to visit his neighbours at their homes, or to meet them at their Court Houses . . . ."[46] Also, Congress at this time met only a few months of the year, leaving members to actually live in, not just visit, their districts, territories, or states.

Newspaper advertising was the least popular category, with only seven instances counted. Seven letters written by six authors contained this form of advertising in which members drew attention to letters, notices, or congressional proceedings published in newspapers. Again, however, such a small number does not seem to reflect the full extent of congressional newspaper advertising. As noted before,

[42] Ibid., 626.
[43] Ibid., xxix.
[44] Ibid., xxxi.
[45] Ibid., 591.
[46] Ibid., 1331.

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newspapers of the era covered Congress, especially the House, in depth and members circulated them widely. Thus, a member's speech or legislative role would be publicized. Newspapers in the South and West also frequently featured portions of circular letters.

Testing Predictions

We can see that Mayhew's theory of the twentieth-century congressional electoral connection can also be applied to the pre-Jacksonian House. As with modern representatives, these early members had long-term career ambitions for political office and used strategies likely to enhance their political bases of support. Assorted institutional perquisites and the benefits of a developing committee system facilitated their political individualism as did weak or nonexistent parties. These partisan conditions permitted a great deal of member autonomy in nominating and electioneering activities on the home front and political independence in Congress.

Moreover, we have seen evidence that these conditions and patterns of behavior were not confined to the circular letter writers. Pre-Jacksonian congressmen as a whole seem to have been aspiring politicians who widely engaged in at least some forms of credit claiming and advertising, taking advantage of the political freedom of the weak Federalist and Jeffersonian Republican parties and the resources of congressional office to do so.

Having drawn the pre-Jacksonian analogue to the modern electoral connection, we can now turn to Mayhew's predictions for its future. Mayhew, as mentioned before, is pessimistic on the prospects for fundamental congressional change. If members' career goals remain the same, he expects continued credit claiming, position taking, and advertising activities along with the low level of party voting and weak party leadership with which these activities are associated.

Mayhew, however, does recognize other factors that could potentially affect the electoral connection: campaign finance reform, powerful presidents, muckrakers, and stronger political parties. Since campaign finance reform is a twentieth-century phenomenon, it can quickly be dismissed as an historical explanation. Of the remaining factors, each seems incapable of fundamentally diverting a legislative electoral connection. Presidents and muckrakers, for instance, have in the past exercised important influence on Congress by constraining its particularistic tendencies and enhancing its accountability. Nevertheless, members' career goals and the kind of legislature produced by those goals are left intact.

Although stronger political parties in Congress and/or in the political system as a whole could vitiate the sort of autonomy legislators need in order to pursue their goals of congressional careerism, Mayhew rules them out as a probable reform. Outside of Congress, "the main thrust of reform in twentieth-century America has been to destroy parties rather than to strengthen them."[47] Inside Congress,

[47] Mayhew, Congress, 175.

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party reform initiated by career-oriented members with strong, personal incentives to maintain minimal political discipline seems a far-fetched scenario at best.

Did the post-Jeffersonian Congress fulfill Mayhew's predictions for the future of an electoral connection? Because a thorough review of congressional history of that period is beyond the scope of this article, we will explicitly deal with the three out of four elements of his predictions for which an appreciable amount of secondary research is available: congressional career goals, levels of party voting, and the strength of majority party leadership. By virtue of Mayhew's logic that the level of career-oriented activities is roughly in inverse proportion to the strength of party leadership and degree of party voting, we can infer the amount of career-oriented activities undertaken by nineteenth-century representatives from available evidence on party voting and party leadership.

What does the roll-call literature reveal about post-Jeffersonian congressional voting behavior? According to Margaret Susan Thompson and Joel H. Silbey's review of research on the nineteenth-century Congress, "it shows that party almost always prevailed as the dominant force at any given moment in U.S. politics after the 1820s."[48] While nonpartisan or extrapartisan blocs like southerners, Radical Republicans, or Scalawags were influential in different eras, different Congresses, different sessions, or on various issues, "they were likely to appear as exceptions or deviations from the norm, emerging intermittently, if often importantly, but without the persistence or reach of party loyalties."[49]

The nineteenth century's partisan trend began in the 1830s as the second party system emerged.[50] Although party voting fluctuated from session to session in this decade, it tended to increase for both parties by about the same rate.[51] In the 1840s, although sectionalism dramatically reared its divisive head in the middle of the decade with the rise of the territorial expansion issue, its influence was largely confined to slavery-related questions.[52] In other areas, such as economic issues,[53] land policy, the tariff, internal improvements, and foreign affairs, party remained the chief influence.[54] Although with the coming of the Civil War in the 1850s representatives became less partisan- and more sectionally-oriented, sectionalism

[48] Margaret Susan Thompson and Joel H. Silbey, "Historical Research on 19th Century Legislatures" in Gerhard Loewenberg, Samuel C. Patterson, and Malcolm E. Jewell, eds., *Handbook of Legislative Research* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 709–710.

[49] Ibid., 709.

[50] Most of the voting literature reviewed for the analysis below is compiled in Joel Silbey's "Congressional and State Legislative Roll Call Studies by U.S. Historians," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 6 (November 1981): 597–607.

[51] Alvin Lynn, "Party Formation and Operation in the House of Representatives, 1824–1837," Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University, 1972, 442.

[52] Joel H. Silbey, *The Shrine of Party: Congressional Voting Behavior, 1841–1852* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), chap. 5.

[53] Thomas B. Alexander, *Sectional Stress and Party Strength: A Study of Roll-Call Patterns in the United States House of Representatives, 1836–1860* (Nashville, Tenn: Vanderbilt University Press, 1967), chaps. 4–8.

[54] Silbey, *The Shrine of Party*, chaps. 3–7.

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never succeeded in replacing party as the preeminent behavioral force, and party remained a significant influence.[55]

Beginning in the 1860s, partisanship once again became the most important influence on voting behavior. In their analysis of party voting on all roll-call votes between 1861 and 1974, Jerome Clubb and Santa Traugott found the level of partisanship in the 1860s "moderately high" compared to the other decades.[56]

The last decades of the nineteenth century saw a rise in party voting levels, although the trend was not linear and it varied by issue. Party voting steadily increased from 1871 through the early 1880s, dramatically fluctuated between the early 1880s and the middle 1890s, and thereafter rose again, peaking between 1903 and 1905.[57] From 1873 to 1897, Carl V. Harris reports that Congress more clearly divided along party lines on issues such as civil rights, internal revenue measures, and the tariff after 1887. But even in areas in which the Democrats were sectionally split, such as money, the income tax, the tariff before 1887, and railroad regulation, "the sectional cleavage was always blurred by the party dimension, and the sectional polarity on these issues was never as sharp as was the party polarity on such partisan issues as Negro rights."[58]

The evolution of the nineteenth-century partisan Speakership paralleled the general patterns in partisan voting behavior.[59] In the 1830s the House was dominated by partisan Speakers Andrew Stevenson and James Polk, who between them manipulated committee assignments and House rules and procedures for partisan ends. Although Speakers of the antebellum era usually sought not to lead, but to moderate the increasingly divided House, Speakers after 1860 enlarged and exploited their parliamentary and political powers to secure their positions as chief party leaders. With the exception of J. Warren Keifer's two year tenure, every Speaker after 1860 "has systematically used his office as a political office; and no party or important group seriously question that the Speaker is and should be a party leader."[60]

If nineteenth-century House partisanship, measured in terms of the levels of party voting and the power of the partisan Speaker, increased and by inference congressional individualism decreased, what can account for the partisan turn taken by members of Congress after 1830? Within the theoretical framework of the elec-

[55] Silbey, *The Shrine of Party*, chaps. 8 and 9 and Alexander, *Sectional Stress and Party Strength*, chaps. 9–13.

[56] Jerome M. Clubb and Santa A. Traugott, "Partisan Cleavage and Cohesion in the House of Representatives, 1861–1974," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 7 (Winter 1977): 389.

[57] Clubb and Traugott, "Partisan Cleavage," 382–383.

[58] Carl V. Harris, "Right Fork or Left Fork? The Section-Party Alignment of Southern Democrats in Congress, 1873–1897," *Journal of Southern History* 42 (November 1976): 502.

[59] The following analysis of the Speakership is drawn from two standard works on the nineteenth-century House Speakership, Hubert Bruce Fuller's *The Speakers of the House* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1909); and Mary P. Follett's *The Speaker of the House of Representatives* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1896).

[60] Follett, *Speaker of the House*, 97.

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toral connection, most obviously representatives' career goals may have changed from the pre-Jacksonian era, thus increasing the incentives to engage in partisan voting and support a strong, partisan Speakership. A career explanation, however, is deficient on two counts. First, it does not account for the change in partisan patterns of the antebellum House, because career patterns were stable. Up to about the 1850s, House turnover remained high and congressmen continued to maintain a career pattern of holding a variety of political positions at different governmental levels before and after House service.[61]

Second, although representatives' career patterns started to take on a more modern configuration in the latter half of the nineteenth century, they did not have the effect Mayhew predicts. According to Samuel Kernell, beginning in the 1850s representatives increasingly opted for a more stable, specialized career pattern featuring a greater desire to stay in Congress. This can be seen in the greater percentage of members running for reelection to the House. Whereas in the 1850s only 60 percent of the House ran for reelection, by the 1890s it had steadily grown to 73 percent.[62] Yet, while later nineteenth-century representatives were increasingly coming to resemble contemporary congressional careerists, the House was looking less and less like an electoral connection. Instead of declining partisan voting behavior and the weakened party leadership that Mayhew predicts, the House of this period featured historic peaks in partisan voting and a strong, partisan Speakership.

Career goals, then, appear to have little relationship to partisan behavior, as measured by partisan voting; to partisan leadership, as measured by the presence of a strong, partisan Speakership; and, by inference, to the amount of career-oriented activities. Political careerist patterns of the antebellum House were stable throughout the development of an increased partisan orientation. House careerism of the later nineteenth-century Congress coincided not with an electoral connection, but with one of a marked partisan character.

Conclusion

What does the past suggest about Congress interpreted as an electoral connection? Drawing an analogy between the modern House and the pre-Jacksonian House allowed us to evaluate Mayhew's predictions for the future of a legislature driven mainly by the career goals of its members. The evaluation leads us to conclude that career goals had little relationship to major features of congressional behavior and organization in the nineteenth century.

Where a limited temporal perspective almost always focuses only on institutional equilibrium, a longer perspective allows attention to the highly interrelated states of change and equilibrium. In so doing, it reveals a broader picture of perti-

[61] Fiorina et al., "Historical Change," 29–31 and Bogue et al., 289 and 293.

[62] Samuel Kernell, "Toward Understanding 19th Century Congressional Careers: Ambition, Competition, and Rotation," *American Journal of Political Science* 21 (November 1977): 684, 690–692.

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nent factors and facilitates a more accurate assessment of those that have a significant versus a spurious impact. In the case of the theory of the electoral connection, a long-term perspective leads us to reject career goals as the dynamic of congressional change. Just as importantly, it also suggests that those variables that Mayhew dismisses as predictive elements, such as party-system change, need to be reexamined.

If career goals had little relationship to important aspects of congressional behavior and organization, party systems had stronger links. From the Jeffersonian era to the end of the nineteenth century, party systems came and went, each associated with particular changes in congressional behavior. The Federalists and especially the Jeffersonian Republicans were responsible for the development, albeit limited, of partisan behavior and party leadership. Partisan cohesion and a partisan Speakership took hold with the formation of the Democratic and Whig parties, while Republicans and Democrats rejuvenated partisan voting behavior and congressional leadership between the Civil War and the 1890s. The system of 1896 set in place a wide range of factors including decreased voter participation rates and an increased number of safe Congressional seats that continue to affect Congress.

The association between party system and congressional partisan behavior is not, of course, a new observation. Students of Congress have long drawn relationships between party realignments and congressional partisan behavior, among them E. E. Schattschneider and H. Douglas Price.[63] Still others have more closely specified the various effects these relationships might have, including David Brady; Barbara Sinclair; Lester Seligman and Michael King; and Jerome Clubb, William Flanigan, and Nancy Zingale.[64]

Important as these contributions have been, still lacking is a systematic theory of the dynamics of party system change on congressional change, a theory that is necessary for a better understanding of Congress past, present, and future.*

[63] E.E. Schattschneider, "United States: The Functional Approach to Party Government" in Sigmund Neumann, ed., *Modern Political Parties: Approaches to Comparative Politics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956); and H. Douglas Price, "Careers and Committees in the American Congress: The Problem of Structural Change" in William O. Aydelotte, ed., *The History of Parliamentary Behavior* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).

[64] David Brady, "Congressional Elections and Clusters of Policy Change in the U.S. House: 1886–1960" in Bruce A. Campbell and Richard J. Trilling, eds., *Realignment in American Politics: Toward a Theory* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980); Barbara Sinclair, *Congressional Realignment*: 1925–1978 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982); and Jerome Clubb, William H. Flanigan, and Nancy H. Zingale, *Partisan Realignment: Voters, Parties, and Government in American History* (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1980).

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Interest Groups and the White House under Roosevelt and Truman

JOSEPH A. PIKA

As an institution, the American presidency is shaped by a wide range of influences, some contemporary in nature while others are embodied in precedents derived from earlier administrations. Analysts, therefore, are confronted by the need to work within multiple time frames.[1] What appears to be an innovative departure in the structure or operations of the presidency may, in fact, be an extension of practices developed by earlier administrations. The emergence of public liaison as a White House staff specialization illustrates this analytic problem.

Early in the presidency of Gerald Ford, White House assistants responsible for liaison with a variety of separate interest-group constituencies were relocated into a single Office of Public Liaison (OPL). This new office included aides assigned to work with blacks, white ethnic Catholics, women, youth, Jews, Hispanics, American Indians, the elderly, business, labor, and consumers. The Carter White House adopted a different structure for assigning specialists to work with virtually the same range of organized interests, but Ronald Reagan reestablished much of the original OPL structure upon assuming office. As a new component of the White House staff, public liaison has not yet developed as clearly articulated a role as the press office or congressional relations, but its staff has concentrated on several activities: linking White House policy makers with knowledgeable spokespersons of organized interests, particularly those likely to be affected by policy

[1] Bert Rockman, "Constants Cycles, Trends and Persona in Presidential Governance: Carter's Troubles Revisited," paper presented at the 1979 meetings of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.

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decisions; organizing friendly interest groups into coalitions designed to lobby for presidential proposals on Capitol Hill; answering group inquiries and explaining administration policies.[2]

Several observers have suggested that the appearance of public liaison in the White House is the response of recent presidents to a new constellation of forces among interest groups, political parties, and national institutions that took shape in the 1970s. Martha Kumar and Michael Grossman draw particular attention to the rapid proliferation of lobbyists in the nation's capital and the spread of political action committees, indications of substantial growth in the power of organized interests.[3] Simultaneously, political parties declined as effective devices for intermediation of presidency-interest group contacts, a trend accelerated by party reforms adopted earlier in the decade. Presidents elected through increasingly plebiscitary processes, argues Nelson Polsby, found it difficult to form governing coalitions from the "pockets of pluralism" remaining in the system.[4] As a result, writes Hugh Heclo, the modern White House has had to construct a "presidential party" to contend with "rampant pluralism" and form the ad hoc coalitions needed to govern effectively.[5] Some observers described the new conditions confronting presidents as the "atomization" of American politics;[6] while others felt that they reflected the stalemate of entrenched interests more than the fluidity of anarchy.[7]

An alternative view of interest-group liaison from the White House places less emphasis on contemporary developments, draws attention to more fundamental changes in the nature of the modern presidency, and stresses the historical antecedents of public liaison. For many decades there was relatively little reason for interest groups to pursue contacts with the White House. As Arthur Bentley described the situation in 1908, interest groups turned to the presidency for assistance in pursuing their policy goals only "when they found other pathways blocked."[8] With the emergence of the "modern presidency," however, this situation changed dra-

[2] Joseph A. Pika, "Dealing with the People Divided: The White House Office of Public Liaison," paper presented at the 1982 Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Milwaukee, Wis.

[3] Martha Joynt Kumar and Michael Baruch Grossman, "The Presidency and Interest Groups" in Michael Nelson, ed., *The Presidency and the Political System* (Washington: CQ Press, 1984), 282–312.

[4] Nelson W. Polsby, "Interest Groups and the Presidency: Trends in Political Intermediation in America" in Walter Dean Burnham and Martha Wagner Weinberg, eds., *American Politics and Public Policy* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1978), 41–52.

[5] Hugh Heclo, "The Changing Presidential Office" in Arnold J. Meltsner, ed., *Politics and the Oval Office: Toward Presidential Governance* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1981), 161–183.

[6] Anthony King, "The American Polity in the Late 1970's: Building Coalitions in the Sand" in Anthony King, ed., *The New American Political System* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), 371–395. Also see Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership from FDR to Carter* (New York: John Wiley, 1980), chap. 11.

[7] Heclo, "The Changing Presidential Office," 169. Also see Heclo's article "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment" in King, *New American Political System,* 87–124.

[8] Arthur F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908), 344–345.

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matically. Fred Greenstein has identified four factors distinguishing post-Hoover presidencies from their "traditional" antecedents: presidents are routinely involved in developing and promoting an annual legislative program; presidents exercise expanded unilateral policy-making powers; an extensive bureaucracy has emerged to implement presidential initiatives; and public attention devoted to incumbent presidents has increased immensely.[9] As a consequence, each side of the interest group-president exchange relationship has found it politically expedient to establish and pursue communications with the other.[10] Presidents need political support for both electoral and governing coalitions as well as information and cooperation to help achieve their programmatic goals. Interest groups need access to this relatively new center of policy development in American politics to supplement long-established ties with Congress and bureaucrats.

Maintaining liaison with interest groups is not a new White House assignment. Herbert Hoover routinely referred group spokespersons to Walter Newton, his "Secretary for Legislation."[11] Subsequent presidents built such an extensive capacity for interest-group liaison into their staffs that at least one student of the presidency considers this a major cause of White House staff growth.[12] However, we know very little about interest-group liaison prior to the Ford administration. In the absence of a fuller picture, it is difficult to determine what is novel about recent liaison efforts and, by extension, the relative importance of short- vs. long-term forces in shaping this relationship. A close examination of interest-group liaison under Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman provides an historical context for evaluating recent developments.

Group Liaison Under Roosevelt and Truman

The roots of public liaison during the modern era lie in the activities of David K. Niles and Philleo Nash in the decade covered by their combined service under Roosevelt and Truman. Although Roosevelt in particular employed several staff aides in these activities, it was Niles's and Nash's unusual continuity in office that gave them the opportunity to emerge as prototypes for this staff operation. No subsequent staff slavishly copied their activities; indeed, Dwight D. Eisenhower deemphasized the interest-group connection during his first term, although it emerged as an adjunct of congressional relations late in his second term. Nonetheless, succeeding administrations have had to react to the principal features of the

[9] Fred I. Greenstein, "Change and Continuity in the Modern Presidency" in King, ed., *New American Political System*, 45–46.

[10] For a discussion of exchange relations between the president and a constituency, see Michael Grossman and Francis Rourke, "The Media and the Presidency: An Exchange Analysis," *Political Science Quarterly* 19 (Fall 1976): 455–470.

[11] Letter, Chester Gray to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 22 February 1933, Official File 1350, Container 1, 1933–34, FDRL.

[12] Stephen Hess, *Organizing the Presidency* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1976), 47.

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FDR experience. Over time, public liaison, much like press and congressional relations, has developed a set of tasks and generated a more or less clearly articulated White House staff role.[13]

It is ironic that interest-group contacts came to be handled by a cadre of White House aides under FDR, a figure of legendary virtuosity in gathering information from personal sources. Several factors combined to account for this evolution in White House operations.

First, *staff resources.* Unlike their predecessors, Roosevelt and Truman enjoyed the relative luxury of expanded staff resources. Liaison with spokespersons and members of interst groups had been an important task of presidential secretaries, as it continued to be for Stephen Early, Marvin McIntyre, "Pa" Watson, and Matt Connelly in the two Democratic administrations. These aides, however, were by necessity generalists. With the availability of more assistance in the form of six administrative assistant positions authorized in 1939, greater liaison specialization was possible.

Second, *wartime pressures.* FDR's personal skill and penchant for gathering intelligence and moderating conflict were considerable. In fact, FDR did not move toward assigning staff members to regular interest-group liaison assignments until the approach of World War II. James Rowe, for example, during 1939–1940 handled many different liaison tasks along with a number of other responsibilities. War pressures, combined with the political needs of 1942 and 1944, made the use of regular intermediaries more attractive.

Third, *staff continuity.* The unique set of interest-group contacts brought to the White House by Niles (labor, Jews, ethnic minorities) and Nash (blacks) goes far in explaining the emergence of this White House specialization. Because both staff members survived the Roosevelt-Truman transition and remained largely outside the crush of routine policy development under Truman, they were able to develop a set of practices and routines for the position.

Fourth, *coalition politics.* Public liaison was a particularly useful staff specialization for Democratic presidents whose electoral support relied upon knitting together multiple groups with distinct interests, policy needs, and organizational forms. In contrast, Eisenhower found it far easier to dispense with such routine liaison personnel at the outset of his term in office.

Under Roosevelt no less than today, interest-group relations were maintained through several channels. Career and political officials in executive agencies work closely with their particular constituencies; party organizations traditionally maintain special divisions for blacks, women, and nationality groups; presidential friends both in and out of government serve as personal emissaries to groups with whom they are affiliated. Business, labor, and farm groups enjoyed firmly established footholds in the bureaucracy and consequently received only limited attention from

[13] On press and congressional relations, see Michael Grossman and Martha J. Kumar, *Portraying the President* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); and Abraham Holtzman, *Legislative Liaison* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970).

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aides in the Roosevelt and Truman White Houses.[14] Comparable access to government agencies was not enjoyed by Jews and blacks, the two groups that received the bulk of Niles's and Nash's attention. Not by chance, these were critical elements of the New Deal coalition whose policy goals were highly controversial. A close examination of those interactions illustrates why presidents have found it useful to move liaison into the White House and identifies two of the orientations staff members may adopt in working with outside constituencies.

David K. Niles: A Mania for Anonymity

Niles and Nash never held the title of assistant for interest-group liaison. Roosevelt's management style was not particularly conducive to the emergence of clearly articulated staff roles. As Samuel I. Rosenman, Roosevelt's long-time adviser and speech writer, recalled, White House aides "were given an assortment of jobs . . . Each administrative assistant sort of made his own job as best he could."[15] FDR's administrative assistants jokingly designated their hallway of offices in the State, War and Navy Building (today's Old Executive Office Building) Death Row, " . . . derived from the fact that an occupant might be worked to death or left there in suspended animation by the President."[16] As problems arose, Roosevelt would determine whom to dispatch on his behalf. Truman developed greater consistency in staff assignments, particularly during the period that Charles Murphy served as his special counsel,[17] but interest-group contacts never became a formal assignment. Niles, in fact, one of the most secretive persons to have ever worked in the White House, probably would have preferred no identifiable assignment or title whatsoever.

Given the controversial nature of his activities and views, David K. Niles has remained a surprisingly enigmatic figure from the Roosevelt-Truman era. Niles played a major role in every presidential election campaign from 1924–1948; as a protégé of Harry Hopkins, he was intimately involved in Roosevelt's attempted purge of Congress in 1938 and the far more successful "draft" of the President for a third term in 1940. He is alleged to have been the principal fund raiser responsible for eliciting an enormous (for that era) campaign contribution from John L. Lewis and the CIO in 1936, and he was the primary organizer of the CIO's Political Action Committee in 1944. He served as Roosevelt's contact man throughout the war with pollster Hadley Cantril, whose reports helped to shape administration policy on the home front and attempted to sell the American public

[14] Other Roosevelt staff members with liaison responsibilities were Eugene Casey (farmers), Jonathan Daniels (blacks), and Dan Tobin (labor). All three served for brief periods. Under Truman, John R. Steelman was an important link with both business and labor.

[15] Transcript, Samuel I. Rosenman oral history interview, 217, FDRL.

[16] Jonathan Daniels, *White House Witness 1942–1945* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1975), 17.

[17] For an excellent overview of the Truman staff operation see Francis Heller, *The Truman White House: The Administration of the Presidency 1945–53* (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1980).

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on internationalism. Nonetheless, the major attention devoted to Niles has centered on his controversial role in shaping Truman administration policy on Palestine and Israel.[18]

This lack of attention is partly a result of Niles's own efforts to remain unknown; anonymity, for him, was a mania, not merely a passion as set forth in Brownlow's famous job description of a White House assistant. His papers, only recently made available to researchers, "consist almost entirely of notes and memos he received, rather than materials he originated."[19] Abram L. Sachar—a personal friend, executor of his papers, and chronicler of the Palestine decision—notes that "Niles invariably preferred to conduct his negotiations or to express his reactions or sentiments in person or by telephone."[20] White House colleagues understood little more of him than the public. As one recalled,

> Dave Niles was a most secretive individual who slunk rather furtively around the corridors of the White House and the Executive Office Building and Dave Niles rarely, if ever, confided to his White House colleagues as to what he said to the President or what his recommendations were. Part of the influence that Niles liked to have people feel he had on the President was his, *was* this secretiveness.[21]

Under Truman, Niles remained carefully outside the White House mainstream. Not only did he avoid staff meetings, but he also spent much of his time outside Washington. As his long-time assistant Philleo Nash described it, "The guts of the Niles operation was close liaison with liberal and labor organizations of all kinds but particularly those that were influential along the Washington-New York-Boston axis," a position that was tantamount to an ambassadorship to the third-party movement in New York."[22] To fulfill this mission, Niles traveled weekly to New York City and Boston, meeting with organization and foundation leaders while also tending to personal business: the theatre (a personal passion), relatives in Boston, and Sunday-night lectures at the Ford Hall Forum, an institution with which he had been associated since before World War I. Thus, Niles was ordinarily away from White House business for more than half the week pursuing contacts outside the capital. In fact, he was the consummate contact man as described by Joseph Feeney, a legislative liaison aide to Matt Connelly, Truman's appointments secretary.

> Dave knew a great many people. He had close associations with Jewish leaders, particu-

[18] On Niles and Israel see Peter Grose, *Israel in the Mind of America* (New York: Knopf, 1983); Abram Sachar, *The Redemption of the Unwanted* (New York: St. Martins/Marek, 1983); and Zvi Ganin, *Truman, American Jewry, and Israel* 1945–1948 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979). For one of the few contemporary journalistic accounts of Niles see Alfred Steinberg, "Mr. Truman's Mystery Man," *The Saturday Evening Post*, 24 December 1949, 25ff. Steinberg's notes for the article are included among Niles's personal papers.

[19] Grose, *Israel*, 338. Philleo Nash has also noted that Niles routinely purged his files once a year. Heller, *Truman White House*, 53.

[20] Sachar, *Redemption*, 195.

[21] Transcript, George Elsey oral history interview, 330–331, HSTL.

[22] Philleo Nash, in Heller, *Truman White House*, 52

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larly in the textile business and the coat and suit industries. And he knew where to reach people, and how to reach them, and bring them in. Dave Niles had a vast knowledge of reaching the right people on the right problem, and knowing how to bring them into Washington if necessary or go to see them if necessary . . . he sure could produce the right person on the right kind of problem.[23]

This network of acquaintances was the product of years devoted to stitching together elements of the New Deal coalition.

Niles and the Democratic Coalition

If David Niles is taken as the prototype of a public liaison staffer, it is clear how directly White House contacts with interest groups are linked to a president's electoral needs and strategies. Throughout his long career on the national political scene, Niles was associated with the Progressive movement and liberal elements of the New Deal Coalition. He served as vice chairman and director of the Speakers' Bureau in Robert LaFollette's 1924 presidential campaign and was director of the Progressive League for Al Smith in 1928, when he met Harry Hopkins, his mentor in the Roosevelt administration. After attending the March 1931 conference called by LaFollette, Burton Wheeler, and other Progressives to organize their political efforts, Niles became director of the National Progressive League for Franklin Roosevelt in the 1932 campaign. During the elections of 1936, 1940, and 1944, Niles coordinated Progressives' efforts from Democratic National Committee headquarters.

But Niles was instrumental in shaping coalitions that extended well beyond Progressives. Active in labor organizing during the 1920s and having actually been arrested on the scene of one textile workers' strike, Niles had excellent credentials with the labor movement. He worked closely with labor's Non-Partisan League in 1936, served as Sidney Hillman's assistant in the Labor Division of the Office of Production Management in 1941–1942, and later helped Hillman organize the National Citizens Political Action Committee in 1944. During 1940 and 1944, Niles was responsible for mobilizing support from ethnic and minority voting blocs. Nor was Niles inactive during off years. As Harry Hopkins's assistant in the Works Progress Administration (WPA), he used federal employees as a nation-wide phalanx of voters in 1938 in an effort to strengthen administration-backed challengers to incumbent Democrats. Unsuccessful in that endeavor, as he was in seeking the Massachusetts' governership for James Roosevelt and in engineering Harry Hopkins's presidential nomination, Niles was an influential figure at the 1940 Chicago convention, both in securing FDR's historic nomination and winning the vice presidential nod for Henry Wallace.[24]

[23] Transcript, Joseph G. Feeney oral history interview, 68–69, HSTL.

[24] On Niles's career see particularly the family history completed by Elliott A. Niles in 1955 included among the Niles papers. Niles's files are full of correspondence from congressional candidates loyal to the administration complaining of WPA employees' support for their opponents or asking

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For his long service, Niles was rewarded with a succession of posts within the administration. As chairman of the National Recovery Administration (NRA) Adjustment Board in Massachusetts, assistant administrator of Massachusetts' Federal Emergency Relief Administration, and director of the census for Boston, Niles occupied important patronage-dispensing positions. Named as a consultant to Harry Hopkins in 1936, he soon became director of WPA Information Services and ultimately assistant administrator (1937). Niles moved with Hopkins to the Department of Commerce (1939) and Office of Production Management, always serving as his political adviser, patronage chief, and administrative stand-in. It is hardly surprising that Niles would eventually join the White House staff as an administrative assistant in 1942, ostensibly with responsibilities in personnel training, unemployment, social security, and health matters, but actually assuming many of the campaign duties performed earlier by James Rowe.[25]

From 1942–1945 Niles was the principal White House recipient of polling data provided by Hadley Cantril, head of the Office of Public Opinion Research at Princeton University. Cantril conducted surveys for the Bureau of Intelligence in the Office of Facts and Figures and the Office of War Information. More importantly, he provided the White House with analyses of both published and unpublished Gallup data and undertook confidential surveys of his own expressly for FDR and his aides. These activities were financed privately and were initially designed to mobilize public support behind the war effort. As the election year approached, however, the emphasis shifted to watching political trends: holding straw votes among potential presidential candidates, monitoring public opinion on a fourth term, suggesting ways to present war-time policies and post-war planning to the public, and sampling public reaction to possible campaign themes. Cantril sought to influence Gallup's polling efforts by suggesting topics of special interest to the White House and passed on gossip about advice that Thomas E. Dewey, the Republican candidate, was receiving on his campaign.[26]

Setting campaign strategy overshadowed Nile's more mundane liaison tasks, which nonetheless were essential to maintaining the Democrats' electoral coalition. At times these involved nothing more than sending autographed photos of the President to devoted supporters or arranging for a presidential letter to an organization's annual conference. It also meant arranging meetings with FDR for

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for help from WPA administrators in Washington. On Wallace's selection as the vice-presidential nominee see an undated letter from Henry A. Wallace to Niles thanking him for "the vastly effective work that you did in my behalf at Chicago" and help that "was not simply important but was pivotal."

[25] For White House memos concerning Niles's career see Official File 4847, FDRL.

[26] For Niles's internal White House memos to FDR on the polling, see Official File 4847, FDRL. Materials covering 1944 are available in the Files of Philleo Nash, Box 62, "White House File—Political 1944 Hadley Cantril 1943–1944," HSTL. Niles's papers also include extensive correspondence and reports prepared by Cantril for Niles and the President spanning the period October 1942-April 1945. A useful account of the Cantril-Roosevelt relationship can be found in Michael Leigh, *Mobilizing Consent: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 1937–1947* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976).

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the chairman of the American Labor party on an enrolled bill of interest, railway union leaders on proposed amendments to the Railroad Retirement Act, and James G. Patton, president of the National Farmer's Union during the election year of 1944.[27] In other words, it was critical to have people on the staff sensitive to the President's electoral needs in dealing with routine problems that touched on portions of the New Deal coalition. It was also important to act swiftly when trouble or opportunity appeared. When the Department of Labor drafted such a brief and lukewarm letter to the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union's twenty-fifth convention in May 1944 that it promised to be a campaign problem, Niles requested the opportunity to provide a more appropriate greeting. It was Niles who proposed that food be shipped from scarce supplies on the eastern seaboard to Italy in order to relieve severe shortages, because he felt this could be an important campaign issue to Italian-American voters. And Niles recommended that the President broadcast a message on religious tolerance on 9 April 1944, the day that Easter coincided with the first day of Passover.[28] Thus, there is substantial evidence that Niles's group liaison within the White House was structured by the need to build and maintain Roosevelt's electoral coalition. But public liaison staffers are in a position to influence policy as well.

Niles and Palestine: Group Advocacy within the White House

The most distinguishing feature of Niles's nine years of service on Democratic White House staffs was his close association with Zionist groups in the United States. George Elsey, a junior staffer under Roosevelt who rose to prominence under Harry Truman, described the perception of others in those administrations.

> Dave Niles had been regarded for many years in the Roosevelt administration and on into the Truman administration, as a representative of, or spokesman *for*, I should say rather than of, spokesman for various minority groups in the United States and as the Zionist clamor grew louder and louder, David Niles, who was Jewish, was just expected to be setting forth their point of view.[29]

In many respects, working with Jewish groups was no different from working with unions or other organized interests. But in dealing with Jewish interests Niles went beyond being a facilitating intermediary and became an *advocate* within the White House. Elsey implied as much when describing Niles as "representative of" rather than merely a "spokesman for" Jewish interests, a commitment that was potentially detrimental to his effectiveness. As Elsey put it during the same inter-

[27] Phone message, Niles to FDR, 29 August 1944; telegram, Roosevelt to Patton, 30 August 1944, Official File 4847, FDRL.

[28] Memos, Niles to Roosevelt, 7 September 1944 and 3 March 1944, Official File 4847, FDRL.

[29] Transcript, George Elsey oral history interview, 331, HSTL. Elsey, Joseph Feeney, and Matthew Connelly acknowledged in their oral history interviews that Niles worked with blacks and labor, as well, but emphasized the overwhelming significance of his Jewish ties.

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view, ". . . when you know what position a man is going to present, it doesn't have any particularly outstanding merit or weight. You don't give it any special treatment."

Most of what we know about Niles's White House activities is contained in histories of the Truman administration's decisions on Palestine, where it is clear that Niles played a vital behind-the-scenes role in helping Truman avoid pitfalls in the bewilderingly fragmented world of Jewish affairs, engage in protracted bureaucratic warfare with Arabists in the Department of State, and win critical votes both in Congress and the United Nations. In short, the historical record of these events provides a complex portrait of the many activities associated with public liaison in its modern form.[30]

In some respects, Niles was an unlikely hero in the Palestine drama. Although born into a Jewish family in Russian Poland, Niles did not have a long history of activism in the Zionist movement. Peter Grose argues that deep personal respect for Rabbi Stephen Wise, a leading American Zionist, and an unrequited love affair with Wise's daughter led Niles to become increasingly associated with the Jewish cause. He was also one of several Jews in influential wartime positions whose support was consciously cultivated by allies of Chaim Weizmann, head of the World Zionist Organization and longtime advocate of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, in hopes of developing a "back channel through official Washington."[31]

Judge Samuel Rosenman seems to have overshadowed Niles as a confidant of FDR on plans for Palestine, a pattern that continued under Truman so long as Rosenman remained on the staff. Niles was the leading White House figure in 1945 on Jewish refugee and displaced persons problems, helping to advise Truman on pressuring Britain to raise its restrictions on immigration to Palestine and formulating the Harrison Commission, which called for changes in American administration of displaced persons camps and for admission of 100,000 refugees into Palestine. He generated support for this proposal in Congress and among state governors while drafting Truman's messages to British Prime Minister Clement Attlee on the matter.[32] Truman also sought counsel from Rosenman on Middle-East problems as in October 1945, when Secretary of State James Byrnes mounted pressure for Truman to honor FDR's pledge to consult with Arab leaders before advocating any change in the Palestinian status quo such as lifting immigration quotas. Interestingly, Rosenman expressed personal discomfort with Truman's request for advice. "For obvious reasons, it is very embarassing for me to be in disagreement with the State Department on this particular question. I really think you should have someone else here in the White House handle it—and hope you

[30] In addition to the works cited in note 18, see Robert Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman 1945-48* (New York: Norton, 1977).

[31] Grose, *Irsael*, esp. 177, 227. Abram Sachar, in a personal interview with the author, strongly denied the report of a romantic link between Niles and Wise's daughter.

[32] Sachar, *Redemption*, 197-199.

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will."[33] Rosenman went on to present a rationale for Truman's immigration proposal, but the request for relief amounts to a personal admission that Jewish affairs placed him in an uncomfortable, if not compromised position.

Rosenman's advice continued to be solicited while he was on the staff and Truman called upon him in 1948 (long after he had left the White House in 1946) to serve as an intermediary with Weizmann on the President's plans regarding recognition of Israel.[34] But following Rosenman's departure, more of the White House responsibility for Palestine policy gravitated toward Niles, especially throughout the tumultuous period of 1946 through Thanksgiving 1947, when partition of Palestine was approved in the United Nations.

As recent histories make clear, much of the story hinges on a series of classic bureaucratic power plays pitting White House advisers against the Department of State and Joint Chiefs of Staff. Bureaucratic resistance to the President's Palestine policy was deeply entrenched. Secretary of State Edward Stettinius had introduced Truman to Palestine problems with a "personal and confidential" note of 18 April 1945, warning him that "It is very likely that efforts will be made by some of the Zionist leaders to obtain from you at an early date some commitments in favor of the Zionist program which is pressing for unlimited Jewish immigration into Palestine and the establishment there of a Jewish state."[35] Before making any statement on the matter, Stettinius urged the President "to call for full and detailed information on the subject." Shortly thereafter a memo informed Truman of Roosevelt's promise to consult the Arabs and suggested that FDR had been leaning against establishment of a Jewish State. By 31 August 1945 the State Department under the leadership of Loy W. Henderson, director of Near Eastern Affairs, had formulated a policy opposed to mass Jewish immigration into Palestine though aware of the efforts likely to be made on behalf of lifting immigration restrictions imposed by the British.[36]

These were merely the initial shots in a set of ongoing skirmishes between the White House and the State Department. In these battles Niles demonstrated the reflexes of a Washington veteran. First, he set up an intelligence network wholly independent of the State Department through which he could provide the President with information on conditions in Palestine, negotiations between Britain and the Jewish Agency, opinions in the United Nations, and complicity between U.S. and British diplomats in trying to scuttle the President's policy. Second, Niles took maximum advantage of his expert knowledge of Jewish affairs in the United

[33] Memo, Rosenman to Truman, 17 October 1945, President's Secretary's File (PSF), Box 184, "Subject File Palestine 1945-47," HSTL.

[34] Grose, *Israel*, 278. See also Memo, Rosenman to Truman, 1 November 1945, PSF, Box 184, "Palestine 1945-47," HSTL.

[35] Letter, Stettinius to Truman, 18 April 1945, PSF, Box 184, "Palestine 1945-47," HSTL.

[36] Memo, Joseph C. Grew to Truman, 1 May 1945 (which included a copy of FDR's commitment to Faisal Al Saud of 5 April 1945) and Memo, Henderson to Secretary of State Byrnes, 31 August 1945, PSF, Box 184, "Palestine 1945-47,: HSTL.

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States. Only moderates in the Zionist movement were presented to the President, not the shrill radicals. Stephen Wise and Chaim Weizmann were advocates whose style was far more palatable to Truman than that of Hillel Silver, militant cochairman of the American Zionist Emergency Council, whose condemnation of the administration's policies was joined with a threat to throw Jewish voting support to the Republicans. Thus, Niles orchestrated strategic visits from Weizmann, Zionism's elder statesman, and sought to mollify Truman's open exasperation with radicals' criticism of his efforts by soliciting letters from supportive moderates.[37] Being on the scene and responsive to the President's shifting moods was a major advantage over his bureaucratic opponents.

Third, Niles proved extraordinarily effective in countering State Department arguments and strategies detrimental to the Jewish cause while devising gambits of his own. Niles ensured that a favorable report would result from the Harrison Commission by including the head of the major relief program for Jewish refugees among its members. He carefully monitored progress of the Joint Anglo-American Commission (1946) and intervened to prevent its premature dissolution. Perhaps his consummate move was to ensure that the UN delegation's principal adviser on Palestine at the time of the crucial debate on partition (September-November 1947) would be responsive to the White House rather than the State Department. By persuading Truman to intervene on this issue, Niles was able to have Major General John H. Hilldring appointed to the UN delegation thereby reducing Henderson's influence on the key decisions.[38]

Loyalty and Cross Pressures in the White House

Did Niles abuse his access to Truman and serve Zionist interests more ardently than those of the President? Two incidents suggest this possibility. In 1946, with the off-year election a month away, Rosenman and Niles learned of a dramatic statement on Palestine policy planned by Governor Thomas Dewey, which New York Democrats feared would cost them the election and adversely influence the 1948 contest as well. Niles drafted a statement issued on 4 October 1946, Yom Kippur, which repeated Truman's call for the immigration of 100,000 refugees and hinted that future economic assistance might follow a political solution along the lines of partition.[39] What was then unknown, however, was that Eliahu Epstein, representative of the Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency, had submitted the draft of such a presidential statement to Niles. Indeed, it was Niles himself

[37] Sachar, *Redemption*, 219 on Weizman's visit; but see the apparent error in his account of Jacobson's visit which occurred five months later. On Truman's exasperation with Jewish critics see Sachar, *Redemption*, 308 and Grose, *Israel*, 217.

[38] Memos, Niles to Truman, 29 July 1947, and Truman to Undersecretary of State, 6 August 1947, PSF, Box 184, "Palestine 1945-47," HSTL. Also see Peter Grose, "The Partition of Palestine 35 Years Ago," *New York Times Magazine,* 21 November 1982.

[39] Grose, *Israel*, 216.

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who had stimulated the political pressures that resulted in Democratic National Committee Chairman Robert Hannegan's suggestion that the President issue a pro-Zionist statement. Thus, the Jewish Agency representative reported back to his superiors that credit for the Truman statement

> . . . must go again primarily to our friend [Niles] who at this time, as in the past, has shown determination and great courage in attempting to overcome all kinds of tangible and intangible difficulties in order to accomplish the matter at hand. He consulted me frequently during the critical days preceding the statement and has shown an admirable spirit of understanding and cooperation.[40]

The second incident occurred in 1947, when some have suggested Niles's enthusiasm for partition led him to exceed the President's orders. Truman made it clear to State Department officials on several occasions that the U.S. delegation was not to lobby other delegates on the crucial partition vote. On the other hand, Niles served as the master strategist for a coordinated U.S. lobbying effort, which enlisted Bernard Baruch to work on French contacts, Edward Stettinius to pressure Liberia through the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, Justices Felix Frankfurter and Frank Murphy of the Supreme Court to lobby the Philippine ambassador, and several contacts to seek support from Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua and the Greek government.[41]

Was all this done in behalf of the Zionist cause without the President's knowledge, let alone his approval? We lack definite evidence, although one account reports that among a sheaf of papers presented to Truman a full eighteen days before the final Palestine vote was a memo reporting on efforts to win UN support. Another account argues that Truman gave Niles explicit approval to line up votes when defeat for the effort appeared certain.[42] What they both demonstrate is that Truman, like other presidents, may have been forced at the time to adopt a dissembling position toward the State Department (as well as future historians) when disavowing lobbying efforts in which he actually engaged. To exceed Truman's wishes and thereby endanger his position as an adviser would also have been inconsistent with Niles's characteristically deep-seated caution.[43]

These cases illustrate the delicacy of a liaison staffer's position and its potential to confront him with incompatible demands. Fortunately for Niles, Truman's instincts and political interests pointed toward pro-immigration and then pro-partition postitions. This coincided with the pressures Niles faced from the Jewish commu-

[40] Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, 322. Donovan's interpretation emphasizes a letter from Eliahu Epstein to Nahum Goldmann, 9 October 1946, Weismann Archives, HSTL.

[41] On Truman's statement see Grose, *Israel*, 250; and Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, 329–330. Sachar, *Redemption*, 223, presents the most detailed account of Niles's lobbying. Included among Niles's papers is a 26 November 1947 letter from Thomas A. Pappas, a Boston businessman, who enclosed copies of cables sent to Greek officials as part of the lobby effort Niles had stimulated.

[42] For the first interpretation see Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis*, 329–330. Grose, *Israel*, 251 offers the second.

[43] Philleo Nash, personal interview with author, 27 June 1984.

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nity, at least that portion of the moderate community with which he was most closely associated. While he also had to run interference with the hawks and persuade them to trust the President's good intentions which thereby made him the "eyes, ears and even to some extent, whipping boy for the President,"[44] Niles could be generally confident of his capacity to satisfy the interests of both his constituencies—the President and Niles's coreligionists. In fact, this is the essence of a public liaison staffer's role when he closely identifies with the group whose interests he represents within the White House. In this instance there was no conflict between loyalty to the President and a commitment to Zionism. But there is no guarantee of identical interests; staff advocates must sometimes engage in a personal search for ways to achieve an end that will be beneficial to both principals. In such cases, successful mediation will resolve personal conflicts as well as political dilemmas.

Niles was able to serve the President well throughout this three-year period. Truman sorely needed help in navigating the treacherous shoals of Zionist politics, as well as those constructed by his own State Department. Given the critical role in the Democratic coalition played by Jewish voters strategically concentrated in New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and other metropolitan centers, Truman could not afford to violate Jewish expectations or allow misunderstandings of his policies to go unchecked. Niles, then, served as a guide to political territory relatively unknown to the President from Independence and as an intermediary with major figures in the Jewish community. At times, being the middleman meant that Niles had to serve as the lightning rod for bitter complaints; here he demonstrated loyalty to the President. At other times, however, he sought to soothe the President's irritation at criticism or reassure him of his policy's wisdom. Niles was also a valuable source of intelligence. It is probably more than mere coincidence that Truman's single most serious misstep in this entire policy process was committed in Niles's absence, when he approved a State Department proposal to reverse U.S. support for partition in March 1948. This shift elicited storms of protest and doubts about the President's effectiveness when announced to the UN on the same day Truman declared his candidacy for the Democratic presidential nomination. Significantly, Niles was recalled to Washington at this time to aid Clark Clifford and others in the White House in repairing the damage.[45]

Thus, Niles was able to remain true to both sets of demands focused on his person. His personal dilemmas, however, would have been far greater had the President's irritation with Zionist pressure led him to reverse policy. Niles emerges as a major force on Palestine policy, a staffer able to maximize the advantages that flow from proximity to the prime actor in foreign policy formulation.

[44] Sachar, *Redemption*, 204. Also see 197 and fn. 1 p. 301 for evidence that Truman was fully aware of Niles's policy commitment. Philleo Nash also noted that anti-Zionist Jewish groups enjoyed access, as well, so that there were alternative avenues of advice available to the President.

[45] Grose, *Israel*, 276.

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The White House and Blacks

Niles's personal identity was the basis for his liaison with Jewish groups, but neither Roosevelt nor Truman was willing to have "a black man in the White House" to undertake a comparable job in handling race problems.[46] Despite his many impressive qualifications for such a White House position, Philleo Nash's appointment did not meet the many requests received by both FDR and Truman to include a Negro on the President's immediate staff. Black organizations and individual leaders pressed Roosevelt both before and during World War II to establish a staff position "where the responsibilities would include touching all the varied interests of Negroes in the government and in the war effort" not merely as "Negro assistant but as a full assistant who incidentally happens to be a member of the Negro race."[47]

Effective liaison with Negro groups had been a White House problem for some time. When President Roosevelt desperately needed someone to deal with angry Negro leaders in 1940 and 1941, he was forced to turn to a variety of non-White House aides to conduct negotiations and defuse problems. When the March On Washington Committee threatened a mass demonstration to be held 1 July 1941, the administration worked through numerous contacts to forestall the mass action. Eleanor Roosevelt; Wayne Coy from the Office of Emergency Preparedness; Aubrey Williams of the National Youth Administration; Judge William Hastie, Negro assistant to the Secretary of War; New York's Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia; and Roosevelt confidant Anna Rosenberg were all enlisted in the administration's efforts.[48] By not having a personal assistant available to deal with the problem, FDR ran the risk of administration confusion and an outcome that failed to serve the President's best interests. One might have expected the administration to have learned from a similar experience in 1940 when a major misunderstanding followed a White House summit meeting between Negro leaders and administration officials concerning segregation in the armed forces. Negro distrust for FDR's coterie of southern advisers exacerbated the problems, which followed Stephen Early's White House press release describing the meeting. Early, FDR's press secretary, ultimately offered a profuse apology to the black leaders.[49]

[46] This phrase is the title of R. Frederick Morrow's recollections of the Eisenhower White House.

[47] Letters to Roosevelt from Edgar Brown, 19 November 1940; James Nabrit, 7 November 1941; Walter White, 11 June 1942, Official File 50a, "Administrative Assistant to the President Applications 1940–45," and Letter, Mary MacLeod Bethune to McIntyre, 20 May 1942, Official File 50b, FDRL.

[48] Memos, Wayne Coy to Early, 12 June 1941; McIntyre to Roosevelt, 4 June 1941; Pa Watson to Roosevelt, 14 June 1941; telegram, Randolph to Roosevelt, 16 June 1941, Official File 391, Container 1, "Marches on Washington 1937–1945," FDRL. Also see the account in Joseph P. Lash, *Eleanor and Franklin* (New York: Norton, 1971), chap. 44.

[49] A. Phillip Randolph, T. Arnold Hill, and Walter White had met with the President and representatives of the Navy and War Departments in the White House. They proposed full integration of both the army and navy as well as equal training opportunities for blacks. The administration responded by expanding aviation programs for blacks, promising to recall black reserve officers to active service, and appointing a black adviser to the secretary of war. Segregation of the armed services, however,

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Loose arrangements that were inadequate in dealing with blacks prior to the war proved even less adequate to cope with racial tensions generated by the migration of Negroes to urban war industries and associated problems in housing, education, and transportation. Largely in response to the Detroit riot of June 1943, FDR established a low-visibility network of civil rights officials (many of them Negroes) coordinated from the White House by Jonathan Daniels, a North Carolina newspaper publisher considered "liberal" on race problems. Daniels was assisted by Philleo Nash and Ted Poston from the Office of War Information (OWI) on a part-time basis. Daniels's group monitored racial tension through the news tickers in OWI as well as weekly reports from OWI field men, the Army's Counter Intelligence Command, and information from sixteen other government agencies involved in the network. Their goal was to anticipate flash points and take action before racial conflict damaged the war effort. The operation's success hinged on keeping a low profile, but so did the administration's political interests. Foremost in the staffers' minds was the example of the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC), which succeeded in attracting immense amounts of publicity (and criticism) but produced little tangible progress. The low-visibility program was adopted in the wake of the Detroit riots as an alternative to creating a National Committee on Race Relations, something sought by black leaders for several years. Preventing disruption of wartime production was the program's primary goal, not progress for blacks. Thus, Charles Eagles describes the administration's wartime relationship with Negroes as one of "two 'Double-Vs'": blacks sought victory over fascism abroad as well as discrimination at home, while the administration shared the desire to vanquish fascism but sought victory over Republicans and other domestic critics as well.[50] Reconciling the tensions in such a situation is a classic task for public liaison.

The war's conclusion, if anything, resulted in greater racial tension as black servicemen returned home, the economy converted to a peacetime footing, and the unifying purpose of victory gave way to domestic disharmony. Regarding World War I as a precedent, the administration anticipated heightened interracial tensions, but did not settle on an immediate strategy. Daniels and Nash had helped to organize the American Council on Race Relations (ACRR) during the war with

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remained in force. The White House press release carried by wire services implied that black leaders had accepted these policies, including continued segregation. Criticism of the three black spokesmen swept through black organizations and the Negro press. To salvage their reputations, the three leaders demanded and received White House apologies. Memos, Mary Bethune to Watson, 15 July 1940; Early to Watson, 19 September 1940; Early to Roosevelt, 14 September 1940; Letters, Roosevelt to Randolph, 25 October 1940; Early to White, 18 October 1940 and 25 October 1940; Randolph to Roosevelt, 1 November 1940; and press releases from the NAACP, Official File 93, "Colored Matters," Container 3, "1940," FDRL.

[50] Charles W. Eagles, *Jonathan Daniels and Race Relations: The Evolution of a Southern Liberal*, (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1982), 103–120. Eagles reviews this operation, which is only briefly described in Jonathan Daniels's own recollections in *White House Witness: 1942–1945*, 204–207. The importance of the FEPC precedent was emphasized by Philleo Nash during his personal interview.

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a boost from Eleanor Roosevelt and funds from the Field and Rosenwald Foundations. But their effort to use the ACRR as a central organization to consolidate efforts in combating postwar race problems was unsuccessful when black organizations objected to surrendering some of their functions.[51]

When Daniels became FDR's last press secretary in early 1945, Niles was given supervisory responsibility for the network. Nash, who left OWI at the war's conclusion, moved over to the White House where he remained throughout Truman's service. The Daniels-Nash-Niles assignment did not stanch the calls for a Negro appointment,[52] but it was not until Eisenhower's second term that the first black was appointed to a professional White House position. Even then, Frederick Morrow was not initially entrusted with civil rights as an area of responsibility. In all three presidencies there was a concern that placing a black in this position would heighten rather than ameliorate racial tensions.

Nash as Ombudsman

Philleo Nash, with a University of Chicago Ph.D. in anthropology and an uncle who had preceded Walter White as head of the NAACP, had credentials to deal with civil rights problems, as they came to be called during this period; but these were not his exclusive concern. Operating as Niles's deputy, Nash enjoyed considerable latitude to pursue his own policy concerns but did not share the full independence of an administrative assistant until late in 1952. His assignments were fashioned more by his own interests than according to any rational plan: statehood for Alaska and Hawaii; civil administration in the Pacific (Guam, American Samoa, and the Trust Territories); immigration, naturalization, and displaced persons; civil rights; American Indian affairs; Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands; and conscientious objection. Organizations and individuals concerned with these areas had their correspondence routed to Nash, and he also monitored related developments in Congress and responsible agencies. In some instances, Nash was an advocate for the interests of blacks and American Indians, in particular, but kept the President's best interest uppermost in his mind.

> Was I an advocate for civil rights? Yes. Was Niles an advocate for political Zionism? Yes. In the sense that both of us had made up our minds that it was right for the President to do it and the President had made up his mind that it was right for him to do it and the only question was how, and our job was to help him do it.[53]

Unlike Niles, however, Nash's personal identity was not invested in the relations he was mediating for the President. His activities were less those of an *advocate* and more those of an *ombudsman*—someone to field complaints, help solve a

[51] Nash interview.

[52] Letter, Jonathan Daniels to Edgar T. Rouzeau, 1 January 1944; Letter, John H. Sengstacke to Eleanor Roosevelt, 12 January 1945, Official File 40a, FDRL.

[53] Nash interview.

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group's problems, and run interference within the bureaucracy or the White House when difficulties arose.

Even an ombudsman, however, will best serve the president's interests by enlisting group support for the administration. Despite a largely academic and bureaucratic background prior to joining the White House, Nash was drawn deeply into electoral politics. In 1944, 1948, and 1952, Nash was part of the Democrats' Instant Reply Committee, drafting instant rebuttals to charges contained in Republican speeches. Nash's principal activities, however, focused on the black voting bloc. He and Ted Poston prepared a series of administrative actions designed to give blacks a larger role in the war and whose announcement was timed to generate support in 1944. He prepared post-election analyses of Negro precincts in each national election from 1944 to 1952, advised publicists in the Democratic National Committee on the administration's civil rights record, and kept track of Negro appointments to government positions, a traditional measure used to demonstrate administration responsiveness. Recommending worthy blacks for job openings was an important activity, as well, making Nash a central figure in black patronage.[54] His prominence on race relations was illustrated in 1948 when he drafted Truman's Harlem speech, the campaign's sole address on civil rights.

Niles delegated to Nash the responsibility for establishing and overseeing the Truman administration's three major efforts on civil rights: the President's Civil Rights Committee, the Government Contract Compliance Committee, and the Committee on Equal Opportunity in the Armed Services. These efforts had symbolic importance but were also genuine attempts to address racial problems. Niles and Nash were directly involved in each; for example, they developed the rationale for the Civil Rights Committee (the formation of which had been resisted throughout FDR's term), selected its members, monitored progress, and reported to the President on the reception accorded its report.[55]

Part of the liaison role, however, is to convince affected groups that the focus, pace, and timing of administration efforts on their behalf are the best they can expect. In the face of black demands for more rapid progress, Nash met with members of the American Council on Race Relations and explained that the President could play a direct, but not necessarily a determining role in government procurement decisions, civil service policies, and defense manpower as well as procurement decisions. But the President had difficulty attempting to shape race

[54] Memo, Nash to Truman, 7 November 1952, Papers of Philleo Nash, Box 64, "Political—1952 Campaign Negro Vote Analysis," HSTL. Memos, Bertram Gross to Nash, 18 April 1952 and 28 June 1952, Nash Files, Box 4, "Civil Rights," Niles to Brightman, 26 July 1950, Nash Files, Box 11 "Negroes Nominated by President Truman," HSTL. Similar lists for 1944 and 1947 can be found among Nash's papers, as well.

[55] The Nash files and papers are especially rich on these matters. Niles's papers offer only an occasional glimpse of his role, as in the working paper used to determine members of the "President's Committee on Civil Liberties" (later changed to Civil Rights) dated 14 October 1946 with possibilities both added and deleted. There is also internal White House correspondence with Robert K. Carr, executive secretary of the committee, dealing with particularly sensitive problems; see 2 and 19 May 1947.

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relations in the District of Columbia. What he sought to establish was appreciation for the administration's "good faith" efforts and a supportive context. As Nash recalled the message,

> We need your suport, we need your data, we need your backing, we need not to fight with you; we need you to believe in us; we need you to tell us if you think we're going too slow. We want to be able to tell you that we can only go so fast without getting a counter-productive crackdown on appropriations or something else. Don't try to turn us into an FEPC which can never do wrong because it can never do right, or never do right because it always does wrong.[56]

For the D.C. problem, the administration worked closely with groups to develop a body of case law, documentation of discrimination, and publications setting forth the existing problems. The White House also maintained close liaison with the NAACP in developing their legal challenges to restrictive housing covenants and school segregation.

Beseeching organized interests to be patient and have confidence eventually wears thin. Responsiveness to particular complaints and concerns must be manifested as well. This also becomes an important role for public liaison, which resembles, in many respects the case work performed for constituents on Capitol Hill. On specific civil rights problems Nash served as an intermediary, a resource for the President and other White House Aides while also acting as an in-house ally for civil rights organizations. Such a situation can be illustrated by Nash's activity on housing discrimination in 1951–1952.

Though Nash did not routinely handle housing policy, he was concerned with housing as an area of discrimination and an important concern of black organizations. Thus, when the head of the NAACP wrote President Truman on 25 September 1951, asking for an executive order ensuring that construction financed by the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) be made equally accessible for rental or purchase to all citizens regardless of race, Nash became heavily involved in developing a response. The problem was especially acute in several southern and border-state communities where Negroes, displaced by slum clearance programs, could not find replacement dwellings. Restrictive covenants, tolerated by FHA, banned blacks from occupying many new structures. Charles Murphy, the President's special counsel and a key actor in congressional relations, became involved in the issue when several legislators, supported by the NAACP, sponsored nondiscriminatory amendments to the Housing Act. Murphy had discouraged such remedies and assured the members of Congress that new rules from federal housing agencies were forthcoming. When FHA proved unresponsive to follow-up inquiries from the Hill, the legislators and NAACP complained to Truman.

Nash explained to Murphy that FHA had been dragging its heels, but the Housing and Home Finance agency (HHFA) had made considerable progress in drafting new regulations.

[56] Nash interview.

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> In short, we are making progress in the practice of nondiscrimination in the field of housing as we are in other fields, by the use of administrative measures, far more rapidly than we will if we engage in legislative battles which arise when hard and fast clauses are introduced on the Hill. The Congressman was well advised to withdraw his amendment.[57]

The Congressman was referred to more responsive housing officials (alerted separately by Nash); and the administration, faced with considerable pressure for action, accelerated issuance of new regulations by HHFA without reference to the FHA, which continued in its obduracy.[58]

Nash continued to follow housing problems and seized upon the opportunity of a vacancy in the FHA directorship to force a thorough review of administration housing policy in 1952. His memo to the president noted that "in 55 years of FHA operations, only 1.8 percent of FHA projects were available to Negroes, as compared to 35 percent of public housing projects" and pointed to the broad ramifications of federal policies.

> Washington is typical. Its suburbs are ringed with "White Only" developments. Many of these are FHA financed. In the heart of D.C. is a handful of projects open to Negroes. Nearly all of them are FHA financed. This is commendable but it does not answer the problem.
>
> If this process is permitted to continue, our northern cities will grow into Negro "downtowns" surrounded by white suburbs.
>
> This is what lies at the heart of the D.C. school crisis. Only 35% of the District population is Negro, but over half its school population is Negro. This is a post-war change.[59]

Public housing policies, slum clearance programs, and FHA financing practices produced cumulative results. Nash set forth four administrative steps that could be taken immediately, including the "arrangement for regular White House liaison on this subject" with the responsible agencies.

Nash's guiding motto might well have been a dictum enunciated by a public liaison staffer serving under President Ford: "Good policy *is* good politics." There is no necessary conflict between the two, nor can one be successfully pursued without the other. The administration's caution in eschewing legislative strategies to fight discrimination produced conflict with the NAACP and placed even more emphasis on producing progress through administrative action. Having someone in the position to reconcile differences over tactics and timing was ultimately advantageous to both parties.

Conclusion

Public liaison's emergence as a White House staff specialization during the 1970s

[57] Memo, Nash to Charles Murphy, 20 September 1951, Nash Files, Box 8, "Housing," HSTL.

[58] Letters, Nash to Walter White, 5 October 1951 and Nash to Raymond Foley (HHFA), 26 November 1951, Nash Files, Box 8, "Housing," HSTL.

[59] Memo, Nash to Truman, 23 June 1952, Nash Files, Box 8, "Housing Memo to the President," HSTL.

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is less a departure of recent origins than the culmination of forces shaping the presidency over a period of several decades. The work of David Niles and Philleo Nash with interest groups during the Roosevelt and Truman administration was strikingly similar to accounts of the activities and responsibilities of their counterparts in the 1980s. As the studies cited at the outset of this article suggest, a strong case can be made that important changes have occurred in the interim; organized interests have multiplied, parties have declined in efficacy, and presidential responsibilities have accumulated. But a central factor remains unchanged: presidents need someone to monitor interest-group communications—requests, recommendations, demands—that flood the White House and to ensure that politically sensitive problems receive appropriately delicate treatment. This research demonstrates that these activities were brought into the White House as early as the 1940s, an indication of how important it is for intermediaries to enjoy the president's trust and be accepted by outside interests as presidential spokespersons, not merely representatives of party or agency interests.

Presidents establish group liaison as a means to further their own political interests. In itself, the designation of Niles and Nash as contact points within the White House was one means to demonstrate administration responsiveness to the needs and demands of Jews and blacks. It also provided Roosevelt and Truman with an opportunity to present the rationale behind administration programs and seek to win a measure of patience from two Democratic constituencies with politically volatile policy goals. The campaign responsibilities of Niles and Nash demonstrate how movement toward achieving the groups' policy goals was clearly tied to an effort to maintain their electoral support.

Routine liaison also enabled administration representatives to keep the groups' demands and independent efforts within acceptable bounds. Niles monitored the activities of pro-Zionist groups, counseling them to be patient at the same time as he sought to temper the President's reactions to some of their more outrageous demands. Nash's contacts with civil rights organizations represented an effort to secure acceptance of the administration's cautious legislative strategy and draw the groups into a cooperative effort. In this way the administration sought to control the pace of policy change and avoid political damage, which could have resulted from more militant actions.[60]

Niles and Nash represent distinctive approaches to discharging White House liaison responsibilities; the former was an advocate and latter an ombudsman. Sharing his constituency's identity facilitated Niles's acceptance by Jewish groups as a sympathetic White House intermediary and provided the President with access to a broad array of important contacts within the Jewish community. But close identification also made Niles's views and advice on Israel suspect in the eyes of some actors in the policy-making process. Because the President's views on Pales-

[60] For a valuable look at how similar damage limitation goals were pursued during the Johnson administration see Bruce Miroff, "Presidential Leverage over Social Movements: the Johnson White House and Civil Rights," *The Journal of Politics* 43 (February 1981): 2–23.

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tine coincided with his own, Niles was able to exercise a measure of influence over policy despite the State Department's distrust; maintaining the President's confidence was what counted. There is no evidence that Niles exceeded the President's orders in working for partition of Palestine and independence of Israel, but there are strong indications that Niles took maximum advantage of his proximity to the Oval Office and familiarity with the President's moods to advance his own policy preferences.

Nash, the ombudsman, also found it necessary to demonstrate personal commitment to his principal constituency's goals, a task possibly made more difficult by not sharing the group's identity. Although an ombudsman may encounter greater difficulty than an advocate in establishing credibility and access with interest group leaders, such an aide more readily avoids the suspicion of being his constituency's White House representative and is less likely to face conflicting pressures, potentially irreconcilable, between loyalty to the president and loyalty to the constituency. Throughout his extended White House service, Philleo Nash was unquestionably devoted to advancing the interest of blacks, but his actions lacked the ambiguity and potential for personal conflict surrounding Niles.

Given the presidency's central role in national policy making, White House liaison with interest groups is likely to remain a continuing feature of the modern era. As illustrated by the experiences of Niles and Nash, assistants serving in this capacity have the potential to influence administration policies (though this is by no means assured);[61] they may also become the target of group complaints or colleagues' suspicions. Future research might usefully proceed simultaneously on two levels of analysis. The degree of congruence between a president's program and interest-group goals establishes the context of interaction, but particularly skillful and politically astute staff members can make important contributions to the relationship. A staff member's efforts to further the president's interests can sometimes redound to the benefit of a group and make a genuine difference in national policy.*

[61] On the low influence of the public liaison unit in both the Carter and Reagan White Houses, see John Kessel, *Presidential Parties* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1984).

* Much of this research was made possible by a summer grant from the University of Delaware Research Foundation as well as a supplemental funds grant from the College of Arts and Sciences. The research employs materials from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (FDRL) in Hyde Park, N.Y. and Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL) in Independence, Mo., primarily from the Official Files, President's Personal File, and President's Secretary's File. From the Truman Library, I have cited materials from the Office Files of Philleo Nash as well as Nash's personal papers, also available at the Library. The papers of David K. Niles were examined with the generous cooperation of Abram Sachar while they were still housed at Brandeis University. Until they are processed by archivists at the Truman Library, their new location, they lack standard file designations.

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More Defense for Less Money: A Review Essay

ROBERT J. ART

In just under sixty pages, Joshua Epstein has elegantly surveyed and criticized the Reagan administration's fiscal year (FY) 1988 defense budget.* He looks at planned expenditures for both the strategic nuclear and conventional forces, separates the essential from the desirable and the wasteful, suggests alternative choices, and through these alternatives shows how to save nearly $25 billion in actual expenditures in the next two years with no detriment to United States security.

Epstein locates five "troublesome features" of the FY88 defense budget: an exaggerated assessment of Soviet strength; strategies, such as the maritime strategy, that are either infeasible, escalatory, or both; an excessive pace in programs of doubtful urgency; duplications of effort; and misplaced priorities. To a degree, the first, third, and fourth have characterized America's defense spending since 1945. The Reagan Administration has added two features (the second and fifth) and has pushed the other three to the extreme. The troublesome features that Epstein finds in the FY88 budget are there because they have been with us since 1982.

Continuity in misplaced priorities has typified the Caspar Weinberger defense program. The United States has overspent in the investments accounts (mainly research and development, and procurement) and underspent in the operations and support accounts (mainly operations and maintenance, and personnel). It has pushed modernization of forces, both nuclear and conventional, at the expense

*Joshua Epstein, *The 1988 Defense Budget* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987).

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of their readiness and sustainability. Moreover, the United States has "overmodernized" in the nuclear forces and overexpanded the navy. It was not that modernization was not in order in the early 1980s; rather it was a question of pace, degree, and area. Under Reagan the United States started more new weapons programs than it could sustain at the pace and price originally planned. With the defense budget now frozen, it will buy fewer numbers of weapons and, consequently, pay more for each of them. With the predictable choice made by the services not to cancel the procurement of new systems already started, the United States will slight the readiness and sustainability of the forces for war. With the large yearly increases in defense spending now over, it may not even be able to "people" the numbers of weapons, diminished though they may be, that it is buying.

To knowledgeable observers of the Pentagon, these results were predictable. If given the chance, the services will always slight readiness for modernization. For seven years, the Reagan administration gave them the chance. The result of these seven years is that nearly 40 percent of the defense budget for the next several years will consist of "backlog" spending—budget authority that will be spent in the present and next several years on projects approved in past years. Add to this the 30 percent of the defense budget needed to pay, house, and run the defense establishment. As a consequence, if no major systems are cancelled and with 70 percent of the defense budget frozen, readiness will suffer badly even if defense spending simply keeps pace with inflation. The situation will become even worse if Congress continues to cut real (inflation adjusted) defense spending, as it has done for the past two years.

To rectify this situation, Epstein provides sensible alternatives. For the strategic nuclear forces, he recommends the following: cancel the Midgetman missile; cap the MX missle at fifty; avoid railbasing for the MX; and slow the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and spending for the stealth bomber. Epstein points out that the Midgetman and MX missiles are optimized against fixed hard targets (Soviet silos) at a time when the Soviets are investing in mobile missiles. The United States is thus buying new missiles directed at present, not future, Soviet forces. Moreover, the need for more (or in my view, any) silo-busting capability is debateable at best. And the need for a new landbased missile is problematical, because the United States already have 500 of them deployed: it is called the Minuteman 3A, which is for all practicable purpose a new missile because its motors and critical subsystems have been modernized. (By the way, the Minuteman 3A has silo-busting capability if that is deemed desirable.)

Without an arms control agreement that limits Soviet warheads, whatever mobility America buys in the Midgetman and MX will be wasted. Political constraints in the United States will mandate that mobile landbased missiles be confined to federal bases in the West, and these can easily be barraged by the Soviets. Mobility for landbased missiles is a good idea, but without constraining the numbers each side buys, it can easily turn into a "mobility race" for both, rather than what it should be—a survivability solution for each. SDI can only shore up, not replace, deterrence because population defense is not feasible, as the Reagan administra-

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tion, though not the President himself, now admits. The question then, as Epstein correctly poses it, becomes this: Does deterrence need shoring up? He points out that the Pentagon itself now says that 20 to 35 percent of its landbased silos would survive a Soviet SS-18 attack. Add to that the number of bombers and seabased missiles surviving a surprise attack. Epstein concludes that "a conservative Soviet planner today would have to bank on an overall American retaliatory capability of some 6,900 warheads." There cannot be more than 100 major Russian cities that need targeting. Surely America's deterrence looks assured. At the minimum, haste on SDI is wasteful.

Finally, why must the stealth bomber proceed full steam ahead when the B-1B bomber is already being procured and deployed? It even incorporates some of the new stealth technology. In view of this and the fact that the United States has enough deterrence already, haste in stealth means waste in resources.

Epstein's suggestions for the conventional forces are equally trenchant. The major targets for cuts are future planned systems for both the navy and the tactical air forces. The maritime strategy calls for a posture that is irrelevant for a long conventional war in Europe and dangerous to boot. As presently configured, the navy will emphasize power projection against the Soviet mainland and attacks against Soviet seabased missiles. This requires a large number of carrier-based battle groups and early attacks against Soviet SSBNs. With economy of effort, Epstein shows why power projection is a greater risk to American carriers than to Russian mainland targets and why American SSNs (attack submarines) are better utilized to protect convoys going to Europe than to go after Soviet submarines in the Barents Sea.

Similarly, the United States is buying too many new air superiority fighters at the expense of close air support. It is the Soviet armoured (tank) forces with which it should be concerned. Aircraft like the A-10 kill tanks, the F-19 (the stealth fighter), and the ATF (advanced technology fighter) do not. Besides, the air force's General Gabriel has testified that the current F-15 air superiority fighter is a decade ahead of comparable Soviet planes. If the United States spends less on the navy and less on new tactical fighters, it will have the resources to [put into successors] for the highly successful A-10 that will yield significant payoffs for the European theater. Again, it is not a question of not developing new weapons, merely a matter of how many and what types.

With suggestions such as those above, Epstein has given a recipe for a more effective defense at less cost. But because of the proven proclivities of the Reagan administration, these suggestions will likely serve as a blueprint for a new administration, not a needed corrective for the present one. I recommend this highly readable and concise book for all those awaiting January 1989.

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Book Reviews

Strategy and Force Planning: The Case of the Persian Gulf by Joshua M. Epstein. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1987. 169 pp. Cloth, $28.95; paper, $10.95.

Since the 1940s we have known that the Soviet Union cannot hope to attack Iran and win its oil-rich province of Khuzestan at the Persian Gulf—not if the United States is ready to fight a conventional defensive war relying on five divisions and airpower. Who is "we"? Epstein shows, on the basis of documents now unclassified, that "we" is the Soviet Union, Great Britian, and the United States arriving at the same conclusion on startling similar grounds. But Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan could no longer remember, and earlier administrations at times forgot.

What Epstein contributes here is by far the most sophisticated and knowledgeable up-to-date analysis of why and how such a Soviet conquest can be deterred or, at worst, defeated. His exceptionally lucid and persuasive exploration accomplishes three things, though not a fourth. First, he actually describes the obstacles to conquest intrinsic to Iranian geography—a set of facts almost self-evident but seemingly unknown to many political leaders. It is a thousand kilometers from the Soviet frontier to the oil across three high mountain chains with one giddy railroad, very few roads, and many choke points easily rendered impassible. It is even farther from Afghanistan to Khuzestan across a desert without a road, hardly any water; too hot even for caravans in the summer; in the winter snow-covered mountains before and after the desert; floods and swamps below the foothills in spring and fall.

Second, Epstein offers a keen evaluation of why nuclear strikes of any kind or substitute attack on the Soviet Union or its allies in other regions is unnecessary to halt such a conquest and exceedingly dangerous.

Third, and this constitutes the main body of his contributions, Epstein offers a dynamic formal model—a major improvement over the F. W. Lanchester model—that can be used for any force planning, and is here, with cautiously conservative assumptions concerning defensive requirements, applied to the Persian Gulf. It is not possible to summarize the formulas used, the variables analyzed, the limita-

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tions explicitly acknowledged. This exercise, carefully articulated and explained in the text and a number of appendices, impressively utilizes evaluation of actual Soviet and American forces likely to be employed, likely military movements both of withdrawal and attack, and considerations of time and space.

What is missing from this fine work? Nothing that should make anyone hesitant to read it. Some fundamental questions are never raised or if raised, not pursued beyond a relatively conventional sentence or two. Epstein's model has no room for them, yet they are central to the matter. Indeed, most scholars and policy makers do not ask whether, supposing the Soviet Union actually succeeded in paying the high costs of conquering central and western Europe, it could actually hope to govern that area and utilize its human and economic resources. Considering the Soviet political and economic record within the Soviet Union and East Europe, I cannot imagine that Soviet leaders have any such illusions. Could they have such hopes in Iran, a country one-third the size of the United States and containing, as we have only recently come to realize, Iranians? "Occasionally," Epstein writes, "low probability events occur," with "extremely grave consequences"—"a contingency no responsible analyst can ignore" (p. 3-4). It is hard to disagree in the abstract; one is grateful for Epstein's cautious and relatively inexpensive response. But who will have the courage to question the highly unlikely premises most Americans take for granted for spending enormous resources and parking highly dangerous weapons systems in Europe and the Middle East? The Soviets do not have the actual capacity or realisitically the intention to block the shipment of Middle Eastern oil to the West. They do have a modest capacity to join with us in keeping the Persian Gulf open despite local fanatics.

MANFRED HALPERN
Princeton University

Public Prayer and the Constitution: A Case Study in Constitutional Interpretation *by Rodney K. Smith. Wilmington, Del., Scholarly Resources, 1987. 305 pp. $35.00.*

At the beginning of his book, Rodney Smith stakes out a claim to be an "originalist" in his approach to the Supreme Court's role as an interpreter and implementer of constitutional law. He thus appears to put himself squarely in the camp of Attorney General Edwin Meese and others who assert that the courts are bound by the intentions of the Framers if they are to maintain the legitimacy of judicial review, that the Framers' intentions are knowable, and that there is accordingly ordinarily but one answer to any given constitutional issue. This position would seem to be conclusive—indeed is conclusive for Meese and others—on the issue of prayer in the public schools and the imparting of religious messages on public occasions. It is all a matter of "judicial restraint," of imposing the Framers' view, not that of the judge, on decisions by the state as to whether there should or should

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not be such prayer. The premise is necessarily that the Framers at least intended to permit this kind of official religious practice, as is demonstrated, for example, by the kind of legislative chaplains' prayer upheld in *Marsh v. Chambers*, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).

Smith's asserted adoption of the originalist position would, therefore, appear to be the end as well as the beginning of the matter. But no, not at all. His historical research, some of it new, at least to me, and all of it apparently carefully, thoroughly, and objectively reviewed, discloses not one but two original intents. One, termed "the Story view," after the future Justice Joseph Story, would have permitted, perhaps favored, non-denominational Christian religious observances sponsored by the state. Although there were no important public school systems to consider at the time, the book concludes that adoption of the Story view as the Framers' intent, plus adoption of the originalist constraint on Supreme Court decisions, would have led to the opposite result from that reached by the Court in *Engel v. Vitale*, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (the school prayer decision) and *Abington School District v. Schempp*, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (striking down formal Bible-reading sessions in the public schools). Yet those same decisions are justified to Smith, still using the originalist method, by application of the "Madisonian view" of the Framers' intent. It appears that there is no principled historical or other basis for making the choice.

What the Supreme Court, or Attorney General Meese, or the originalist scholars, or constitutional law teachers in general are to make of this case study in originalist constitutional interpretation is a mystery to me. Smith appears unshaken by it himself with respect to his adherence to originalism as the appropriate constitutional method. The book, however, is clearly worth reading for a recent survey of the historical material bearing on what remains a controversial and emotionally charged subject.

BURKE MARSHALL
Yale University

The Future of American Strategy *by David C. Hendrickson. New York, Holmes and Meier, 1987. 210 pp. Cloth, $34.95; paper, $16.95.*

The enormous budgetary problems facing the United States as a result of the Reagan years, when money was poured into the military, suggests that the immediate future will see a retrenchment in military spending. To prevent that reduction from being haphazard or simply across-the-board it is necessary that the United States develop coherent strategic policies that reconcile political commitment and military power. This book provides a framework for such a policy and offers specific suggestions for reducing military spending without losing sight of legitimate interests. In order to do that, though, America must "overcome a persistent tendency to exaggerate our interests and depreciate our power" (p. 6). Specifically

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that means that it must reduce its interest in the Third World and place increasing emphasis on air and naval forces, both conventional and nuclear.

Hendrickson argues that the 1970s saw three major challenges that significantly threatened the Pax Americana. One was the growth of Soviet power, a second was widespread instability in the Persian Gulf area accompanied by increasing western reliance on oil from that region, and the third was the relative decline of the American economy. The author believes that President Ronald Reagan has made some progress addressing each of these issues but in the process has produced a financial crisis that will last after the administration leaves office. Now we need something equivalent to the Eisenhower and Nixon attempts to reorder defense priorities in a time of fiscal constraint.

A lengthy review of the problem of European security, which the author rightly perceives to be the core issue for the United States, produced few points that were new or exciting. In fact, his recommendations appear to be simply urging a continuation of the status quo. The United States must allow Europe to pursue détente with the Soviet Union while resisting efforts both to remove American ground forces and to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. Oddly, he even calls for the expansion of British and French nuclear forces just at the time when the West may be reducing its reliance on the reckless policies of the past that have emphasized those forms of destruction.

His discussion of the oil problem is interesting and contains useful information delineating the extent to which the West has become far less dependent on Mideast oil than it was in the 1970s. By taxing American energy use and encouraging oil exploration in the United States and in the Third World, the United States can continue this process and become less entangled with events in the Persian Gulf, which should result in a reduction of ground forces designated for use in that area.

By far the most provocative part of the book is Part III, which suggests changes in American strategic doctrine at both the nuclear and conventional levels. The author does not view nuclear weapons with the dread displayed by many contemporary analysts but instead sees them as a legitimate and continuing ingredient in strategic policy in the future. He recommends essentially second-strike weapons like manned bombers, cruise missiles, Poseidon and Trident I submarines, and terminal defenses for missile fields. Comprehensive agreements like SALT I and II are essentially dead ends and efforts to negotiate such treaties ought to be abandoned. Efforts to make nuclear weapons irrelevant, whether Reagan's dream for the Strategic Defense Initiative or the Left's dream of nuclear disarmament, are both misguided and futile. In fact, the author suggests that the United States might use nuclear weapons in the Persian Gulf to thwart Soviet expansion and should also consider their use in Korea if necessary and, apparently anywhere else it deems appropriate.

By far the most provocative chapter is the one in which Hendrickson offers his suggestions for revising American conventional force capability. Concentrating on air and naval forces, the United States should reduce its standing army by about 150,000 troops or roughly the nine divisions currently maintained primarily for

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Third World interventions. Not only is it difficult to imagine the army endorsing his suggestion with much enthusiasm, but it is also hard to see how the United States would respond if the air and naval support turns out to be inadequate as it did, for instance, in Korea.

The subject addressed by this book is critically important and needs to be debated. While one can disagree with many of Hendrickson's proposals, especially his endorsement of nuclear weapons and his support for the notion that air and sea power is the answer, I would still recommend that this book be read by anyone interested in the problem of national defense in an environment of increasingly scarce resources.

PHILIP DYER
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination *by Cheryl A. Rubenberg. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1986. 446 pp. $24.95.*

The main argument in this book can be summed up briefly. Far from serving U.S. national interests, American support for Israel has boosted Soviet influence, jeopardized access to Middle East oil and markets, impeded efforts to establish relationships with key Arab states, and generally helped to destabilize the region. According to the author, two factors prompt the United States to pursue such a self-destructive course: an erroneous perception that Israel is a strategic asset and the influence of the pro-Israeli lobby in American politics.

This is a very strange book whose legitimate and important purpose—to write a critical appraisal of the U.S.-Israeli relationship—has been buried beneath a mountain of unsubstantiated assertions and undocumented conclusions. Even if the author intended it as a revisionist counter to what she believes is a fettered debate about U.S. policy in the Middle East, the book is too shrill, too simplistic, and too antagonistic to be persuasive. Indeed, some of its best points, particularly regarding diverging U.S.-Israeli interests in recent years, are overpowered by the excessive moralizing of an advocate committed to a cause.

Rubenberg's approach to her subject seems shaped by two flawed assumptions that run throughout the volume. Not surprisingly, these assumptions lead the author precisely where she wants to go. First, the author adopts far too narrow a framework for analyzing the U.S.-Israeli relationship. Rubenberg believes that the U.S. has supported Israel primarily out of the erroneous but commonly held view that Israel is a strategic asset serving as an extension of American power (p. 13). Rubenberg acknowledges that other factors, including the Holocaust, common political and cultural values, and a moral commitment, also play a role; but these are deemed to be insignificant, irrelevant, or inappropriate. What really drove American policy makers after 1967 was the perception of Israel's strategic utility—buffer against the Soviets and counter to Arab radicals, etc. In any event this too, according to the author, has always been a myth. Having thus discredited most, if

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not all, of the traditional explanations for the U.S.-Israeli relationship, Rubenberg in a truly extraordinary passage gives us her explanation. The "basis" of the relationship is to be found in CIA-Mossad (Israel's intelligence organization) "collaboration" and Israel's battlefield testing of U.S. weapons. Other than these services, the author concludes, "it is difficult to see what benefits the United States has derived from its sponsorship of and partnership with, Israel" (p. 332).

The author has spent much of her analysis constructing and then destroying a straw man. What Rubenberg seems unable to grasp is that the U.S.-Israeli relationship has survived not as a result of any single factor but in response to an extremely broad conception of the national interest. It is the complexity of this relationship—the fact that it embodies so many different dimensions, including commonly shared cultural and political values easily understood at both the public and elite levels—that account for the durability of the relationship. However discordant U.S. and Israeli interests may be on any issue, the American public clearly has an easier time relating to Israel than to the politics and culture of its Arab neighbors. If Rubenberg is correct in emphasizing any single factor, it is domestic politics that allows a well organized and influential Jewish community to orchestrate common bonds between Israel and the United States and to minimize differences between them.

Second, Rubenberg's arguments lack even the remotest sense of perspective and balance. The fact that the author is focusing primarily on the U.S.-Israeli relationship does not free her from the responsiblity of presenting the Middle East in all its complexity. In Rubenberg's Middle East there is first and foremost an expansionist Israel imposing its will on the neighborhood. There are Arabs and Palestinians, to be sure, but they are portrayed as weak and largely blameless for the region's instability. Thus, in Rubenberg's world, Israeli leaders "manipulate" the Holocaust syndrome (they couldn't be genuinely affected by it) to justify attacking Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in 1967 (p. 103) and exploit a fear for their survival (entirely unjustified, of course) to resist negotiating peace. Indeed, in an extraordinary passage Rubenberg argues that it is a "distortion" to believe that Israel felt threatened by the Arabs; in reality it was the other way around (p. 329).

No one who has been involved in Arab-Israeli affairs and who has approached the subject honestly can ignore the contradictions inherent in the U.S.-Israeli relationship or the major problems the United States has encountered in trying to maintain close ties with its Israeli and Arab friends. Nonetheless, it is difficult to take Rubenberg's "root of all evil" approach seriously. Unfortunately, unwinding the complexities of the U.S.-Israeli relationship and its impact on U.S. interests in the Middle East will have to await a scholar who has the necessary detachment and sophistication to accomplish the task.

AARON DAVID MILLER
Department of State

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Defending the Fringe: NATO, the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf *by Jed C. Snyder. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1987. 149 pp. $23.50.*

In recent years, United States and NATO security concerns in the Mediterranean and Perisan Gulf regions have rightfully become subjects for serious discussion and analysis, and Jed Snyder has made a useful contribution to the still small but gradually growing literature. His book is a brief, but comprehensive survey of the geostrategic and military environments and of current issues and policy problems facing the United States and its allies in these regions. He takes seriously the security threat from the Soviet Union and other quarters, although is often more alarmist than this observer thinks—or the author's own analysis sometimes suggests—is warranted. He also takes into account, as any good analysis must, local disputes and the interests and sensitivities of governments in the regions, as well as the divergent interests of the western allies, all of which make the formulation of policy for these regions so difficult.

One might question the wisdom of addressing in one short book two regions as large and as culturally and politically diverse as the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. The arguments for doing so, however, are persuasive. Both are areas of great strategic importance to the western allies that have been long neglected. Both are important sources of oil. Both include numerous Islamic and especially Arab states. The Arab-Israeli dispute and the Iran-Iraq war, both major security concerns, significantly influence both regions. In addition, because of their geographic proximity and their maritime linkage through the Suez Canal, there is considerable overlap in the military forces that both NATO and the Soviet Union could use for military operations in the two areas. A single treatment of security issues in both regions is, therefore, highly appropriate, although it would have been more successful had it been more integrated, rather than sequentially presented.

One of the real strengths of Snyder's work is his blending of military and political considerations. Considerable attention is given to the relevant domestic politics of NATO southern flank states (although much less so for the Gulf states) and to the Greek-Turkish dispute, the Spanish-Portugese competition, and the politics of the Gulf Cooperative Council. Emphasis is also placed on the important political roles of military force deployments in peacetime, including reassurance of allies and intimidation of adversaries. Such roles are often neglected by strategic and political analysts alike who focus exclusively and excessively narrowly on deterrence. However, in considering military scenarios, Snyder does stop short of presenting serious anlysis of how U.S. or allied forces might fare. Rather he is content to draw overly simplified and sometimes misleading conclusions from an enumeration of organizational units and equipment on both sides.

Snyder's ability to draw on the history of the two regions enables him to place current issues in their historical context and to analyze contemporary policy problems by historical analogy. Although one is occasionally left wondering about the

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relevance of some interesting historical point to the main argument, this is a fault to be prefered to the more usual route of analyzing contemporary security problems devoid of historical context. Regretably, though, Snyder's concern for history is directed more backward than forward. All too often, his analysis is based only upon the current reality rather than a projection of what the future might or even probably will yield. One notable example is his emphasis on the recent decline in importance of OPEC producers in the world oil market, without anticipating how their role is likely to change in the future. Such a projection would have reinforced the author's claim that the Persian Gulf will remain strategically crucial to both the Soviet Union and the West.

Overall, Snyder has presented a penetrating and persuasive analysis and one well worthy of attention by students and practitioners of western security and foreign policy. One can only hope that his "plea to modernize Western concepts of conflict to encompass regions that may be emerging as targets for Alliance adversaries" (p. 126) will bear fruit in western policy as well as in academic circles.

TED GREENWOOD
Columbia University

China and the Third World: Champion or Challenger? *edited by Lillian Craig Harris and Robert L. Worden. Dover, Mass., Auburn House, 1986. 174 pp. $29.00.*

As part of its independent foreign policy proclaimed at the 12th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1982, China has reinvigorated its Third World diplomacy over the past several years. However, it is China's relations with the superpowers that command the lion's share of scholars' attention. This well-balanced and useful collection of eight essays on China's Third World policies effectively demonstrates how China's policies towards the superpowers and the Third World are linked. As an emerging global actor that is still a developing country, China has tried to function from time to time as a bridge between the developed industrialized countries and the Third World developing countries. Yet the ambivalence of China's present status elicits skepticism in the developed world as to China's major power credentials while Third World countries, viewing China as in the same league as the big boys, question China's adherence to long-standing Third World goals for transforming the international system and express some doubt as to China's self-identification as a Third World nation.

This first scholarly study of China's Third World policies in the post-Mao (post-revolutionary) period adopts a functional and thematic approach to its rather large and amorphous subject. Chapters by Robert Sutter, Carol Lee Hamrin, and Sara Ann Smith dealing respectively with strategic and economic issues, domestic political factors, and the function of Third World policy in defining China's self-identity deal competently with these questions but cover familiar ground. The chapters by Robert Worden, Bruce Larkin, and Lillian Harris are empirically richer

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and illuminate their topics in new ways. In discussing China's participation in international organizations, Worden shows that notwithstanding the rapid expansion of China's activity in international organizations during the past decade, China still lags behind the participation rates of developed countries. Larkin discusses how Chinese participation in international financial institutions and international trade has affected other Third World countries. While emphasizing its commitment to South-South cooperation, China has in fact emerged as a major competitor for international loans and a rival of other Third World countries for markets in the developed world. Lillian Harris's interesting chapter on People's War in the 1980s demonstrates that this quintessentially Maoist notion has survived the death of its progenitor. She skillfully describes the adaptation of this doctrine and strategy to the objectives of current Chinese foreign policy including the struggles against pro-Soviet regimes in Afghanistan and Kampuchea. Robert Manning's final chapter on Third World views of China is a quick and superficial sketch of a subject that deserves more considered treatment.

Among aspects of China's Third World relations that are not covered in this collection are such interesting subjects as China's increasingly prominent role as an arms merchant to the Third World and the role of racism and ethnic conflict in China's Third World cultural relations. Black African complaints against Chinese racism against students in the People's Republic of China have been voiced for over twenty-five years by now.

In a book of eight chapters by seven different authors, there is bound to be some redundancy, but there is less here than one might expect. The contributors are all skilled veteran analysts of Chinese affairs who write in accessible prose. Sensitive to the historical context of Chinese foreign policy, their essays make a useful contribution to the endless debate about continuity versus change in Chinese foreign policy. They further the discussion about what role China will play in the world as its power increases towards the end of this century by virtue of its ongoing modernization program.

STEVEN I. LEVINE
American University

Escalation and Intervention: Multilateral Security and Its Alternatives *edited by Arthur R. Day and Michael W. Doyle, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1986. 181 pp. $23.50.*

This volume is a collection of essays commissioned by the Multilateral Project of the United Nations Association of the USA. The work consists of six studies of Third World conflicts—Chad, Lebanon, Iran-Iraq, Somalia-Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Grenada—sandwiched between a short introduction by Michael Doyle and an analytical summary by Arthur Day. Like so many edited volumes, the respective parts of this book are more impressive than the whole. The case-study chapters of the volume are individually fascinating. Each is written by an

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analyst who is intimately familiar with his subject; and each, therefore, provides a wealth of information in compact and readable form. The infinite complexities of the regional conflicts are displayed to the great benefit of nonexperts. William Zartman carefully explains who was who, and who was on whose side in Chad, and why. John Harbeson does the same for the Horn of Africa. Michael Doyle traces the hour-by-hour chronology of events leading to the United States intervention in Grenada and usefully illuminates the role of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. Arthur Day writing on Lebanon and Barry Rubin on the Iran-Iraq conflict are sensitive to subtleties that even informed readers might miss. Louis Dupree's chapter on Afghanistan is vintage Dupree—knowledgeable, witty, thoughtful, accurate, and complete.

Arthur Day's summary chapter stands out. Day is perceptive in his analysis of opportunities and limitations for United Nations interventions into regional conflicts. His summary observation that regional organizations probably cannot be very useful conflict managers is not surprising, but it is worth underlining. While no intervenors have been especially successful at controlling Third World conflicts, the case studies suggest that unilateral intervention by militarily-capable actors is more promising than multilateral intervention under any organizational auspice. Day also underlines that the escalation of Third World conflicts beyond particular regions is rather improbable, and this raises questions about future re-runs of the "Sarajevo" scenario, where minor conflicts escalate to world wars. Smaller conflicts, however, will proliferate, because they are so easy to start and so difficult to stop.

One almost wishes that Day had written rather than edited the book, because there was much more about escalation, intervention, and multilateral processes in the summary than in the case studies. Despite all of their detail, most of the case studies are not focused on escalation or intervention. Instead, they are individually focused in different directions—some on chronology, some on setting or context, some on decision making. The contributors generally paid scant attention to multilateral organizations, and they did not respond well to consistent questions that could have linked the chapters. As a collective product, therefore, the volume is much too loose to be very useful. We end up with a work that does not greatly enhance our general understanding of escalation and intervention.

DONALD J. PUCHALA
University of South Carolina

Security Interdependence in the Asia Pacific Region *edited by James W. Morley. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1986. 189 pp. $25.00.*

This book, a product of a Columbia University research project, examines issues of the security interdependencies of the non-Communist states of the "Asia Pacific region." It consists of an introduction by Morley, a Columbia professor; four

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papers by native scholars discussing the strategies of the Pacific states; and a concluding chapter.

Morley describes the so-called "new Asia Pacific security region" (p. 3) and its makeup. He examines the interdependencies among its members and how the two Communist powers (especially the Soviets) have contributed to them. The U.S. strategy of global deterrence and the place the region holds in it are discussed by Richard K. Betts, a Brookings fellow. While Washington's security interests coincide with those of its East Asian allies, this is not the case with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), states, which have a relaxed view of the Soviet threat. The Europe-centered United States, with its worldwide strategic urgency, is seen unable to raise Southeast Asia's strategic importance to a level justified by its economic importance. Cognizant of this divergence between economic and strategic considerations, Betts suggests a larger role for Japan and Australia in regional security.

The Japanese National Defense Academy's Masashi Nishihara outlines Tokyo's commitment to regional stability, specifying its actions contributing to that stability. He counsels against institutionalizing regional security cooperation. The best arrangement is the informal coalition he sees now evolving around bilateral security ties between the United States and its Asian allies; under it Japan can play an effective role in checking Soviet power and in promoting regional stability. The paper on South Korea and Taiwan by Byung-joon Ahn of South Korea describes their strategy of local deterrence and the importance held by the United States, Japan, and ASEAN in that strategy.

Chan Heng Chee, a Singaporean, examines intra-ASEAN topics, with only scant attention to ASEAN's security relations with the United States and its East Asian allies. He sees America's interest in ASEAN as a corollary of its anti-Communist strategy. While ASEAN views its ties with the United States and Japan as "a source of enormous comfort" in its search for regional security, it remains committed to a long-range goal of creating "a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality" (p. 138).

While the book has an opening essay, it lacks a concluding chapter that brings together preceding discussions. In the last chapter entitled "Some Concluding Reflections," Michael Leifer, a London-based scholar, assesses linkages between the Asian states' relations with the United States and Japan and their political stability. While the two powers have no "specific, direct, decisive influence" on regional stability, what he calls a "structure of interdependence" gives "an essential support" (p. 172) to the ASEAN states, South Korea, and Taiwan.

The book obviously achieves its intended objective of providing "an overview of some of the major intellectual and policy issues" (p. x) of Pacific security. As with other anthologies of this type, there is considerable variation in quality and readability among the papers. Some tend to be more speculative essays sprinkled with personal policy preferences than products of rigorous systematic research. One of the substantive papers has no documentation. While diverse opinions are to be expected in a collection of conference papers, readers may be puzzled by

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some basic discrepancies found in this book. While Betts laments "a steadily emerging gap between objective U.S. intrinsic economic interests and derivative strategic interests" (p. 39) in Southeast Asia, Leifer is heartened that the region's low order of strategic priority in the United States "has been changing since the late 1970s" (p. 168). Part of the volume's discussion of South Korean and Filipino politics has been made obsolete by recent developments. The book contains numerous assertions likely to disturb some readers.

YUNG PARK
University of Tsukuba, Japan

Strategic War Termination *edited by Stephan J. Cimbala. New York, Praeger, 1986. 227 pp. $37.95.*

War termination has been a long-neglected topic in strategic studies. The contributors to the Cimbala volume persuasively argue that strategic war termination must be analyzed if leaders are to have any chance of dealing with nuclear deterrence failures—if they are to avoid the choice between surrender and catastrophe. The authors successfully challenge arguments against the study of termination ranging from those that assert that the study makes the event more likely to those that stress the futility of attempts to terminate nuclear war.

The volume is divided into three basic parts. The first discusses the implications of deterrence for war termination, the second discusses policies and problems in war termination, and the third focuses on new approaches to war termination. Two articles deserve special mention because of their excellence. Leon Sloss and Paolo Stoppa-Liebl offer an incisive discussion of targeting objectives and capability requirements for war cessation. Carl Builder first describes how new weapons technologies will change our conceptions of strategic war. He then argues that PGM's (Precision-Guided Munitions) and strategic defense in a point defense mode (protection of a missile field) will allow for a slower, more controlled, somewhat more easily terminated war.

The major strength of the volume is that it presents a solid and broad elaboration of many issues relevant to war termination. It offers a good understanding of current strategies for termination, of the major variables that affect chances for termination, and of the likelihood that a war in the near future could be terminated.

The volume as a whole allows the reader to isolate the variables that affect the chances of successfully stopping a war. Force structure is a key variable, which should emphasize accuracy, flexibility, and survivability. Strategic defense in a point defense mode is helpful to termination because it discourages large, escalatory counterforce strikes. Survivable and redundant C^3I (command, control, communications, and intelligence) is of central importance. The pace of a war is relevant; the slower the exchanges the greater the chance for termination. A greater degree of conventionalization of weapons and strategies facilitates cessation of hostili-

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ties. Finally, the existence of beliefs that limited nuclear war is possible is a prerequisite for termination.

The contributors agree that currently the termination of a limited nuclear war would be quite difficult. They stress that the vulnerability of existing C^3I is a very important reason for skepticism regarding termination. However, conventionalization of doctrines, deployment of PGMs, and progress in Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research are factors seen as holding hope of slight improvement in the chances of bringing an end to hostilities.

The volume also has several notable weaknesses. The great majority of contributors come from an intellectual perspective that focuses on force ratios and issues of relative military advantage. However, the views of an author in the classical deterrence school (Thomas Schelling, Robert Jervis) would have provided balance and raised some interesting questions. If nuclear war follows the logic of competitive risk taking instead of relative military advantage, what are the implications for termination? How do shows of resolve such as demonstration strikes relate to termination? And can the concept of punishment be a useful element of a termination strategy?

Finally, the volume lacks a sufficient discussion of Soviet views on issues relevant to war termination. Those few authors who refer to the Soviet literature argue that the Soviets do not discuss termination openly and that they deny the possibility of limited nuclear war, a crucial prerequisite for termination. Though the Soviets in fact do not discuss termination openly, important changes relevant to termination have taken place in both Soviet doctrine (the conventional option) and Soviet force structure (emphasis on conventionalization). Moreover, there is an interesting new line of evidence that describes Soviet views of limited nuclear war (Notra Trulock) and is certainly relevant to termination studies. In sum, the Cimbala volume is a good early step in the study of an important topic. Hopefully it has laid the foundation for further work by analysts from many professional specializations.

CLIFFORD KUPCHAN
Columbia University

The National Security: Its Theory and Practice, 1945–1960 *edited by Norman A. Graebner. New York, Oxford University Press, 1986. 316 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $8.95.*

Originally prepared for a West Point symposium, the essays presented in this volume represent a worthy addition to the growing body of new scholarship dealing with the postwar years and in particular with the Eisenhower administration. While centered around the evolution of national security policy, individual essays explore the larger economic, bureaucratic, and political context of military planning. This variety, indeed, is one of the volume's principal strengths; while the general reader will find a broad overview of security policy in the 1940s and 1950s, indi-

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viduals whose principal interest or expertise lies in one particular aspect of this issue are likely to gain useful insights on related topics.

Richard Challener's "The National Security Policy from Truman to Eisenhower," as well as Norman Graebner's introductory essay, provide a useful context in which to place the more specialized pieces, outlining the broad trends that defined the evolving national security environment: from Truman's concept of the atomic bomb as a terror weapon of last resort to Eisenhower's view of nuclear weapons as America's first line of defense; from the early emphasis on the economic aspects of international relations to the increasing militarization of U.S. foreign policy in the 1950s; from the crisis planning of the late 1940s to the longer term viewpoint of the Eisenhower years.

At the heart of the collection are two essays that focus specifically on the evolution of military planning: "The Origins of Overkill" by David Allen Rosenberg and "Civil-Military Relations" by Douglas Kinnard. The first might appropriately be subtitled, "The Rise of the Strategic Air Command." It details SAC's largely successful effort to establish and defend its preeminent role in defining the practical aspects of nuclear war planning. While chronicling this remarkable military-bureaucratic success story, however, Rosenberg takes pains to point out the extent of opposition to SAC on the part of the other services (particularly the navy, which was pursuing its own nuclear program) and of certain civilian planners. Indeed, Rosenberg generally supports SAC's critics, agreeing with them that the air force's doctrine and target lists were driven by expanding technical capabilities rather than a realistic assessment of the actual Soviet threat. This process led directly to the perceived need for an ever-larger nuclear arsenal. Kinnard's essay focuses on one particular opponent of SAC's increasing power—Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor, detailing Taylor's long, and in the end unsuccessful struggle to reverse the emphasis placed on strategic nuclear forces at the expense of conventional strength and preparedness.

Perspective on the issue of nuclear planning is provided by the volume's other essays. Of particular interest among these is Gary Reichard's critique of the myth of the bipartisan consensus on foreign policy. Reichard's well documented assertions that the so called consensus was both much less broad than often claimed and—to the extent that it existed—largely counterproductive, provide a timely rebuttal to those who look back nostalgically to what was in fact a period of unprecedented executive branch dominance in foreign policy making.

Drawing heavily on primary sources, all of the essays reinforce the newly credible view of Eisenhower as a strong active president, very much in charge of his administration. Perhaps more importantly, they emphasize the importance which this most military of modern presidents placed on fiscal prudence in defense spending. In Eisenhower's own words, "Once you spend a dollar beyond adequacy, you are weakening yourself" (p. 55). A thought to bear in mind in the difficult years ahead.

MARC E. SMYRL
Washington, D.C.

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East Bank/West Bank: Jordan and the Prospects for Peace *by Arthur R. Day. New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1986. 166 pp. Cloth, $17.50; paper, $8.95.*

Some countries receive more attention from scholars and policy analysts than they deserve, and some receive less. Jordan is in the latter category, for although it is an interesting, important, complicated, and controversial place, it is sorely neglected by serious writers. Arthur Day's workmanlike survey is therefore a welcome addition to the too paltry literature.

The product of British imperial strategy, Jordan is what Day calls a "classic buffer state," sitting in the heart of the Middle East, surrounded by Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel. The population, which thinks of itself as Jordanian, is a minority in its own country; even without the West Bank, Palestinians constitute more than half the residents. The ruling monarchy owes its position to the British, who installed King Hussein's grandfather Abdallah in mandatory Transjordan as his Hashemite family was being chased from their ancestral realms in Mecca by the Saudis. It is small wonder, then, that Day organizes his essay around two questions: "Is Jordan a Palestinian state waiting to happen? . . . Or is Jordan an integrated and cohesive state with a political structure that has deep roots in powerful sectors of the population?" (p. 2).

Day convincingly argues that the answer to the first question is no, attributing to King Hussein the observation with which he most agrees: although the Palestinian problem is Jordan's main preoccupation, it is not its definition. The impression that Jordan is little more than a Palestinian state lurking behind the Hashemite facade is widely held and, indeed, not infrequently advocated. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) came to blows with Hussein over the question in the early 1970s (and shortly thereafter left to reconstitute its "state-within-a-state" in Lebanon), while Israeli politics has its share of advocates of the position that "Jordan is Palestine"—that is, that the Palestinians should be permitted to rule the former British territory of Transjordan and simultaneously be required to give up claims to mandatory Palestine.

King Hussein has obvious reasons for objecting to this interpretation of Jordan's present or future role in the Middle East. There are others, however, as well. The Palestinian population is divided—by class, longevity in Jordan, ties to the West Bank, the Gulf, the PLO, among other things—and creation of a Palestinian political entity will be difficult as it is. Certainly attachment to Jordan, Hashemite or otherwise, is unlikely to provide a focus of consensus since it is not widespread among any of the politically relevant groups. Moreover, the cleavage between the East Bankers, as the natives are known, and the Palestinians is palpable. And both deliberate government policy and the unintended effects of educational, social, and economic development have ensured that the indigenous inhabitants of Jordan have an investment in a system that is their own.

Day wishes to go further, however, than merely demonstrating the fruitlessness of looking at Jordan as a Palestinian state in embryo. He is sensitive to the distinction between dynastic and national interests, and he tries to make a case for a

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Jordan that is neither Hashemite nor Palestinian. That is, he tries to answer the second of his questions with a yes, and here he is less persuasive. His assertion that "Jordan is a state and is becoming a nation" (p. 142) deliberately precludes the possibility that Jordan is neither state nor nation but rather an international convenience and a dynastic realm. Yet the combination of, on one hand, the tacit consensus of the neighboring countries and their allies to deny others influence on their borders—that is, to maintain the buffer—and, on the other, the ability of an adroit monarch to dispense patronage shrewdly at home may retard rather than foster the difficult, costly, and often painful processes of state formation and nation building.

Nonetheless, it is United States policy makers, not students of state formation, who are Day's most important audience (he spent twenty-eight years in the United States foreign service himself) and he makes his most important point with conviction and intelligence: Jordan should not be treated merely as the most malleable and least demanding of the countries in the Middle East. The book is pleasantly written (despite the rare lapse into a faintly patronizing tone), sensibly organized, and accessible to the nonspecialist. This is not the definitive book on Jordan, but it is certainly worth consulting while we are waiting.

LISA ANDERSON
Columbia University

The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War *by Fraser J. Harbutt. New York, Oxford University Press, 1986. 370 pp. $24.95.*

Many may greet another book on the origins of the cold war as an exercise in historical overkill. The past two decades of cold war research have witnessed one wave of orthodox interpretations, followed by another of revisionism, and then a post-revisionist synthesis. Archives have been opened, documents declassified, and analyses are now carefully nuanced. Is there room for another fly-by over this intellectual battleground?

In the case of Fraser Harbutt's book the answer is yes. He has given a fresh perspective to that densely packed period from 1943 to 1946, when the entire order of world politics was rearranged. In focusing upon the role of the British in general and Winston Churchill in particular, Harbutt gives us a new insight into how the Grand Alliance dissolved into a superpower struggle. In the later stages of World War II, when Soviet power was projected into Poland and South Central Europe, it was Winston Churchill, not Franklin D. Roosevelt nor Harry Truman, who sounded the alarm bell. Churchill had three major concerns: the rise of Soviet power, the decline of British influence, and the apparent readiness of the United States to disentangle itself militarily from Europe after the war. According to Harbutt, Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin struck a deal at the Teheran Conference in 1943 whereby Roosevelt signalled his tacit support for a Soviet sphere in East Europe; and Stalin in turn agreed to participate in the postwar United Nations. For Chur-

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chill, Teheran raised the chilling specter of Britain alone in Europe facing the Soviet Union.

Thus, Churchill was convinced that the future of British power and influence lay in an Anglo-American alliance that could bind America to Europe. As a practitioner of the old school of power politics, Churchill had little faith in the power of moral suasion, which Roosevelt's United Nations represented. But for Roosevelt East Europe was a remote concern, beyond the reach of American power and worth only a rhetorical investment. The American leaders were willing to concede to the Soviet Union what they felt they must. As Harbutt puts it, Roosevelt granted at Yalta "conditional agreement to the Curzon line, [and] the Lublin Communist core of a reconstituted Polish government" (p. 41). Harbutt contends that Roosevelt hoped that the moral force of the Declaration of Liberated Peoples and the United Nations Charter would serve to constrain Soviet behavior.

Churchill apparently bought none of this. Neither was he reassured by the attempts of Secretary of State James F. Byrnes in the early months of the Truman administration to find a negotiating formula for the remaining issues surrounding East Europe. But in early 1946 events erupted in Iran to push American policy in the direction Churchill had hoped it would go. When Stalin reached outside East Europe and into Iran, the alarm bells went off in Washington. Within a matter of weeks, Harbutt argues, Truman and Byrnes turned their policy from accommodation to confrontation. Although out of power, Churchill remained a major player. His Iron Curtain speech in March 1946, delivered with Truman's encouragement, was a deliberate attempt to prepare a confused American public for the new "get tough" policy. The Soviets themselves helped to influence the course of public thinking by their clumsy handling of the 1946 Iran crisis, which Harbutt chronicles in elaborate detail. Harbutt has helped our understanding of the dynamics of Anglo-Soviet-American diplomacy of the mid-1940s and in the process has brought new light to an historical debate that had seemed to have exhausted itself.

ROBERT J. BRESLER
Pennsylvania State University at Harrisburg

Armed Truce: The Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945–46 *by Hugh Thomas. New York, Atheneum, 1987. 667 pp. $27.50.*

This remarkably thorough and comprehensive first volume of a proposed longer study of the cold war takes us to February/March 1946, those two crucial months during which Joseph Stalin made his famous election speech on 9 February; George Kennan sent his long telegram on the sources of Soviet conduct to Washington on 22 February; Winston Chruchill made his iron-curtain speech at Fulton, Missouri in the presence of President Harry Truman on 5 March; the United States took the Iran troop-withdrawal issue to the United Nations; and a host of other things occurred to mark a watershed in the transition from the wartime coalition to postwar confrontations and the cold war.

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The book has five major parts, the first on Stalin and the Russians; the second on the "new Americans" and Anglo-Saxon relations; the third on the "disputed lands" of eastern Europe, Finland, the Baltic States, East Prussia, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Persia, China, Japan, Korea, and Indo-China; the fourth on the atomic bomb, atomic diplomacy, and postwar atomic energy control; and the fifth on "worlds apart," dealing with Kennan's telegram, Churchill's speech, and the Iran crisis of 1946. A brief concluding chapter discusses causes, responsibilities, and might-have-beens. There is an index and there are eleven appendices and extensive notes that refer to an impressively broad range of published materials and cite documents in the Public Record Office, the National Archives, the Library of Congress, and other appropriate collections. The author's synthesis of published materials alone recommends the book as essential reading for anyone interested in the early cold war.

The thesis of the book is revealed in its structure. Beginning with an analysis of Stalin's speech and Russian policy, which he concludes with the observation that the Soviet Union "was a state which, because of the character of its leaders, its ideology and its internal mood, could not have fitted into any design to create a tranquil world" (p. 86), the author takes the reader through a detailed examination of the topics listed in the previous paragraph to the point early in 1946 when the Americans (and the British) "began to move towards a hard-headed view of Soviet behavior" (p. 529). Along the way he frequently gets to the heart of the matter, for example when he quotes Henry L. Stimson—during internal American discussions on the postwar control of atomic energy—on the need to take the Russians on their own terms ("The chief lesson I have learned in a long life is that the only way you can make a man trustworthy is to trust him"), and concludes that "that comment would have been fair in most circumstances. But it has no application to Russia" (p. 444).

The book is rich in detail about the events and episodes of the early cold war, and it is filled with much fascinating information about—and some judgments on—individuals who participated in them. One that caught my attention was that "[Ernest] Bevin, for all his blunt ways, and his reliance on clever officials for papers on strategy, was an original mind and would have as large an effect on policy as any Western statesman in the next four years, except perhaps for Dean Acheson" (p. 199). If Acheson and Bevin were to become the prime movers in the future, they nevertheless take a back seat to George F. Kennan in this volume. Thomas devotes an entire chapter to the long telegram and frequently uses references to Kennan to put forth his own views.

JOHN GIMBEL
Humboldt State University

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Republicans and Vietnam, 1961–1968 *by Terry Dietz. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1986. 184 pp. $29.95.*

Much has been written on the politics of the Vietnam war, but the pertinent role of the Republican party in the years between GOP Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon is commonly treated as an historical blank, except for the Goldwater election campaign of 1964. Terry Dietz undertakes to fill in that blank – not by adding anything but by understating the Goldwater phenomenon. Dietz chronicles how Everett Dirksen, Senate minority leader from Illinois, held to the faith in bipartisanship with which Senator Arthur Vandenberg and Dwight Eisenhower had imbued the then-dominant wing of the GOP and hence how Dirksen muted Republican congressional criticism as John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson slogged deeper and deeper into Vietnam.

For Dirksen's "loyal opposition" the accent was overwhelmingly on the loyalty not the opposition. Most people are likely to judge this behavior on the basis of their opinion of the war itself. But Dietz studiously avoids that approach on the ground that the Republican leaders genuinely shared the Kennedy-Johnson "hold Vietnam" goals and differed at most about means, in a more hawkish direction at that. So unless one believes that more abrupt escalation would have succeeded, it is hard to argue that more assertive Republicanism would have improved the outcome in Vietnam – Dietz does not attempt that argument. Instead he concludes that more open, less muted debate is a good in itself for enlightening the public and inducing compromises and that in this instance it might at least have forestalled the credibility gap and ensuing cynicism and alienation, including disillusionment with bipartisanship itself, which contributes to what Dietz sees as excessive discontinuity of policy today.

This is a reasonable argument and one wishes that Dietz had undertaken to elaborate it. But his bent is not to generalize; it is to chronicle. All but his final chapter is simply an account of events – and a limited one at that. His conception of the Republican party is simply its congressional leadership and its top contenders for presidential nominations, never its voters (in any kind of election), nor its financial contributors, nor its affiliated interest groups, nor its media backers, nor even its ordinary members of Congress. We are never once given the numbers of any vote that took place anywhere. Such a narrow perspective cannot possibly explain very much that happens in American party politics.

But it can make one pay attention to Everett Dirksen and observe how his affection for Lyndon Johnson and his own vanity in being positioned as patriotic ally (plus of course his own policy outlook) have actually plummeted him into nearly total oblivion. (Who ever mentions Everett Dirksen nowadays, except occasionally as Howard Baker's father-in-law?) "Vietnam amnesia" has simply wiped him out. There is irony here that Dietz could have turned into Greek tragedy perhaps, had he noted it. But Dietz just juxtaposes Dirksen to Charles Halleck, who was eminently forgettable even while still in office as House minority leader, and to Gerald Ford, whose better days were still long years ahead of him when he took

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over from Halleck. And with such a trio to describe, Dietz can leave it to his readers to draw an obvious conclusion that a reason for the Republican party's ineffectuality about Vietnam from 1961 to 1968 was the personal weakness of the GOP's congressional leaders. But one wishes for more.

The more (yet still within Dietz's narrow frame) might have been real scrutiny of Richard Nixon and Vietnam. Some of Dietz's potential here is realized. There are tantalizing quotations from Nixon that suggest more continuity with what came after 1968 than has commonly been noted (that is, about Vietnamization of the ground war). We get a sense that the famous "secret plan" of 1968 was more of a plan (and not so secret) than conventional wisdom has it. But Dietz does not follow through; he is too much preoccupied with Dirksen/Halleck/Ford. All in all, a responsible book, but too narrow, too cautious, and too woodenly written to satisfy.

H. BRADFORD WESTERFIELD
Yale University

Congress, Parliament and Defence: The Impact of Legislative Reform on Defence Accountability in Britain and America *by Andrew Cox and Stephen Kirby. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1986. 315 pp. $29.95.*

With the U.S. deficit growing and the West European economy showing few signs of rejuvenation, pressure for significant cuts in defense spending will mount on both sides of the Atlantic. As the Gramm-Rudmann Bill has already indicated, responsibility for making such cuts is likely to fall heavily on the legislative branches of government. It is precisely this question of legislative oversight of defense policy that Cox and Kirby address in their timely and informative book. Their central question is this: have the wide-ranging reforms instituted by the British Parliament and the U.S. Congress since the early 1970s succeeded in giving legislators sufficient power to oversee effectively the management of defense policy? Their conclusion is unequivocal. Neither Parliament nor Congress has been able to establish control over the key elements of defense policy—allocating resources, shaping procurement programs, and setting force levels and structure.

Cox and Kirby argue that two factors have restricted the impact of legislative reform on defense accountability in both Britain and the United States. First, the pressures of electoral and party politics prevent legislators from objectively and rationally approaching defense issues. Individual legislators and numerous committees have devoted much attention to national security issues, but they must "put policy questions before party and personal ambition" if they are to play a more effective role (p. 283). Second, constraints on the availability and use of information have limited the extent to which legislators can knowledgeably intervene in the complex processes of guiding procurement and setting strategic requirements. In Britain, legislators are hamstrung by a dearth of information; the stringent Official Secrets Act allows little detail to move beyond executive offices. The

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problem in the United States is the opposite. Congressional committees are overloaded with information, and staff often lack the expertise to use materials effectively. The necessary condition for improving accountability is thus not the quantity of information but "its quality and the use that the legislature makes of such information that is available" (p. 303).

To reach these sensible conclusions, Cox and Kirby amass a remarkable quantity of detailed material on defense decision making and budget processes in both Britain and the United States. The organization could have been better; the text offers a virtual deluge of facts, charts, and figures. Nevertheless, those in search of a detailed account of legislative oversight of defense policy will find the waters well worth plunging into.

The book does suffer from one principal ommission. The authors implicitly suggest that effective legislative oversight is attainable. It requires a proper institutional context and that legislators be more objective and make better use of available information. Cox and Kirby fail to discuss, however, a key part of the problem: the task of setting strategic requirements and determining defense policy is itself an extremely difficult one that resists micromanagement. The Ministry of Defence and the Pentagon have for years been seeking to refine the relationship between missions and capabilities and between inputs (expenditures) and outputs (force levels). Nevertheless, the process remains very arbitrary and chaotic. Legislative reform can indeed improve defense accountability. But such reform will be effective only if the broader process of setting strategic requirements is also improved and rationalized. Both executive and legislative branches must rethink how to go about answering the question that has plagued planners and strategists for centuries: how much is enough?

CHARLES A. KUPCHAN
Princeton University

Disciples of Destruction: The Religious Origins of War and Terrorism *by Charles W. Sutherland. Buffalo, N.Y., Prometheus Books, 1987. 451 pp. $22.95.*

It was bound to happen. In an age of revived fundamentalism when clean-shaven Elmer Gantrys and bearded gurus of various persuasions claim media attention, their mirror opposite, old-fashioned atheists who attribute most of the ills of the world to priestcraft and obscurantism is also to have a revival. Charles W. Sutherland's distasteful diatribe in this vein is likely to be followed by others. This book reminds me of a cartoon *The New Yorker* carried years ago which depicts a drunk sitting on a bar stool and saying to the bartender, "I hate everybody regardless of race, creed, or color." The author hates Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Marxism (which he takes to be a religion) with equal fervor. When it comes to Zionism, his hatred is even more equal. He holds with his eighteenth-century forebears that human happiness will be achieved only when the last king is strangled by the entrails of the last priest.

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The four parts of the book, devoted to a history of Judaism, Christianity, Mohammedanism, and Marxism are devoid of scholarly merit or redeeming social significance. They are based on a variety of secondary or even tertiary sources of more than dubious value. Much of what the author has to say about medieval Christianity, for example, is based on the pamphleteering ex-Jesuit Malachi Martin's *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Church*. We learn a good deal here of the abnormal sexual proclivities, bestiality, incest, and murderous inclination of the Roman Popes, but there is no mention of the cultural significance of medieval or post-medieval Rome. To Sutherland, Rome was nothing but an open sewer.

Voltaire or Gibbon, whom Sutherland wishes to emulate, wrote with wit, style, and elegance; but he only manages to revel in vulgarity and platitude. For example, "The church fathers saw frightening light at the end of Galileo's telescope, because it was on darkness that their world, and their privilege too, was based" (p. 185). Or this: "Many rulers govern with their 'head' or with their 'heart'; Henry VIII was one of those men who rule with their penis" (p. 206).

There is no need to dwell in detail on the distortions and outright lies that stud these pages. Let me only quote a blatant example from Sutherland's writing on the history of Zionism. He claims that Hitler gave "direct support" to the Zionists (p. 73) and that "the foundation of the Israeli economy during the 1930s and 1940s was laid by secret agreements between Zionists and the Third Reich" (p. 76). Later on, Stalin and Gromyko "became two of the leading world spokesmen for Zionism" (p. 80). And so it goes.

The book reminds me in many ways of the subliterate books and pamphlets that poured from the German presses in the last years of the Weimar Republic. These writings gained a ready audience in those years of acute crisis even when they were ignored by the respectable critical media. To ignore such books now would be a mistake. It is an act of public hygiene to show them up as what they are; thinly disguised paranoid ravings with a profoundly inhuman and destructive message.

LEWIS A. COSER
State University of New York
at Stony Brook

Borrowed Time: Artificial Organs and the Politics of Extending Lives *by Alonzo L. Plough. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1986. 214 pp. $24.95.*

The artificial kidney, or dialysis machine, is in many ways emblematic of the dilemmas of contemporary health policy. Here is a technology that means the difference between life and death; that has successfully progressed from experiment to standard therapy; that costs a small fortune (on the order of $25,000 per year per person); and that is the object of a tug-of-war between the old nonprofit hospital sector and the newer for-profit health care industry.

Alonzo Plough, an anthropologist by training, gives us a rich and detailed look

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at this microcosm of health policy. We see one disease/technology complex from several perspectives: the patient's experience, the clinician's norms, the medical profession's internal controversies, the hospital staff's routines, the federal government's payment and regulatory schemes, and the medical device industry's strategic planning. Although I sometimes wished for more depth in the individual chapters, Plough's application of different perspectives to a single, but significant, medical problem stands as a rare example of truly multidisciplinary policy analysis. One can forgive some weaknesses of execution for the brilliance of the total conception.

The first half of the book concentrates on what might be called the social construction of kidney dialysis. Here Plough teases out notions of "successful" and "normal" that permeate the expectations of patients, families, physicians, hospital staff, and ultimately policy makers. Dialysis is deemed successful if it keeps people alive and ideally returns them to productive work as well. Although it is widely perceived as a medical miracle, only 30 percent of end-stage renal disease patients survive longer than five years and only 25 percent of dialysis patients are able to hold a job outside the home. Plough's interviews with patients reveal a much darker side of this gift of life—physical confinement; a constant battle with a severely restricted diet (for example, only one cup of fluid per day); sometimes painful treatments; gradual debilitation and social isolation; family stress often leading to divorce; and, as one person put it, the loss of the "feeling of being yourself." These portraits point up the absurdity of the conventional measure of program success—survival rates—and the perversions of a medical care system so fundamentally oriented toward life prolongation pure and simple.

Perhaps Plough's most important contribution is to show that the profession's norm is reality's exception. The profession marginalizes as "complications" and "psychiatric problems" the experiences that are in fact the ordinary, normal course of the dialysis patient's career—infections, general sickness, itchiness, sores, frustration, and severe depression. The disparity between the profession's definition of "normal" and the reality of dialysis creates a constant tension between patients and hospital staff. Plough suggests how this tension manifests itself in high levels of staff "burnout" and turnover, and in staffs' effort to control patients by labeling them as "difficult" and "demanding" and by occasional outright deception and threats to withhold treatments.

The second half of the book traces the evolution of dialysis from a technical invention to a minor industry virtually created and subsidized by government funds. Federal legislation in 1972 guaranteed payment for dialysis for any person with end-stage renal disease. Plough shows how ethical arguments about life-saving and erroneously low cost projections justified the program and how the clinical definition of suitable patients expanded with the availability of payment. He uses the financial press to describe Wall Street's excitement about the dialysis products industry and shows that for-profit centers have lower costs than the nonprofit hospital sector only because they skim off the less sick, lower-risk dialysis patients. We get a rare glimpse at the medical-industrial complex as Plough tells how the

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largest for-profit chain of dialysis centers attempted to block publication of his findings.

DEBORAH A. STONE
Brandeis University

Democratic Education *by Amy Gutmann. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1987. 321 pp. $19.95.*

This is a thoughtful volume, carefully written with a strong belief in increased citizen participation as the critical necessity of a democratic society. It is a book that urges restraints on ideology, authority, and autonomy as it develops a theory of democratic education that supports increased involvement by those concerned with schooling. Although clear and relatively jargon free, it is not easy reading. The arguments are intricately crafted, the matters are complex, and sometimes the arguments have the appearance of judicial opinions. At the same time the book has an appeal that goes beyond the specialist's interest. And while the author has some strong political beliefs and attitudes that identify her as within the liberal tradition, the book resonates with a strong sense of tolerance and with understanding for positions that are at variance with her own. She has a strong respect for the way in which the democratic system should reach its policies as well as for the products of that process.

While the book addresses topics in higher and adult education, most of its focus is on issues of primary schooling. Its topics are wide-ranging, from sex education and creationism to school finance and adult illiteracy. The work is relatively balanced, with Gutmann seeming to moderate the debate among partisans. On some of the most basic and sensitive issues, she shows insight and knowledge that go well beyond a sense of only the theoretical. Her treatment of First Amendment issues, for instance, is sophisticated in both its reasoning and in an understanding of the underlying issues of Church-State.

When discussing the rights of parents to have their children not participate in sex education courses, she is not willing to see the matter through the eyes of either state authority or family rights. She carefully crafts a role for both and urges a process of understanding to allow the child's family values to be respected, while the state pursues its responsibilities to deal with the issues such as teenage pregnancy that make the matter of sex education much more than a family issue. Her belief in the family's freedoms stem from the high value she places on nonrepression and nondiscrimination. The citizen's right not to be coerced by the state to engage in activities that limit citizen freedoms is very much a part of the principles that undergird the democracy as she sees it. And these principles are applied to her theory of democratic education.

In an important political area, the right of private schools to exist, her sensitivities again go beyond theory. She understands full well that private schools in America are in the main religious schools, and these largely Catholic schools.

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Knowing their history, she defends the right of these schools to exist in terms of the reason for their creation and their subsequent development. She understands the fact that these schools promote democracy and are quite compatible with the freedoms she admires. And the development of her theory reflects these facts.

When the matter of high education is raised, she is not content—as are many members of academy—to see the matter in simple terms of academic freedom. She understands how the research university frequently cloaks itself in its role as defender of freedom while it pursues objectives—such as contracted research—that might actually limit freedom. Her response here is to increase the levels of participation by the constituents within the university to insure that the university's goals have mechanisms in place that actually promote those goals.

Very few will agree with all that Gutmann's theory proposes. She frequently applies it in ways that are too grounded in a point of view. But it will engender discussion and respect. I am confident as well that it will be referred to as sound authority.

FRANK J. MACCHIAROLA
Columbia University

In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America *by Michael B. Katz. New York, Basic Books, 1986. 338 pp. $22.95.*

Numerous puzzles confront any student of American social welfare policy. These include its comparative meagerness, an unusually deep split between social insurance and provisions for the poor, the role of federalism in shaping and constraining social programs, the importance of race, and the uneven tempo of initiatives and reform. The literature on the American welfare state is voluminous, and each of these themes has recently been subjected to close scrutiny, usually however, in fragmented and time-limited fashion.

It is the great merit of *In the Shadow of the Poorhouse* to tackle all of these issues across the entire sweep of nineteenth- and twentieth-century American history in the compass of a single engagingly-written book. Michael Katz is a historian who is well known and well regarded for his work on industrialization, schooling, and public policy. Here he applies his considerable skills of synthesis and interpretation to present a coherent analytical chronology of the development of the "semi-welfare state" we know today, which in spite of its limits has been under considerable attack.

Katz's work is in three parts. The first, "The Poorhouse Era," focusing on the poorhouse-outdoor relief antinomy and "scientific" charity, is a marvelously evocative treatment of the structures, practices, institutional transformations, and tensions inherent in American social policy up to the 1890s. These discussions demonstrate that today's policy repertoire regarding welfare reform is not much more than a rehash of nineteenth-century themes: an unsteady mix of compassion, work incentives, fears of promoting dependence on the state, increasing specialization

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and expertise, and debate about the appropriate mix of public and private relief initiatives.

The second section, "Building the Semiwelfare State," takes the reader from the 1890s—a watershed period for social policy in which the institutional choices of the nineteenth century were transcended by new ideologies and policies—through the 1930s. As the title implies, Katz traces the sources of the development of a distinctive American welfare state, one characterized by the dualism of social insurance and targeted policies for the poor and by a meanness of spirit and funding. The broad story of the Progressive Era and the New Deal is familiar, but Katz retells it freshly, with splendid pointilist discussions of such issues as the development of social work as case work with a Freudian basis, the inherent limits of public employment, and the role of women in shaping New Deal reform.

The last and shortest section, "From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare," reviews the Great Society and the more recent conservative assault on welfare capitalism. Best read as an epilogue rather than as a substantive study with the weight of the previous sections, I wish it had preceded the other two to establish a double-barreled object of analysis for the historical materials by defining the poles of possibility in American social policy. Within its considerable limits, which Katz notes, the Great Society, after all, represented the United States's most developed social democratic-reform movement; and the conservative reaction carried into the Reagan administration has been the most vigorous assertion of the superiority of private, market solutions to the agonies of the poor. It is within the field of tension between these two positions that an American *politics* of social policy takes place.

Katz's book is written as an analytical narrative. The argument, as I read it, is composed of a mix of two kinds of elements: those that have produced far more continuity than discontinuity in themes and policies across two centuries, and those that have produced moments of rupture, when new reform initiatives are taken, either for or against an enhanced state role vis à vis market capitalism. The continuities—including the dividing line between insurance and relief, the permeability of the public-private boundary, the importance of a federal political order—provoke the discontinuities at moments of major economic crisis or political realignment or demographic change, because they represent inherently contradictory policy goals and practices: benevolence and punishment, enforcement of labor market regimens and a softening of their harshness, trusting and policing families caring for children. In turn, these conflicting policy goals reflect a deeper set of tensions embedded within the social organization of democratic capitalism. The policy dualities make any institutionalized settlements provisional, because at moments of duress current policies are found wanting, and reformers try a new mix from within the available repertoire.

I find this an intriguing and suggestive framework. It also provokes many still-to-be answered questions. If the dynamics of democratic capitalism are the basic and formative ones, then what accounts for the distinctive traits of the American experience as one member of the democratic capitalist family? How are we to think

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about the relative importance of expertise and popular mobilization in shaping the welfare state and responses to it? How have race and regionalism, intertwined with class, been constitutive elements of the making of American social policy? How have such basic changes in the social geography of American life as postwar suburbanization, the new immigration, and the decline of the organized blue collar work force changed the possibilities of American social politics? In future, anyone interested in these questions will be fortunate to have *In the Shadow of the Poorhouse* as an orienting companion.

IRA KATZNELSON
New School for Social Research

The Right to Life Movement and Third Party Politics *by Robert J. Spitzer. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1987. 154 pp. $29.95.*

This is a very fine little book—well written, carefully researched, original in its treatment of third-party problems, and significant in its subject matter. The focus is on the anti-abortion movement and, more specifically, the Right to Life party in New York State. The book can be considered on two levels: first, as an analysis of a single-issue group and its political arm, a minor party—what it accomplished, how it did it, who it attracted. In this sense, it is a case study of one aspect of a major phenomenon of the last few years. Judged in this regard, Robert J. Spitzer, a professor of political science at the State University of New York at Cortland, has done a conscientious, and, I would say, even-handed job of placing the Right to Life party in the context of one of the most emotional and value-laden issues of our time. The pro-abortion, anti-abortion debate incorporates a variety of ethical, moral, religious, and life-style (the role of women in modern society) overtones that has brought to the controversy an intensity rare for American politics.

Second, the author has attempted to place the emergence and impact of a minor political party within theoretical and practical considerations of representation in a nation with a dominant two-party system. In the process, he makes a commentary on the quality and adequacy of choice in the contemporary American party system. In this frame of reference, the Right to Life party provides an example of minor parties that arise periodically to contest issues of consequence, more often than not, to a small segment of the electorate. Minor party supporters feel intensely about the subject—frequently to the exclusion of other political concerns. The major parties either do not address the issue in question or fail to offer voters real alternatives in their programmatic stands. In developing this theme, Spitzer is able to comment on the adequacy of present-day party arrangements and he makes some telling points.

He presents a three-stage model of third-party influence. The potential alternative paths a party could take in response to other social and political conditions and major party reactions are presented at each stage of development. The Right to Life Party is examined within this conceptual framework.

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The book briefly reviews the conflicting popular attitudes on the abortion issue and places the party and its membership within this frame of reference. Not surprisingly, a dogmatic, no-compromise stand has marked the party's approach to politics. While such a posture may please adherents and while the party has enjoyed substantial success, such an approach can eventually dismay allies, alienate others, and provide for a basic split in party ranks between the more dogmatic ideologues and the more pragmatic activists. In turn, the strains produced by such tensions can lead to a stabilization of growth and a decline in support and/or influence. Such a scenario may fit the Right to Life party.

In placing third-party efforts in perspective, the author concludes by arguing that the two-party system may have succeeded too well; that is, it may have institutionalized the present two-party coalitions to the potential detriment of quality representation. It is a provocative argument. This is a significant piece of research and an analytically insightful book. The recent literature on third parties is limited. This book should take its place among the best.

WILLIAM CROTTY
Northwestern University

Impact: How the Press Affects Federal Policymaking *by Martin Linsky. New York, W.W. Norton, 1986. 260 pp. $19.95.*

This book presents a lot of new and interesting data about the influence of the Washington press corps on policies of the national government. The author, a one-time journalist and practicing politician, and now a lecturer in public policy at Harvard University, uses six case studies prepared by colleagues to illustrate how the policy process and occasionally even the substance of policy are affected by media coverage. The case studies cover the 1969 reorganization of the Postal Department, Vice President Spiro Agnew's resignation, President Jimmy Carter's decision to halt deployment of the neutron bomb, the relocation of 700 families from the polluted Love Canal area, President Ronald Reagan's support of tax exemption for Bob Jones University, and the 1984 suspension of Social Security disability reviews. From these case studies, and from a mail survey of senior federal policy makers and lengthy interviews with prominent policy makers and journalists, Martin Linsky reaches numerous important conclusions about the press/policy maker relationship.

Media impact, he believes, is substantial. It shapes the perspectives from which issues are viewed, condenses the time table for policy formulation, determines which proposals will lead to actions, and often engages the communications talents of high-level politicians who would otherwise remain uninvolved. Public relations objectives may lead to major changes in policy substance. Television impact is especially potent, thanks to its enormous audiences and its unparalleled capacity to dramatize events and stir emotions. Policy makers now spend a great deal more time on public relations efforts than in the past, because media impact on their

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successes or failures has escalated. Many officials realize that the media are an asset that should be used to achieve policy goals. They have become experts in attracting favorable coverage through accommodating journalists, including providing them with ample doses of leaked information. But many federal executives still balk at cooperating with the media and lack the necessary skills. Attention to public relations considerations often comes much too late in the policy-making process, which suffers as a result.

Three problems lessen the value of Linsky's study. The first concerns the scientific basis for the findings. Linsky uses testimonials from knowledgeable people, rather than empirical evidence, to establish the scope of press impact. He relies on circumstantial evidence to define the role of the press, pleading that the complexity of the situation makes firm judgments hazardous. Other studies have claimed as much with similar evidence. While Linsky's work makes a contribution by adding weight to these studies, it provides no more conclusive evidence. The second problem is similar. Linsky uses his survey and interview data to map out the roles that public officials play in dealing with journalists. But the officials' perceptions are not corroborated by factual information. As Linsky notes, perceptions are important. But they are not sufficient for establishing facts. Corroboration is especially important in this case, because Linsky points out repeatedly that his interviewees had good reasons for fudging their answers.

Finally, the concluding recommendations are distressingly one-sided. They stress the role of public officials but neglect the role of the media. Linsky argues that public officials must protect their policy-making turf by structuring the policy process so that it lends itself to the kinds of stories that appeal to journalists. He does not project the consequences that increased emphasis on public relations aspects of policies might have on the array of political forces that become involved in policy making and on the quality of policy outcomes. He ignores the possibility that media impact on policy making may be salutary so that policy making will suffer if officials try to checkmate media power. He places the burden of adjustments in the relationships between public officials and newspeople almost entirely on policy makers. He gives little attention to the obligations of a responsible press to accurately publicize the government's public policies. The reader should be grateful that these important questions are raised. It would be nice if tentative answers had been forthcoming as well.

DORIS A. GRABER
University of Illinois at Chicago

Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics *by David M. O'Brien. New York, Norton, 1986. 384 pp. $18.95.*

This is, quite simply, an excellent book. It will appeal to all students of the United States Supreme Court. Well written, carefully researched and documented, and conceptually cautious, O'Brien's largely descriptive narrative of the workings of

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the high court past and present reaches out to a wide audience of students, teachers, and nonacademic court watchers. This is a book that at first glance might invite comparison with Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong's *The Brethren. Storm Center*, however, is a coat of a somewhat different color. It suffers neither from the gossipy nor the conspiratorial tone of the Woodward and Armstrong volume. O'Brien draws upon extensive original sources, including the private papers of fifty-five justices and six presidents, as well as oral interviews. *Storm Center* is in the best tradition of modern academic publishing, a marriage of scholarship with the lighter touch of professional journalistic writing. This does not mean that O'Brien has not made effective use of vignettes in which he describes the legal, political, and personal storms that have beset the Supreme Court. Nor is the details department overlooked: the reader learns everything from the fact that Justice Harry Blackmun received 45,000 letters as the author of the court's *Roe* opinion to the fact that Justice William Howard Taft suppressed more than 200 of his dissents in the name of institutional solidarity. There is a great deal of discussion of the personal dynamics of the judges, with Justice Felix Frankfurter apparently taking honors as the brilliant, but overbearing, bête noir of the present century.

Storm Center divides into six sections. It begins with a chapter on the controversial abortion decision in *Roe v. Wade*, which O'Brien uses to demonstrate that, Alexander Hamilton notwithstanding, the Supreme Court is no longer "the least dangerous" branch. Next, judicial selection is considered, followed by a chapter, "Life in the Marble Temple," which covers everything from early circuit riding to the nature of interactions among nine "little law firms," to the role of law clerks and the management of an evergrowing caseload. The fourth section takes up the caseload issue in depth, examining how the court decides what to decide, describing technical doctrinal considerations, and considering what it means for individual litigants and the nation that the court set its own agenda. The fifth chapter is rich in historical material and anecdote and makes lively reading on the subject of deciding cases and writing opinions. A final section, "The Court and American life," explores compliance, public opinion, the media, and relations with lower courts and the other branches of the government.

If there is a criticism to be made of *Storm Center*, it is that the book attempts to cover a great deal of ground; as a result it does not fulfill all its promises. For example, early in the volume O'Brien states that "over the last thirty years the Court, regardless of its composition, has increasingly asserted its power. . . . The trend is likely to continue . . . . The reasons why this is so are the subject of this book" (p. 42). However, aside from several short passages concerning the impact of the expanding number of law clerks and passing commentary on the shift from private disputes to matters of public policy, O'Brien does not impose a strong analytical approach on this study. As a result, he does not really answer the question he himself posed. If the reader believes, as O'Brien writes, that the Supreme Court has a "new, more difficult role to play in American political life" (p. 43), this is not the book that will explain why.

This does not, however, diminish the book's power as an explication of judicial

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organization and behavior. And since O'Brien always has an eye for the comparative historical example, the book is all the richer for the intriguing and well-matched descriptions of earlier courts and judges. Indeed, the periodic use of historical perspective protects the book from becoming dated too quickly at a time when there are changes in the court's membership.

Everyone, of course, will have particular subjects she or he wishes might have been more fully covered: there is a curious lack of discussion of the court's attitude toward class-action litigation as well as the importance of the first woman justice (to matters other than the initiation of a women's exercise class) (p. 115). Conversely, some sections, such as the discussion of the rule of four, are too lengthy for a general text. The author is, however, to be complimented for the excellent tables found throughout the book; they are clear, meaningful, and very much belong in a study of this kind. *Storm Center* extends and complements the work of Henry Abraham and C. Herman Pritchett, among others. While there are currently a number of treatises available concerning judicial doctrine, there are few up to date narratives about this highest temple of American law. This book fills that gap well.

JILL NORGREN
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The Burger Years: Rights and Wrongs in the Supreme Court, 1969–1986 *edited by Herman Schwartz. New York, Viking, 1987. 293 pp. $22.95.*

This volume, an expansion and augmentation of a symposium originally appearing in the *Nation*, inevitably must be compared with Vincent Blasi's similar effort, *The Burger Years: The Counter-Revolution That Wasn't*. Both are symposiums with multiple authors' essays on various topics, with the usual range of success and failures in that kind of project. The *Nation* effort won a 1985 Silver Gavel award from the American Bar Association. This volume also has the advantage of coming at the end of the Burger years, avoiding the trap set by Blasi's brilliant title and wonderful essay. The last two years of the Burger Court and the first year of the Rehnquist suggest that predicting the "wasn't" of the counterrevolution was at the minimum a bit premature.

On the average, I would judge it no contest, with the Blasi volume far superior in analysis and coverage. Part of the problem of the book under review is that there are fifteen essays in 293 pages and many are skimpy in words and thought. I thought four of them first-class summaries: Norman Redlich on religious cases, Yale Kamisar on criminal justice, Schwartz's own piece on prisoner rights, and Alan Morrison's discussion of bureaucratic controls. At the other extreme are four or so "chicken little" essays, which shrilly suggest the Burger Court has totally abandoned law, equity, and justice in the subject matter area that they cover.

Schwartz's introduction and Burt Neuborne's essays are two near misses that could have radically tilted the quality of the volume. Schwartz's introduction seems

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written in white heat and without an outline. Fully one-third of the essay is devoted to refuting Edwin Meese's egregrious original intent argument. This is both an error in its historic significance and relevance to the Burger court and a missed opportunity to strengthen and integrate the volume, which desperately needs a core. Neuborne presents an admirable distillation of theories of standing and when court intervention is appropriate and gives some reasons for rejecting them. He rejects what he calls the *Marbury* model – essentially the constitutional requirement of a case and controversy – because it interferes "with the Supreme Court's power to carry out the role of guardian of the Constitution" (p. 15). (This is echoed in another essay, which suggests that "government must be accountable to the people through the Courts" p. 132.) This sweeping theory is buttressed by no argument at all and Neuborne never acknowledges or even hints at the contradiction between a nonconstrained Court power and democratic theory. Indeed, he suggests the argument for a "case or controversy" rests solely on the advantage of a focused fact situation, ignoring the separation of powers argument that courts could be trusted because they are channelized.

The dominant tone of the book is that the courts are an expression of a naked result-oriented power, and this crudely collides in most of the same essays with efforts to prove the Burger Court violated constitutional principles. The argument for complete supervisory power by the courts, what William Y. Elliot called "guardian democracy" or Learned Hand called rule "by a bevy of platonic guardians" is assumed and never defended. It is doubly incongruous if one assumes absolute judicial subjectivism. In short, the book has its merits, but it fails to transcend its origin in brief, largely journalistic treatments.

SAMUEL KRISLOV
University of Minnesota

Punishment Without Walls: Community Service Sentences in New York City *by Douglas Corry McDonald. New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1986. 278 pp. $30.00.*

The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that most state prisons are operating at over 110 percent capacity. Politicians have been satisfied to respond to this national crisis by building more correctional facilities. This policy, without serious consideration of alternatives to incarceration, will inevitably fail to aleviate the overcrowding problem. It is not only costly to lock people up (in New York City, maintaining an inmate in jail on Riker's Island costs about $43,000 per year), but it is unlikely that we can build enough cells to keep pace with the increase in the current rate of incarceration. It is in this context that McDonald's intelligent evaluation of the Vera Institute's Community Service Sentencing program in New York City is a welcome addition to the debate on the value of alternatives to incarceration in criminal sentencing.

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McDonald's study begins with a general discussion of the idea of community-service sentencing, tracing its American origins to a program instituted by California municipal court judges in 1966. He explains that service to the community rather than to victims, and its provision for unpaid labor outside custodial settings make community service a unique form of punishment. McDonald is careful to point out that the renewed interest by policy makers in community service was generated by the fiscal pressures on states and cities and not concern for rehabilitating the criminal or providing restitution to the victim.

The main purpose of McDonald's study is to determine whether a community-service sentence would be used by judges as a jail substitute when it is made available to the courts, and whether it is a cost-effective means of sentencing criminal offenders who are not violent. McDonald analyzes the Community Service Sentencing Project, the New York City program designed and instituted by the Vera Institute in 1978. He shows that community service can work when the offender is carefully selected and the work teams are small and closely supervised. McDonald also collected data on nonviolent offenders indicating that, although they consider jail a more severe punishment than community service, significantly the recidivism rate for those sentenced to community service was no worse than for those sentenced to jail.

Of general interest to criminal justice policy makers is McDonald's analysis of the sentencing process. His findings call into question the bureaucratic model that dominates the literature on sentencing. McDonald demonstrates that criminal sentencing is the result of adversarial competition among judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys and not the product of a formal classification of crime and its severity.

McDonald is careful not to offer the community service program as a panacea to the crime problem. His analysis of both its advantages and disadvantages is particularly insightful. On the positive side, offenders provide needed services to the community instead of wasting time in jail at the taxpayer's expense, the demand for jail cells is reduced, and the courts are given greater flexibility in finding the appropriate penalty for different types of crimes. On the negative side, the direct cost of operating community service programs will be difficult to reduce and the potential for further criminal activity by the offender is not eliminated, since he is not incapacitated in jail. In the end, it is this kind of thoughtful research that offers the best argument for expanding the use of responsible community-service programs as both an alternative to short jail sentences and other lesser sanctions.

Vera's success has not gone unnoticed. The Community Service Sentencing project has expanded to four boroughs in New York City and supervises 1300 offenders per year. It is also increasing both its enforcement capacity and the social services available to the participants. The mayor has plans to further expand the program. Without the kind of carefully considered analysis that McDonald provides in his book this innovative program would, more than likely, have been

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lost in the muddle of criminal justice policy reforms. McDonald's study is a model for evaluation research and should be read by all those interested in criminal justice policy.

ESTER FUCHS
Barnard College

Women and Children Last: The Plight of Poor Women in Affluent America *by Ruth Sidel. New York, Penguin Books, 1987. 236 pp. Cloth, $16.95; paper, $6.95.*

This forceful analysis of the feminization of poverty or, more precisely, of the impoverishment of women and children in the contemporary United States has become available at an opportune point—during a time in which the National Governors' Association has prodded the U.S. Congress into its first serious consideration since Richard Nixon's first term of the restructuring of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Sidel succinctly synthesizes the existing statistical and conceptual approaches to the feminization of poverty and then adds to that received wisdom the findings of her own qualitative research with rural, suburban, and urban poor women from all regions of the country. This mixture of quantitative and qualitative understandings, informed by the author's crosscultural perspective, proves to be compelling throughout.

Sidel gives almost as much attention to examining possible solutions to the poverty of women and children as she does to exploring the nature and scope of the problem. A scholar with a penchant for framing policies, she creates a comprehensive and coherent strategy that addresses the work place, family, gender roles, old age, child care, health care, and housing. Adapting Swedish policies, which Sidel has studied firsthand, to a far larger and more diverse society in the United States, she proposes an outline for an interesecting set of family and work policies that would honor the extraordinarily complex mosaic of resources and needs of employed and unemployed Americans.

Ironically, the only weak chapter of the book's ten is that on the welfare system (pp. 77–99). Here, Sidel is superficial and somewhat simplistic in her critique of the failure of AFDC to sustain poor women and their families and to help them escape poverty. Her hackneyed criticisms of the inadequacies of AFDC reveal nothing new about this neglected and despised program and display a distanced contempt for welfare workers that rivals that held by many Americans for Sidel's informants, the welfare recipients themselves.

The leitmotif of *Women and Children Last*, that most poor people in this country (80 percent) are *newly* poor women and their children—who have been propelled into poverty by divorce, widowhood, abandonment, or unemployment—is a useful corrective to prevailing stereotypes of welfare recipients as sluggards who learn dependency on AFDC at their own mothers' knees. However, in emphasizing the newness of poverty for many, Sidel understates both the persistence of poverty in selected population pockets and the continuity of indifference toward those

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who live in those pockets. In stressing repeatedly the recency of most poverty, the author obfuscates the historic obduracy of the underemployment, underpayment, and occupational segregation of women and of minority men, thereby undermining the force of her own chapter on women's disadvantaged position as workers.

Women and Children Last will prove especially useful for teaching undergraduates about social and public policy, the political economy of family and work, and about gender and class divisions. Its highly readable style and conceptual breadth make the book appealing to the general reader as well.

BARBARA LEVY SIMON
Columbia University

The Party Period and Public Policy: American Politics from the Age of Jackson to the Progressive Era *by Richard L. McCormick. New York, Oxford University Press, 1986. 369 pp. $29.95.*

In the last several years, historians have rediscovered politics and political scientists have rediscovered history. In this book of essays Richard McCormick assesses the progress of those writers concerned to join history and politics in the study of the nineteenth-century United States and offers his own contributions to the task.

The first three essays provide reviews of the historiography of U.S. political parties, examining in turn ethnocultural analyses, the realignment synthesis, and the "new" social history. Readers new to these areas will be well and efficiently educated, and readers who know the literature may be provoked to reconsider the importance of familiar findings. While any of these approaches may illuminate the relationship between voters and parties, none of them provides a picture of the relationship between parties and public policy, much less between voters' desires and policy outcomes.

In the second set of essays McCormick presents such a picture of the whole for the years from the 1830s to the early 1900s. This was the "party period," "when parties dominated political participation and channeled the flow of government policies" (p. 200). On one hand, parties were "objects of vital attachments grounded in the people's cultural backgrounds . . . " (p. 201). On the other hand, the parties managed the distributive benefits that served as appropriate economic development policies in the nineteenth century. Distributive policies were good for parties because they did not involve zero-sum conflicts and because citizens were more aware of their benefits than their costs. Thus it is not surprising, McCormick argues, that U.S. parties were strongest when distributive politics dominated the political agenda.

Although this is a coherent presentation of nineteenth-century party politics, it is problematic. For one thing, there are good reasons to think that distributive politics undermines party discipline among politicians. For nineteenth-century politicians there were other, powerfully centralizing, partisan tools: most patronage

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came from control of the presidency, and campaign funding was nationally organized. These may better account for party dominance than the character of distributive politics.

The last three essays are reappraisals of the Progressive Movement and historians' treatment of it. Assessing the Progressives, McCormick argues that the apparent contradictions between Progressive thought and policies is not hypocrisy, but a common failing of liberal reformers: their outrage at systemic abuses is countered by their commitment to the system itself. As to the historians, McCormick makes the simple but profound point that the "organizational synthesis" misses the passion and popular mobilization that are so much of the Progressive story. Missing too is the role party politicians played, making concessions to strengthen themselves in the face of reformers' criticisms. McCormick shows that among New York State Republicans the controversies of the Progressive era were not battles of partisans versus independents, but rather, accommodations between those who exercised political power and those who wore the mantle of reform. "Those strategies resulted in measures we label 'progressive' reforms, but their origins and meaning must be sought as much in the exigencies of party politics as in a progressive movement" (308). For this scholarly reminder that Progressivism was *political*, McCormick deserves great praise.

As one might expect in a collection of essays, the chapters here share thematic concerns without offering a clear analytic bottom line. While that is disappointing, it is probably our shared failing rather than McCormick's. His essays are rewarding reading for ordering and assessing much that has been written, for McCormick's original contributions, and for setting out some historical puzzles we need collectively to solve.

AMY BRIDGES
Stanford University

Women, Public Opinion, and Politics: The Changing Political Attitudes of American Women *by Keith T. Poole and L. Harmon Zeigler. New York, Longman, 1985. 196 pp. Paper, $13.95.*

Poole and Zeigler have produced a most useful book, one that could beneficially be included in courses on gender politics and public opinion. Scholars in both fields will find it helpful as well. Its writing is accessible, engaging, and often witty; its use of statistical techniques is simple but sound. These characteristics are two genuine advantages the book offers to teachers wishing to include up-to-date material on women's political orientations in their American politics courses. And the book is, indeed, an exhaustive (if sometimes exhausting) compendium of recent gender differences in policy, partisan, and candidate preferences.

But to some extent *Women, Public Opinion, and Politics* is damned by its virtues. The authors take as premises the assumptions that women are not a cohesive political bloc but that feminism, as it percolates through the culture, is making a

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difference in women's politicization. They determine that a thorough, multivariate examination of women's political attitudes is just as appropriate a subject of study as we have long regarded the heritage of research on men's attitudes. Thus they subject women's orientations to a similar analysis through the use of Michigan National Election Studies (NES) data from 1972 to 1982. They take education and employment status (the latter used dichotomously, with "employed" and "housewife" as the two categories) as their principal controlling variables. But they investigate partisanship and ideology as well. Their use of egalitarianism, or sensitivity to feminism, occurs in two stages: first, egalitarianism is the dependent variable to be measured and assessed; later it becomes another independent correlate of opinions. Their assumption that gender alone is insufficient to explain women's politicization makes a great deal of sense. And this simple model of women's political orientations—with its concomitant expectation that women and their beliefs can be arrayed in most cases from the liberal, educated, employed, and egalitarian woman to the conservative, less educated, inegalitarian housewife—is one of the main reasons that the book will be so useful to students. The extremely large number of issue orientations that Poole and Ziegler analyze by subclasses of women and the consistent comparison of male and female attitudes also provide scholars with helpful information about opinion distributions across and within genders since the early 1970s. The findings are sometimes at variance with those from similar studies but only rarely surprising. Some exceptions include the finding that conservative women are more antinuclear than liberal men (p. 115) and the finding that egalitarian women are extremely consistent in their feminism while inegalitarian women are *not* consistently *antifeminist* (pp. 117–119). The latter does suggest the degree to which feminist orientations are making themselves felt across society, even among women from whom one would not expect such a reaction.

At the same time, however, the simplicity of the theoretical framework and the analysis, composed almost entirely of controlled bivariate relationships, deny the authors and their readers the opportunity for a deep exploration of the contexts and processes of this genuinely significant development of women's politicization to which we have been witness these last two decades. The book is sensitive and intelligent, but it does not contribute a great deal that is new to either our theoretical perspectives or our empirical treatment of gender and politics. The last two chapters in particular, on women's political participation and women in the House of Representatives, provide us with very little that has not been better done elsewhere. Two exceptions are the imaginative treatment of women nonvoters versus women voters in the participation chapter and the neatly done comparisons of male and female voting records on a number of persistent policy questions in the chapter on the women in the House.

Poole and Zeigler graciously acknowledge their debts to earlier gender politics scholars and, indeed, that debt is a large one. But if the book is not a major advance in gender politics scholarship, it is still a solid, topical addition to it.

SUE TOLLESON RINEHART
Texas Tech University

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Why Some Peoples Are More Unemployed than Others: The Strange Paradox of Growth and Unemployment *by Goran Therborn. London, Verso NLB, 1986. 181 pp. Cloth, $24.95; paper, $8.95.*

This is an interesting and, from some respects, even an important book written by a Swedish social analyst now teaching political science at the University of Nijmigen, Netherlands. It is a book that in approach and execution falls far outside the domains of academic research in the United States, for its point of departure is Marxism—historical with a strong emphasis on the role of politics in the determination of macroeconomic policies.

I should quickly note that I do not believe that the author succeeds in his condensed empirical analysis of fifteen countries—Norway, Sweden, Finland, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, Canada, the United States, Australia, and Japan—based heavily on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data in answering definitively the question raised in his title. But in seeking answers to the differential short fall from full employment since 1975 he forces the nonradical reader to face up to many unnerving questions for which conventional economic analysis has no satisfactory answers.

The nub of Therborn's thesis goes as follows: Norway, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, and Japan stand out as the five countries that were able to maintain relatively full employment policies after the crisis of the mid-1970s. On the other hand, the Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany moved into and stayed in the double digit column. Finland, Canada, the United States, Australia, and Italy fall somewhere in between the more successful and the failures identified above.

Since Therborn has relied heavily on the OECD for his basic data and since the staff produces competent figures and analyses about employment and unemployment, I have no basic argument about his classification schema with the possible exception of Italy, which he sees as a country falling just below, if not within, the high unemployment group. But Therborn fails to allow for the size of the off-the-record economy in Italy which a former minister of the budget assured me some years ago was in the 25 percent range!

But the better way to assess Therborn's thesis is to look more closely at his five success stories. The first observation is that four out of the five countries—Norway, Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland—are not members of the European Economic Community, which allowed them much wider discretion for independent action, a point that the author notes. But he fails to place adequate emphasis in my view on the following. Austria and Switzerland balanced their labor markets during the last decade largely through the repatriation of guest workers. Norway was able to engage in all sorts of costly national programs by virtue of its windfall earnings from oil. Sweden had a narrow call until it opted for a radical devaluation. That

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leaves Japan which has been on a long-term expansionary roll that has catapulted it into the second largest industrial economy in the world, bigger than Germany and the United Kingdom combined. For an author who repeatedly stresses, and in my view correctly, the importance of history and institutions in appraising the differential experiences of these fifteen countries with unemployment, he is strikingly uninterested in the stage of evolution of their capitalistic economies and in what economic historians call the problem of "catch up."

I agree with the author that the level of long-term unemployment is an important criterion as to how well an economy is functioning, but I would not make it, as he does, the sole consideration. My first objection derives from the fact that the numbers of unemployed can be masked by public expenditures, tax, and welfare policies. Second, as the Marxian economies help to remind us, employment with low productivity is a questionable societal goal. Since Therborn believes that modern capitalism entered an advanced crisis in the mid-1970s, his failure to relate these nations' fall-away from high employment to other aspects of their malfunctioning is a serious shortcoming. If these economies are ever to escape from their crisis they must undergo radical restructuring of their industrial structures, their labor markets, foreign trade, and much more.

I want to conclude by calling attention to a number of important places where I found Therborn's approach and conclusions suggestive, insightful, and worthy of further exploration. American social scientists, particularly economists, pay too little attention to the role of power and politics in the shaping of macroeconomic policies. Reading Therborn sympathetically will serve as a reminder that the neglect of the political can lead to egregious errors. Next, Therborn provides a rich collection of incidents that point to the simultaneous pursuit of contradictory policies by large and small countries with the inevitable result that the unemployment problem is not relieved but often worsened.

The most interesting and important insight of the author is his demonstration that an *institutionalized* concern with the achievement and maintenance of full employment within a country's tradition is the best assurance that the subject will remain high on its agenda and will be energetically pursued. Regrettably, as he makes clear, many trade union movements lost their faith in the face of a deteriorating national and international economy that full employment was both worth fighting for and did not have to be sacrificed in the pursuit of fiscal and monetary policies that had little potential to restabilize the economies that had been destabilized by the oil crisis.

ELI GINZBERG
Columbia University

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Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985 *by K. M. de Silva. Lanham, Md., University Press of America, 1986. 429 pp. Cloth, $36.50; paper, $19.75.*

Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy *by S. J. Tambiah. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1986. 198 pp. $17.95.*

There have been no complete, objective, and scholarly analyses of the Sri Lankan civil war published to this date. K. M. de Silva and S. J. Tambiah attempt to provide their readers with this analysis. They are two of the leading social scientists of their country. Historian De Silva and anthropologist Tambiah present conflicting perspectives of the Sri Lankan civil war. De Silva is a member of the Sri Lankan ethnic majority, the Sinhalese, and Tambiah is a member of the Tamil ethnic minority; both are unable to escape their ethnic backgrounds in their presentations.

De Silva presents a historical narrative that is a little disappointing if one expects, after reading the title, that the book examines the problems of managing ethnic tensions in multiethnic societies. The book deals solely with Sri Lanka and does not make an attempt to link its arguments with other societies through a theoretical framework. After a brief introduction, the first nine chapters examine the relationship between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils during the colonial era. As a historian, de Silva draws from his depth of knowledge to present the colonial impact on the postcolonial ethnic crisis. Throughout these chapters he argues that the roots of the conflict were put in place by British colonial policies. Chapters 10 through 22 examine the postindependence era. Each chapter presents a specific time period with several chapters overlapping by presenting the perspective of the various ethnic groups. He focuses on the policies of each of the governments since World War II and the reactions of the Sri Lankan elites to these policies. Chapters 20 and 21 present the worsening crisis and the events that have led up to it. The conclusion offers a series of opinions about what should be done in Sri Lanka to end the crisis.

De Silva frames the Sri Lankan conflict in terms of an ethnic minority (the Tamils), which was given an advantageous position in the society during the colonial period, and is now seeking to prevent the loss of its position in the society. He is at his best when he deals with the history of the colonial era. The analysis of the independence era fails to remove itself from the author's ethnic roots. It also at times appears to place most of the blame for the crisis on the policies of the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) and the actions of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), the largest Tamil political party, as well as its predecessor the Federal Party. The current United National Party (UNP) government, which has ruled Sri Lanka since 1977 and has presided over the worsening of the crisis, is presented as a victim of the past policies of the SLFP and the irrational policies of the TULF.

Tambiah is equally as biased in his book. However, as a Tamil he presents a different perspective. He acknowledges in the beginning of the book that it "is an 'engaged political tract' rather than a 'distanced academic treatise'" (p. ix). The

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book is a very personal statement based on his opinions and thoughts about the crisis. It starts with a description of the anti-Tamil riots of 1983 and presents a series of arguments about the government's actions, which he feels helped to foster the riots. He also finds fault with the government's response to the riots once they started. Chapters 5 and 6 present the historical background of the conflict. The history is not as detailed as de Silva's but does a credible job of presenting the Tamil interpretation of Sri Lankan history. Chapters 7 and 8 offer an analysis of the current levels of violence and a solution to the conflict. Chapter 9, the epilogue, is a striking personal observation of the impact of two prime ministers' actions on the author.

Tambiah argues that the ethnic majority Sinhalese have tried to dominate the country and recast it as Sinhalese Buddhist society. Despite democratic political institutions, the ethnic minority Tamils have lost their position in the society and face serious obstacles to reach an equal role in Sri Lanka. Tambiah does not escape his ethnic heritage. He uses inflammatory language throughout the book. For example, he refers to the Sri Lankan army's presence in the largely Tamil Jaffna peninsula as an army of occupation and to the "neo-fascist" policies of one UNP cabinet minister. However, the emotional appeal in the book captures the essence of the Sri Lankan Tamil's feelings of deprivation and discrimination.

Neither book provides the reader with a complete and objective picture of the conflict. When read together readers may come to an understanding of the complexity of the civil war in Sri Lanka, but by themselves the books present a biased picture of what led to the war and what is prolonging it. Each book has several appendices that contain valuable documentary information and data. The books are useful to scholars of ethnic conflict, although neither book uses a theoretical framework to tie its arguments to other countries. Although biased, de Silva's pro-Sinhalese and pro-UNP, and Tambiah's pro-Tamil analyses are the best presentations of the conflict in Sri Lanka that have been published to date. The arguments presented in the books are well thought out and are done in a highly scholarly manner.

ROBERT C. OBERST
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Duarte: My Story *by José Napoleón Duarte, with Diana Page. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1986. 284 pp. $18.95.*

This first-person account of the career of one of the most interesting politicians of Central America is not a biography. *Duarte* is really the chronicle of a campaign for personal recognition. The insights of the first democratically-elected president of El Salvador likely to finish his term of office do not constitute contemporary Salvadoran history. *My Story* is biased not because it is selective, but because

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it is addressed to a North American audience. This requires that the value of this book be examined in relation to two different audiences, although basically only one reality.

As literature *Duarte* lags far behind Gary Wills's *Nixon Agonistes*, although both share the plot of a stubborn protagonist, regarded as a tragicomic dilettante by many of his contemporaries, who refuses to follow the script. As propaganda, *Duarte* provides a more convincing presentation of self than Richard Nixon's *Six Crises* and will be very revealing to those trying to understand the motivations of this tenacious politician. *My Story* tells how the grandchild of Mayan Indians and middle son of a common-law union between a tailor and a seamstress, unruly student with too much energy and a talent for mischief, disoriented freshman who shed his broken English and graduated from Notre Dame, and overcame rejection and initial failure. This is the most credible part of an authentic, albeit unlikely, success story. Under normal conditions, "Napo" Duarte would not be where he is. Is he for real?

Perilous parallels lie here, for remarkable as the services that Duarte has lent to the democratic movement are, it would be flawed to consider him indispensable or to identify the credibility of the Salvadoran transition to democracy with his own. As is the case in other, less complicated processes of transition, it will be difficult to separate the two. It is here where, unfortunately, the adornments that aim to make the story more accessible to the U.S. public are certified to be nothing but insufferable bromides to many Salvadorans: pragmatist among purists, man in the middle. This is problematic, since they are likely to provide Duarte's most unforgiving and savage critics a new opportunity for derision and ridicule.

To be sure, Duarte's own arrogance, Rotary Club rhetoric, and disconcerting self-assurance make him easy prey: "I concluded that the only way I could live with myself was by taking the side of those fighting for a better form of government" (p. 80); "I wanted my legacy to be democracy, not deaths" (p. 115). But the fact that this may ring hollow, coming from a devout Christian and former Boy Scout, is not just a problem of personal credibility but also a crisis of the democratic imagination. In western political discourse, patriotism has been taken over by jingoist rightists, while idealism and social concern have become the preserve of the Left. It is not difficult to imagine what kind of an ally the democratic but confused center is likely to be in Duarte's or in any other circumstances; it is not difficult to see why this book was written and addressed to that center, which is to say that a whole lot more is at stake in El Salvador than the survival of a regime or the vindication of one man.

Basically, this book deserves to be read and discussed, because it addresses our own capacity to do good, to be authentic and faithful to our purpose, to heal and to convince people of the indispensability of the rule of law, and to function and be legitimate in the space available to us, even in the middle of a civil war. *My Story*'s ultimate value as credible testimony may hinge on our willingness to be-

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lieve that this is still possible. The center can hold, but it needs viable metaphors to vouch for the validity of the unlikely.

ENRIQUE A. BALOYRA
University of Miami, Coral Gables

Post-Revolutionary Nicaragua: State, Class, and the Dilemmas of Agrarian Policy *by Forrest D. Colburn. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1986. 145 pp. $17.50.*

Forrest Colburn begins his analysis of Nicaragua with the general observation that "contemporary revolutions invariably espouse some form of self-defined socialism" (p. 11). This ideology, he argues, leads to a specific set of unwise economic policies. One principal shortcoming of these policies is that they discourage exporters. This is particularly unfortunate for economies similar to that of Nicaragua, for unlike large countries such as China and the Soviet Union, "small revolutionary countries need to import, and therefore to export, if they are to maintain consumption levels" (p. 13).

Revolutionary leaders are aware of this dilemma, and they are also aware that their legitimacy rests upon their ability to fulfill popular expectations of a rising standard of living. The obvious short-term response to this dilemma—price controls—therefore temporarily appeases urban consumers, but it does not address the basic problem of underproduction triggered by unwise, ideologically motivated, macroeconomic policies. Too little is produced; too much is expected.

To increase production, revolutionary policy makers offer concessions to relatively affluent exporters; to maintain political support, they offer subsidies to urban consumers. Caught in the middle are the rural producers of non-export crops and the landless rural workers who are asked to sacrifice for the sake of increased production and who share few of the benefits offered urban consumers. Colburn concludes that "the exigencies of the situation make the continued impoverishment of peasants and [rural] laborers a structural necessity" (p. 22).

Following this general review of revolutionary political economy, Colburn turns to the case of Nicaragua. Using data gathered during fifteen months of fieldwork, he assesses the delicate balance among various sectors of the Nicaraguan economy. Chapter 3 focuses on the rural elite, unconvincingly defined as all (and only) cotton producers. Fearful of expropriation and whiplashed by contradictory state policies, Nicaragua's cotton growers responded by decreasing production. Chapter 4 focuses upon small agro-exporters, defined as coffee growers. Through its pricing policies, the revolutionary government reduced the incentive to coffee producers, who responded by reducing inputs (fertilizer, labor for pruning, etc.) and thereby decreasing production.

Chapter 5 focuses on peasant subsistence farmers. Colburn argues that govern-

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ment policies to improve the standard of living for this sector (e.g., agrarian reform) have been overwhelmed by broader economic policies that subsidize urban consumption. Colburn concludes that because marginal peasants employing backward technology are unwilling or unable to underwrite the urban bias of the Sandinistas's political base, "on the whole, production has been lackluster" (p. 98). Chapter 6 focuses on rural wage laborers, the most marginal group in the Nicaraguan economy. Here Colburn concludes that "rural Nicaraguans clearly perceive increases in public services as inadequate compensation for a deteriorating economy" (pp. 118–119).

The early assessment of any revolution is a risky venture, and Colburn merits admiration for his willingness to undertake the task of evaluating Nicaragua's revolutionary political economy. My impression, however, is that he might have been advised to defer some judgments. Although published in 1986, the book rests upon an analysis valid only in 1983. Since then, striking changes have occurred in rural Nicaragua, changes that modify significantly Colburn's early analysis, particularly his evaluation of agrarian reform.

A long gestation period also would have allowed Colburn the opportunity to expand his analysis and deepen his understanding of Nicaraguan society, including his understanding of how to spell correctly both "Anastasio" and "Fonseca," not an unreasonable expectation of a scholar writing about Nicaragua. Because this is such a slim volume, many readers will feel they deserve more basic information than Colburn provides. For example, they deserve to know whether there is more than hearsay behind the assertion that "many Nicaraguans thought that after the revolution they would suddenly have everything they never had before, and they would no longer have to work" (p. 107) or that "in some localities, peasants caught selling their crops to private parties have their entire harvest confiscated without compensation" (p. 98). I have never met these Nicaraguans, and I would like to know more about them. I would like to know if there are really "many" Nicaraguans who thought they would never have to work again and, if so, whether *any* economic policy would have elicited their support. Were crops really confiscated "in some localities" and, if so, in which ones, how many times, from whom, and for what reasons? The answers to these and similar questions are the building blocks for a convincing analysis. It is my view that Colburn's work is to be praised as provocative and criticized as premature. In time, it will no doubt form the basis for a more compelling interpretation of post-revolutionary Nicaragua.

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East Germany and Détente: Building Authority after the Wall *by A. James McAdams. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1985. 233 pp. $34.50.*

McAdams's book on how Erich Honecker became an advocate of détente in Europe is a masterpiece of good writing and analysis on an exceedingly difficult and complex subject. Working particularly with secondary sources and periodicals, he must have plowed through acres of the stilted jargon of the official newspaper *Neues Deutschland*, which alone deserves a medal for valor and intestinal fortitude. The author's sensitive portrayal reminds the reader of the long history of the difficult status of German communism, since the days of Rosa Luxemburg and Ruth Fischer, within the international, increasingly Soviet-dominated movement. McAdams even gives glimpses of occasional Socialist Unity party (SED), boasts that its achievements in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), and not those of the Soviet Union, show the potential of Communist society at its best (p. 58). Nevertheless, the dependency of the GDR on Soviet power is such that they cannot for long assert their autonomy, even in righteous anger. And they have often had to witness—especially in 1952 and in the *Ostpolitik* era of the early 1970s—that their big Soviet brother is quite capable of sacrificing their best interests in order to pursue his own relations with the West and with their favored sibling, the Federal Republic.

The author is at his best when describing the creation of the inward-looking cocoon of the GDR in the years after the building of the Wall and the cracking open of that shell under the impact of Willy Brandt's clever *Ostpolitik* maneuvers and their appeal to a Kremlin leary of escalating hostilities with China. This was also the hour of Walter Ulbricht's last stand against the inevitable and of his forced resignation. And it was the hour of the more flexible Honecker, who has dominated East German politics in the last fifteen years. Honecker had to preside over the second penetration of East German society, this time from West Germany and even West Berlin, and all this with the active support and approval of the first penetrator, the Eastern superpower. The Berlin agreements securing western access routes (a historic issue the author should perhaps have stressed more), the visiting rights of masses of West Germans in the GDR, and the inevitable inroads of oral, printed, and televised messages into what in the heighday of Ulbricht's reign was a society of quasi-Albanian insulation marked the transformation of the near-totalitarian system despite all efforts at *Abgrenzung*. Somehow, Honecker managed to cope with all these problems and to maximize East German economic opportunities in the West and with Third World countries. Only occasional systemic crises in the communist orbit, such as the Polish troubles with an autonomous trade union movement, have tended to bring out, at least for a while, the latent quasi-totalitarian nature of this Communist state tightening its controls over the churches, the arts, and all voluntary activities within the GDR. Not for long: even the West German decision in favor of rearming NATO forces with new missiles did not long keep Honecker from making new overtures to Bonn, nor from benefiting from

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special international economic advantages the GDR derives from inter-German détente.

Even a book this good must have some flaws, however minor. The author, for example, tends to be a little vague, sometimes disarmingly so, about the long-range aspects of the changed status of West Berlin, the perennial storm center of major East-West crises until 1972. It is not true, for instance, that the special status of the city outside of the Federal Republic was only officially recognized by the Allies as a result of the Berlin Agreements (p. 118). Neither is it accurate to say that routine contacts between East and West German churches were permitted for the first time in 1973 (p. 138); until 1968 the Protestant churches of both countries were under one organization. The author also should have been more explicit and concrete about the wider historical context of inter-German relations and the *Ostpolitik* that gives them meaning in German eyes. The Oder-Neisse line and area are not even in the index of the book, and the other borders recognized de facto by the *Ostpolitik* treaties are neither identified nor related to the eastern boundaries of pre-1937 or pre-1914 Germany. The particular purpose of Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, namely to achieve a reconciliation with the East European nations that German military might wronged so gravely in World War II, consequently remains obscure to the reader. On many occasions and without explanation also, McAdams simply quotes the SED leaders' use of words like "Pan-German," "Greater German," or "revanchist" to characterize West German yearnings for national reunification without mention of the fact that the historic usage of these terms certainly never meant to question the German desire for unity within the present West and East German borders. These words have always referred to aspirations for an empire uniting all German ethnics, including the millions who for centuries lived in Russia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Romania, and other countries, or at least union of Germany with Austria. Clearly, the Communist misuse of these terms is intended to tar the rather peaceful and understandable hopes for German reunification with the brown brush of the racial imperialism of the Third Reich. In the context of the current revival of debates over the "German question," the author's naive use of these terms is regrettable and likely to be taken as approval.

PETER H. MERKL
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Hungary and the Soviet Bloc *by Charles Gati. Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1986. 244 pp. Cloth, $40.00; paper, $14.95.*

The author offers "a series of interpretations and reinterpretations, which place specific Hungarian issues in the broader contexts of Soviet foreign policy, bloc politics, and East-West relations" (p. 3). Gati is true to his promise and scholars interested in the three issue areas should read this study, which is likely to become a new classic in the field.

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Many issues are discussed, but there is a special emphasis on the politics of the coalition governments between 1944 and 1948 and the events leading up to the Hungarian revolution of 1956. The main reinterpretation of Soviet postwar East European policy is that it differed significantly from country to country and that the takeover in Hungary was deliberately gradual to assuage western concern in light of more blatant steps in Poland and elsewhere. Gati also argues that specific domestic contexts mattered and that Hungary presented special opportunities for a non-Communist revolution based on a strong indigenous agrarian populist movement similar to that of the Socialist Revolutionaries in the pre-1917 Czarist Empire.

In discussing the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and developments in Hungary since then, Gati focuses on leadership politics and especially the roles Imre Nagy and Janos Kadar have played in making major decisions. His cogent analysis includes many points worth pondering – for example, the paradox of political careers of Communist leaders such as Nagy and Kadar, who each at one time showed supreme loyalty to Moscow and at another time became leaders of a specifically Hungarian way.

Gati's work stands out by combining the standard literature with numerous previously untapped sources including Hungarian party archives, unpublished memoirs, and interviews with participants in the political events analyzed. This approach allows him to reveal new aspects to old stories and at the same time add a new interpretative perspective. This should revitalize the debate about Soviet bloc politics, since undoubtedly some scholars will want to challenge certain propositions or ask for a clearer definition of important concepts. One example for the need of the latter is his assertion that in Hungary "role by persuasion has replaced rule by coercion" (p. 159). Wouldn't it be more appropriate to speak of persuasive coercion?

In his discussion of the complex relationship between Moscow and its East European client states, Gati's main themes are the extent of Soviet flexibility and duplicity as well as the significant role of Kremlin infighting. Gati also presents a reinterpretation of Stalin's foreign policy. His basic argument is that there is more continuity between Soviet foreign policy under Stalin and under his successors than is generally assumed, since there have always been cycles of coalition-seeking and aggression. Another chapter summarizes the ways in which Moscow has dealt with political challenges in East Europe. Here his most suggestive point concerns the link between leadership uncertainty in Moscow and upheavals in the bloc countries, including the Polish Solidarity period.

The final chapter deals with United States's policy toward East Europe. While arguing for a differentiated approach, Gati presents an excellent analysis of long-standing gaps between American rhetoric and *Realpolitik*. This and other chapters have previously appeared in article form or compilations of writings on Soviet foreign policy.

RASMA KARKLINS
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King Solomon's Mines Revisited: Western Interests and the Burdened History of Southern Africa *by William Minter. New York, Basic Books, 1986. 401 pp. $21.95.*

South Africa in crisis is a subject not lacking attention from a diverse array of authors. William Minter's volume is a noteworthy contribution dealing with the international aspects of this crisis. The primary focus of the book is the role of the West, particularly the United States, in southern Africa. In his view, apartheid is not a unique invention of benighted Afrikanerdom, but must be understood as part of a process rooted in western capitalist colonialism as it developed over the last one-hundred years.

The subject of western colonialism is treated chronologically. The beginning chapters emphasize the rise of British colonialism from the 1870s, focusing on mining and investment and detailing racist practices that enhanced the exploitation of black labor. After World War II, the United States became a major force in the region. Another new feature was the rise of indigenous white capitalism and its increasing importance in the ownership of enterprise. The post World War II era was a time of golden opportunities for investment. The international milieu, however, had changed. New values emphasized human rights, self-determination, and equality; and they treated racism as illegitimate. It is on this score that South Africa found itself at odds with the rest of the world.

Minter's case against British imperialism is argued effectively. That it is the chief culprit in the rise of apartheid is less convincing. While the author notes the rise of local conglomerates, the consequences of this development are not spelled out. Didn't this factor permit Afrikanerdom to defy world and western opinion? Hadn't South Africa's isolation from the intellectual ferment of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe facilitated the emergence of the patently hollow ideology of apartheid?

Later chapters take up the postwar era, a time of cold war, the police massacre at Sharpville, Washington's tilt toward white supremacy under Nixon-Kissinger, the demise of Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique, and the Reagan role after 1981. According to Minter, cold war considerations took priority over the liberation struggle. The white supremacist case, politically and morally bankrupt, was now fought in the guise of anti-Communism. Deprivation of human rights was condemned by western rhetoric, but disengagement from white-ruled Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa was rejected. Washington and London were set on maintaining the status quo and on peaceful change, a policy antipathetic to the radical national liberation movements.

The book's chief strength lies in its critical interpretation of western and United States approaches to southern Africa. Minter is an engaged advocate of the revolutionary thrust of liberation movements and an opponent of American and western capitalism. *King Solomon's Mines Revisited*, therefore, takes on an unbalanced, even distorted interpretation of the western role in the region. This is a book of unrelieved criticism. The author even cites the views of the then eight-year-old Allen Dulles, later CIA Director, who told his father he favored the Boers (p.101 n.).

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At best only in the first two years of the Kennedy and Carter administrations was U.S. policy marginally adequate. The Rhodesian sanctions were a charade (p.202ff). The British blockade of Beira's oil terminal, costing £100 million, was of little significance (pp.209–10). Washington's role in Angola in 1976 is intervention. The Soviet, East German, and Cuban 35,000-strong presence is not (p.261). American administrations are castigated for standing with their European allies against liberation forces. Washington's competitive relationship with the Kremlin in southern Africa is disparaged as a reactionary thrust of U.S. policy. Undoubtedly, this is an authoritative book on what's wrong with the West. But it is no bible. Other perspectives could also be read to advantage.

J. Leo Cefkin
Colorado State University

Oil, Turmoil, and Islam in the Middle East *by Sheikh R. Ali. New York, Praeger, 1986. 238 pp. $33.95.*

Sheikh Ali argues in this book that the role of the United States in the negotiation of the "two Sinai agreements prove[s] the efficacy of the Arab oil weapon potential"; and "political realities in the Arab world . . . doomed the oil weapon from the start" (p. 2). He also states that oil and Islam are two factors that make the Middle East important to the world and that "together, oil and Islam symbolize life in the Middle East, past and present" (p. 2). Oil is the basis of the region's political clout in the world; Islam unites the region and controls the life of its people.

These points set the tone for this book, which purports to explain the political dynamics of a confusing part of the world. The book is very disappointing. The account is superficial, confused, full of redundancies, and increasingly polemical as the author approaches the most highly emotion-laden Middle Eastern issues, particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict and the plight of the Palestinians. Much ink has been spilled on these matters, far too much of it propagandistic and one-sided. One would have hoped that a reputable publisher would hesitate to issue yet one more polemic, particularly one of questionable accuracy and less than pristine logic. Even if the temptation could not be resisted, one would expect such a publisher to exercise elementary editorial judgement and control. None of these normal expectations are met in this volume.

To illustrate, there are frequent references throughout the text to "last year," a point in time that is never clarified. Regardless of which year the author had in mind, such references obviously render his account obsolete almost from the moment of publication. That is the case here, for the current world oil glut and sharp drop in prices creep into the account only gradually; one gets the impression that the author became aware of it as he was writing. Similarly, it is jarring to read in the spring of 1987 that the United States is neutral in the Iran-Iraq war "and does not supply arms either directly or indirectly to Iran or Iraq" (p. 70).

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Although the author might have protected himself against immediate obsolescence by qualifying such statements, one cannot wholly fault him for not knowing of secret government deals or for not predicting the future accurately. But factual errors, which abound, are more difficult to explain. For example, Saddam Husayn is identified wrongly as President of Iraq as early as 1975 (p. 59); the Ottoman Turks appear to be confused with the Seljuks or even earlier groups (p. 139); the date of Lebanese independence is given as 1941, rather than 1943 (p. 140); the outbreak of civil war in Lebanon is dated 1956 instead of 1958 (p. 142); the violent conflict between the Palestine Liberation Organization and King Hussein's regime in Jordan is dated 1971 rather than 1970 (p. 142); there are frequent references to the presidency of Bashir Jemayel in Lebanon (e.g., p. 149), when in fact he was assassinated before he could assume office and was replaced by his brother Amin; the period of Turkish rule in Palestine is described as "a brief period" (p. 962), when in fact it lasted nearly half a millenium; and so forth.

In addition, the book is poorly organized and badly footnoted (basic factual references are not footnoted, while trivial quotations are). In fact, a distressing number of sources are taken from such nonscholarly sources as the mass media. Finally, the line of argument, as suggested at the beginning of this review, is never made clear. The relevance of whole chapters, such as the one on Afghanistan, is unclear.

If the author had a statement to make, as is implied by the vehemence with which he presses the case of the Palestinians in his discussion of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it would have been better to have done so openly and frankly. It is most unfortunate that this book has all the formal trappings but none of the substance of serious scholarship. It is the more unfortunate that it bears the imprint of a major name in the world of scholarly publications.

FRANK TACHAU
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Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, A Twentieth Century Fund Report *by Hyman P. Minsky. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1986. 353 pp. $32.50.*

Hyman Minsky, post-Keynesian economist and Archilochian hedgehog, devotes this book to one big thing: the idea that macroeconomic instability arises from within the financial relations of capitalism. Instability, therefore, cannot be blamed as monetarists would like on failures of monetary management, nor attributed in American Keynesian fashion to unexplained external shocks. Minsky's book is an ambitious, thorough, disorganized effort to document this one big thing and to show that matters since the mid-1960s have been getting worse. The basic argument is that lender-of-last-resort guarantees of Big Government are double-edged. They prevent disaster even as they foster speculation. And so they breed "a system that sustains instability even as it prevents the deep depressions of the past" (p. 95).

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Thus inter alia period recessions and the inflationary bias of modern economic life.

Minsky starts empirically, using the recession of 1974–75, the Real Estate Investment Trades (REITs), and the Franklin National Bank failure to compel acceptance of the fact and importance of increasing financial instability in the United States. Only after this begins an encyclopedic critique of neoclassical and neo-Keynesian economic theory to show how neither can account for instability arising from financial sources. In this way Minsky tries first to subvert, then to demolish the views of readers reared on orthodoxy. But the tactic is doubtful: can the raw facts persuade those trained to screen for irrelevancy by the lights of given theory?

Minsky's own theoretical world is a refreshing melange of dissenting traditions. Here Keynes's investors grapple with Knight's uncertainty as they navigate Kaleckian channels in search of Schumpeter's quasi-rents and Marxian surplus. Real businesses attempt to match investment prospects with liability structures. Herd instincts and animal spirits govern business decisions, not "rational expectations." Events, therefore, cumulate: booms on booms, slumps on slumps. These propositions receive coherent, even lucid treatment. Yet to show in principle that financial instability is endemic to capitalism is a different thing from proving that such instability is in fact the prime culprit for our problems.

On the actual mechanisms of rising financial instability, once he gets to it, Minsky reverses techniques and gives us excellent theory without many supporting facts. Data one might think basic (such as time series on banking and business failures) are missing, and there is little connection with the earlier descriptions of specific events. So in the end we cannot judge whether the Franklin National or the Hunt crash were central or ancillary to their respective recessions, whether speculation or shocks were more at fault in the 1970s inflations. And we never explore just how rising financial instability took hold in the mid-1960s in the first place. Why twenty years after World War II, instead of within one decade or not for four decades?

Alternatives are neglected, and gaps remain unfilled. There were recessions too in the financially wholesome 1950s: what caused them? How can rising financial instability explain falling average productivity growth? And if not, what does explain it? Did macroeconomic miscalculations over Vietnam play no role in setting off the late 1960s inflation? What *should* we think of the oil shocks? Did the rising share of exports and imports in GNP at this time contribute nothing to instability? Minsky forges his vision without pausing to dissuade even the non-neoclassical skeptic from alternative views.

This book is a useful exposition of the financial instability thesis. It will not convert convinced neoclassicals. But it is a curious fact that policy makers grappling today with Glass-Steagall, superbanks, and the Savings and Loans are perforce practitioners of Minsky's economics. They would gain insight into their own actions from this book.

JAMES K. GALBRAITH
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
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